Pork barrel politics in context of Action Plan - Support of Least Developed Districts In: Current Trends in Public Sector Research. Proceedings of the 24th International Conference | Munispace

Current Trends in Public Sector Research. Proceedings of the 24th International Conference

Kapitola

Pork barrel politics in context of Action Plan - Support of Least Developed Districts

Martin Róbert HUDEC

Rok vydání: 2020

https://doi.org/10.5817/CZ.MUNI.P210-9646-2020-3

Pork barrel politics in context of Action Plan - Support of Least Developed Districts pdf, 200KB

Abstrakt

The aim of the paper Pork barrel politics in context of Action Plan Support of Least Developed Districts is to find out and describe if and by which means the attributes of Pork barrel politics were present in redistribution of funds from Regional grants, which were part of Action Plan – Support of Least Developed Districts. Secondary aim is to see how receiving of this grant could have helped in reelection of incumbent in next election. An Index of political patronage was assembled to measure the level of pork barreling. Based on party affiliation, mayors with connections to government were not highly favored when receiving grant, not even in the case of affiliation with party, which redistributed the grants. Neither there were no significant differences in the odds of reelection based on whether the incumbent received a grant or not, that is an unexpected result relative to other research in the field

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