NATO after the End of the Cold War
A Brief History
NATO after the End of the Cold War

A Brief History

ZDENĚK KŘÍŽ

All rights reserved. No part of this e-book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission of copyright administrator which can be contacted at Masaryk University Press, Žerotínovo náměstí 9, 601 77 Brno.
This book was published within the project “Innovation of Bachelor Study Programmes for Better Employability” (reg. number: CZ.1.07/2.2.00/28.0238). This project is co-funded by the European Social Fund and by the national budget of the Czech Republic. For more information on the project see: http://www.fss.muni.cz/cz/site/struktura/projekty/inza.

Scientific Editorial Board of Masaryk University:

prof. PhDr. Ladislav Rabušic, CSc.
Mgr. Iva Zlatušková
Ing. Radmila Droběnová, Ph.D.
Mgr. Michaela Hanousková
doc. Mgr. Jana Horáková, Ph.D.
doc. JUDr. Josef Kotásek, Ph.D.
Mgr. et Mgr. Oldřich Krpec, Ph.D.
prof. PhDr. Petr Macek, CSc.
PhDr. Alena Mizerová
doc. Ing. Petr Pirožek, Ph.D.
doc. RNDr. Lubomír Popelínský, Ph.D.
Mgr. David Povolný
Mgr. Kateřina Sedláčková, Ph.D.
prof. RNDr. David Trunec, CSc.
prof. MUDr. Anna Vašků, CSc.
prof. PhDr. Marie Vítková, CSc.
doc. Mgr. Martin Zvonař, Ph.D.

Reviewed by Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., University of Iceland

© 2015 Zdeněk Kříž
© 2015 Masarykova univerzita

CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION. ......................................................... 6

2. NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT ADAPTATION ............... 8
   2.1 NATO Security Tasks ........................................... 8
   2.2 Security Threats Perception ................................. 10
   2.3 Security Threat Elimination. ................................. 13
   2.4 Importance of the Strategic Concepts Adaptation .... 21

3. NATO ENLARGEMENT ................................................. 22
   3.1 Alternatives to NATO Enlargement ....................... 22
   3.2 Study on NATO enlargement ............................... 24
   3.3 The “Big Bang” and further prospects .................... 28
   3.4 NATO Enlargement Results ................................. 31

4. NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS ...................................... 33
   4.1 Brief overview of NATO – Russia relations ............ 33
   4.2 Russia and Kosovo crisis. ................................... 37
   4.3 Russia and NATO enlargement ............................ 39
   4.4 Other bones of contention between the West and Russia. . . 42

5. NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS .................................. 45
   5.1 NATO peace support military operations –
        concept evolution .................................................. 45
   5.2 NATO’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina ....... 50
5.3 NATO engagement in Kosovo ............................................. 54
  5.3.1 Genesis of the Kosovo crisis and evolution of NATO politics .................................................. 54
  5.3.2 Problematical character of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo ................................. 59
  5.3.3 Further development of the Alliance engagement in Kosovo ................................................. 62

5.4 Macedonia ................................................................. 66
5.5 NATO and Afghanistan .................................................. 68
5.6 NATO engagement in resolving the conflict in Libya ................................................................. 77
5.7 NATO and collective defence operations ................................. 85

6. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NATO MILITARY TRANSFORMATION .......................... 90
  6.1 General Trends in Western Military ...................................... 90
  6.2 From CJT to NRF ........................................................ 92
  6.3 The Lisbon Summit and Further........................................... 96

7. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 101

LITERATURE .............................................................. 107

SUMMARY ................................................................. 124

INDEX ................................................................. 125
1. INTRODUCTION

It is possible to agree with Dan Reiter that “Alliances are central to international relations: they are the primary foreign policy means by which states increase their security” (Reiter 1994: 490–526) Out of all Western Cold War permanent security alliances, NATO has been the most important. After the internal breakdown of former socialist states and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact at the turn of the 1990s, a question of the future of NATO was raised. Great expectations were aroused by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was perceived by many as a suitable alternative to the (allegedly) obsolete NATO. (Kaplan 2004: 109–110) Many prestigious authors, especially from the school of realists and neorealists (e.g. Kenneth N. Waltz and John Mersheimer), anticipated the end of NATO due to the non-existence of a common enemy. (Waltz 1993: 75–76; Waltz 2000: 5–41; Mearheimer 1990: 5–57) Nevertheless, NATO is still here.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been going through a permanent adaptation process that has changed it beyond recognition. If the Alliance had wanted to survive the Warsaw Pact, it did not have any other choice. As regards the beginning of the permanent NATO adaptation process, it is possible to regard the adopting of the 1990 London declaration. Today’s shape of NATO differs from its form in the Cold War substantially. The Alliance’s tasks have been extended significantly, as well as its territorial range and the number of its members. Rob de Wijk points out that the successful adaptation of NATO to the new post-Cold-War realities is an unprecedented event because traditional military alliances were dissolved together with the expiration of the reason for their existence in the past. (Wijk 1998: 14–18) However, one should pay attention to the fact that NATO has never been a merely military alliance based only on the idea of collective defense. According to Karl Deutsch, the Alliance has been an organization of states sharing common values, which makes war among members impossible. He calls this kind of alliances “security community”. (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler – Barnett 1998)

This paper aims to describe and analyze the main tendencies in the NATO transformation after the end of the Cold war and will proceed
as follows. The second chapter will pay attention to the changes in the NATO strategic thinking. The third chapter will focus on the NATO enlargement followed by the fourth chapter dealing with the NATO-Russian relations. The fifth chapter is devoted to the NATO expeditionary operations and the sixth will provide a survey of the NATO military adaptation. The last chapter will summarize the main outcomes of the NATO adaptation after the end of the Cold War. As far as methodology is concerned, procedures typical of history science will be used in this paper.
2. NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT ADAPTATION

NATO Strategic Concepts has been the core document that defines NATO’s role in security issues. Because of the NATO decision-making process, they are very often too vague to be able to incorporate the different points of view of NATO members. NATO usually tries to avoid a binding formulation in order to leave space for ad hoc interpretation based on the consensus of its member countries. After the end of the Cold War, NATO adopted three strategic concepts, namely in 1991, 1999 and 2010. Regarding the procedures of their adoption and content, these strategies are very different from those in the Cold War. First, contrary to during the Cold War, NATO strategies are not classified. Second, post-Cold War strategies were approved by the NAC (North Atlantic Council) and not by the Military Committee. Third, while Cold War strategies used to concentrate on the military sector of security, nowadays NATO strategies pay much more attention to other security sectors. (Johnsen 1995)

In general, post-Cold War NATO strategies are based on a very comprehensive concept of security that addresses its economic, societal and environmental sectors. The contemporary NATO security concept is much more sophisticated than during the Cold War, as it has adopted a some of Copenhagen security school features. (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998) Nevertheless, the fundamental NATO tasks remain unchanged – to safeguard freedom and security for all members using political and military means in accordance with the UN Charter and provide a firm transatlantic security link.

2.1 NATO SECURITY TASKS

The main purposes of NATO – to safeguard freedom and security, provide a forum for security policy consultations and preserve the transatlantic security link – were not altered in the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept, referred by NATO itself as the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. However, many new tasks were added. NATO declared its commitment to pursue dialogue and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance committed itself to
creating a security environment based on the growth of democratic institutions and peaceful conflict settlement. And last but not least, NATO assumed an active role in crisis management and conflict prevention. NATO’s tasks to preserve the strategic balance in Europe might be seen as a useless residuum of the Cold War since the 1991 Soviet Union split-up into independent states. (NATO 1991) Looking at the main NATO tasks, it is paradoxical that the task of being active in crisis management and conflict prevention was not given priority and that NATO’s intention was formulated in a very vague way. Despite that, NATO started to be active in this sphere very quickly.

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept defined the NATO purpose and tasks in a very similar fashion. Collective defense was of primary importance. The creation of a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment based on democratic principles and peaceful conflict settlement was determined as another priority. NATO was to further remain an essential transatlantic forum for consultations among member states. It can be interpreted as a desire to prevent the renationalization of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area and the replacement of NATO by another international security organization. NATO précised its commitment case by case and by consensus to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management including using military means. (NATO 1999a) It is an irony of history that at the dawn of the illegal Kosovo war, NATO stressed the importance of peaceful dispute resolution “in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.” (NATO 1999a) On the whole, one can conclude that NATO’s traditional tasks and goals were not changed. The only exception was its renunciation of the need to create a counterbalance against the Soviet Union due to the fact that, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO no longer had a comparable powerful adversary. (Venturoni 1999: 8–9) The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept reflected the development of NATO’s activities in the 1990s that had led to the concentration on crisis management in the daily routine. In other words, NATO looked for a new sense of life and found it in crisis management. Article 31 of the 1999 Strategic Concept states “In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective
management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO’s Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” (NATO 1999a) Participating in crisis management became a very important NATO task.

In the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed as its main goals and tasks its commitment to collective defense and consultation on member states’ security problems. The Central and Eastern European member states especially opposed the idea of refocusing NATO from collective defence. Poland paid great attention to traditional NATO tasks. (Winid 2009) The Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandr Vondra supported the idea that Article 5 had to remain the core of NATO. (Vondra 2010) A very similar attitude was adopted by Hungary and Bulgaria. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary, Obretenova, Radio Bulgaria) The Baltic States also advocated collective defence as the main NATO function. (Baltic Defence College Faculty 2009) Norway also took up a very similar stance. (Norwegian Ministry of Defence 2009: 34) In fact, against the background of the changes in the US foreign policy and Afghan exit strategy, the 2010 NATO strategic concept paved the way for putting more stress on territorial defense and might be perceived as a departure from the idea of NATO as a world wide security provider.

2.2 SECURITY THREATS PERCEPTION

Before dealing with the evolution of the NATO threat perception, the reader should take into account that there is no clear distinction made between risks and threats in NATO strategic concepts. The perception of security threats has undergone a major change since the Cold War era. The mutual feature of all NATO strategic concepts adopted after the end of the Cold War is that no particular state is either explicitly or implicitly regarded as an enemy or rival. Moreover, all concepts also work based
on the thesis that NATO does not face a threat of intentional military aggression against its territory.

The 1991 NATO strategic concept regarded as the main security threats undesirable consequences of instability in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which, according to this concept, would not necessarily lead to imperiled security of NATO member states, yet which could undermine stability in Europe. It explicitly mentioned risks arising from the unstable situation in the USSR, which had much larger conventional forces than any other European state. Therefore, according to this strategy, development in Soviet territory should be paid primary attention when maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. As early as in 1990, the following threats were identified as major security threats: proliferating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, interruption of the flow of resources essential for life, and terrorist actions and sabotages. (NATO 1991) Terrorism was mentioned as a possible security threat. Originally no NATO action was considered to be necessary. Rhetorically it changed in 1994 at the NATO Brussels summit, when NATO decided to deepen counterterrorist cooperation. Nevertheless, NATO further paid more attention to other security issues, especially to the Balkans. (Borgensen 2011: 63–64) As a novelty, great emphasis was laid on developing friendly relations with the countries in the area of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Also the 1999 concept was revised in a similar way. The Alliance pointed out the necessity to include the global framework in its strategic concept and reached the conclusion that the threat of intentional military aggression against the territory of NATO member states was not likely at that time and that if it did occur, it would be more probable in the long-term perspective. Nevertheless, NATO must further take into regard the existence of strong military nuclear capacities outside its member states. As the main security threat, with a relatively high degree of the risk of occurrence, NATO further regards instability in the surrounding environment and in the Western periphery based on economic, social, ethnic and national problems, which could destabilize regions surrounding NATO, and thus especially indirectly harm the security interests of member states. As a major security threat to the security of its member states, NATO perceives the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery caused by the ever-growing availability of necessary technolo-
gies. According to NATO, their abuse is even possible by non-state actors. These matters are paid much greater attention in the concept than in 1991. Moreover, the Alliance also highlights the global proliferation of advanced technology that increases the availability of hi-tech weapon systems for the potential challengers of NATO member states. Furthermore, the concept also takes into regard the fact that the interests of NATO members can be exposed to the interruption of vital resource supplies and to the migration of inhabitants caused by conflicts in the periphery. As opposed to the previous concept, it emphasizes the threat of an attack on NATO information systems via official and unofficial structures. The concept also mentions as potential security threats terrorist attacks, sabotage and organized crime. (NATO 1999a) Inclusion of terrorism among security threats was a result of US and Turkish pressure. On the other hand, there were a lot of differences in member states’ perceptions of the NATO role in counterterrorism. For instance, France was not very keen on including counterterrorism on the NATO agenda. It changed after 9/11 when NATO’s Response to Terrorism was released and international terrorism was definitively acknowledged as a serious security threat that must be dealt with in the multinational military framework. This significant change in NATO’s strategic thinking was confirmed at further NATO summits, namely in Prague (2002) and Riga (2006). (Borgersen 2011: 64–66)

Moreover, the 2010 strategic concept bears similar features. From the perspective of threats, it is more likely an evolutionary than revolutionary document. The Alliance does refer to a possible threat that could be brought about by the modernization of the conventional forces of “many countries”; nevertheless, it perceives the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons, terrorism, instability and conflicts beyond NATO borders, cyber-attacks and lost access to energetic supplies as the main security threats. Moreover, it also speaks about environmental problems and the restriction of natural resources, which could affect NATO in the future and could have a potential impact on its planning and operations. Nevertheless, as Tomáš Valášek points out, NATO can address these threats only in a limited scope. (Valášek 2009: 37) Last but not least, technological progress is mentioned as well, which can radically affect the Alliance’s planning and operations in the near future. As far as terrorism is concerned, according to Berit Kaja Borgersen, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept is a compromise between
the post-2001 consensus and later controversies, which provides space for improving the NATO counterterrorist policy, and its capacities and capabilities. (Borgersen 2011: 69)

### 2.3 SECURITY THREAT ELIMINATION

The evolution in this realm of Alliance strategy directly pertains to the main interest of this work, i.e. whether NATO exports democratic values when resolving armed conflicts and the modus operandi the Alliance use to resolve these conflicts. Therefore, it will be paid more attention than the other parts.

The 1991 strategic concept changed NATO’s approach towards eliminating security threats in a revolutionary way. The concept endeavored to integrate political and military elements of NATO security policy and promote cooperation with new partners, i.e. old enemies in the East of Europe. As was pointed out by Anthony Cragg, the implementation of the broad approach towards security was the main characteristic feature of NATO’s strategic concept from 1991. (Cragg 1999: 19–22) The Alliance reached the conclusion that a much more crucial role would be played by tools of preventive diplomacy in the future. The emphasis on dialogue and cooperation with the USSR and other post-socialist states was much more intensive than ever before. The North Atlantic Alliance declared its willingness to establish closer cooperation with other European security organizations. In the early 1990s, NATO member states attached great weight to CSCE. NATO declared its intent to develop the processes of arms control and disarmament, and to develop the process of building trust between states. This progress was not unanticipated due to the political reality after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, a surprising intention, diametrically different from the approach in the past, was a reference to the role of NATO in crisis management. (Kaplan 2004: 115) Even though it was not viewed at the time of the concept’s origin as the main purpose of the reformed NATO, and more accurate guidelines to conduct crisis management operations them had not been drawn up, it was a revolutionary shift. (Yost 2005: 23) There is no proof that the Alliance was anticipating at that time how important these activities would soon become. Crisis management mentioned in the 1991
concept was generally underrated in comparison with its real importance after the end of the Cold War.

In the 1999 concept, NATO espoused its traditional roles from the Cold War era. A much greater emphasis was laid on conducting military operations of crisis management, which had become an important part of the NATO agenda. The entire debate took place against the background of the escalating crisis in Kosovo (1998–1999). From the articulation of the document in Article 31, it is evident that, based on the experience from the 1990s, greater stress than before was placed on preventing conflicts and coping with crises that had already arisen. This is also clear from the widely discussed intention to intervene militarily in case of crises that do not fall within Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as well. The concept highlighted the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, but against the background of the Kosovo crisis a discussion was generated about the degree to which NATO could act without being authorized by the Security Council. Among NATO member states, this issue was especially deliberated in Greece, Italy, Germany, and France. France explicitly required NATO to declare that using force (except for self-defense) is tolerable only on the grounds of a UN Security Council mandate. (Kotlyar 2002: 33) However, such a formulation had been unacceptable for the United States as it is willing to act unilaterally if its interests are at risk. (Kotlyar: 41–42) Therefore, adopted solutions referring to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for providing peace and security, which is a formulation absolutely in accordance with the international law, can be regarded as a compromise. It was European member states especially that refuted the use of military force without being authorized by the UN Security Council as a precedent for solving similar crises in the future. (Hunter 1999: 200) When formulating the concept, the United States laid a greater emphasis on the global role of NATO, whilst European states more likely stressed the necessity to face threats in the Euro-Atlantic area and the surrounding regions, such as the area of the Mediterranean and the Balkans. (Johnson, Zenko 2002/2003: 50) Hence the final version of the concept was a compromise between the USA and European members. Nevertheless, the actual development of NATO after 2001, and especially after the 2004 Istanbul summit, more probably supported the conclusion that the American strategy preferring the global role of NATO achieved prominence in the Alliance.
In its 1999 concept, too, the Euro-Atlantic Alliance anticipated the development of partnership with non-member states as a significant tool of crisis prevention. It also accentuated arms control and disarmament. According to this strategy, the coordination of activities between NATO and the European Union should become a major tool to eliminate security threats. According to this strategic concept, the European Security and Defense Identity should be further developed within the North Atlantic Alliance, yet it does not exclude cooperation with the European Union, though it is case by case and based on a general consensus. The aim is to increase the participation of European members in common defense, but not to replace American military presence in Europe, which was further regarded as crucial for the security of the Euro-Atlantic space. The original formulation of the proposal of the strategic concept, presupposing an automatic use of NATO capacities in favor of the European Union, struck against the disagreement of Turkey. However, the strategic concept opened the door for ad hoc use of NATO capacities when resolving conflicts and crises within operations under the military and strategic command of the European Union. (NATO 1999)

In comparison with the previous concept, as regards the issue of how to eliminate security threats, the 2010 strategic concept brought along only evolution and not revolution. According to the Lisbon NATO strategy, the Alliance will build capacities to fight cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks, strengthen energy security and provide the security of sea transport routes. Although it was not a brand new topic on the Alliance agenda, it was a shift in its priorities. The Alliance proclaimed the policy of partnership with non-member states. The strengthening of Euro-Atlantic security is best provided by a network of partnerships with countries and organizations all over the world. According to the 2010 concept, the Alliance was ready to develop a political dialogue with any nation and relevant organization in the world sharing its interest in peaceful international relations. Henrik Boesen and Lindbo Larsen concluded that cooperative security, i.e. the ability to promote security through cooperation with non-member countries, was given the same importance as collective defence and crisis management. (Boesen – Lindbo 2010: 92)

The Alliance is also interested in strengthening cooperation and political dialogue with the UN and the European Union. In the concept, the EU is referred to as Alliance’s unique and main partner. NATO and the EU
can, and should, play a complementary and mutually strengthening role in promoting international peace and security. It does not introduce any guidelines on how to unblock the strategic dialogue between these organizations. Another key partner is Russia. According to the concept, the NATO-Russia cooperation is strategically important, as it contributes to the formation of a mutual space of peace, stability and security. The Alliance expressed its interest in intensifying political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in fields of common interest, including missile defense, counter-terrorism, piracy and narcotics. Last but not least, it confirms the importance of cooperation with other partners within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Special emphasis is laid on the relationship with Ukraine and Georgia within established commissions of NATO.

Nevertheless, NATO also espoused its traditional tools. Deterrence will further take place via nuclear and conventional capacities. This issue was discussed among its member states, as some of them, including the Americans due to Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, opened the issue of nuclear disarmament. It was especially the issue of tactical nuclear weapons that was being discussed. Five NATO states – Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and Norway – decided to publish a declaration on the removal of the remaining American nuclear weapons from their territories, and thus they head towards global nuclear disarmament. (Borger 2010) The 2010 concept confirms that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance until nuclear weapons cease to exist. Nevertheless, Trine Flockhart points out that if one reads the strategy as the whole and interlinked document, it is possible to conclude that “the New Strategic Concept is far from conservative but is intended to herald fundamental change in NATO’s nuclear thinking along with radical chase in long-cherished principles about nuclear sparing and to directly address sensitive issues of Alliance cohesion and deterrence posture.” (Flockart 2011: 156) Flockhart concludes that the further deployment of non-strategic nuclear warheads in Europe is at stake. (Flockhart 2011: 159–164) Flockhart’s conclusion can be accepted, especially taking into account that the idea of reconsidering the role of tactical nuclear weapons has many influential proponents in the USA. (Nunn 2010: 16)

The Alliance declared its intention to develop and maintain strong, mobile and deployable conventional forces that would be able to fulfill
both duties arising from Article 5 and expeditionary operations. Furthermore, NATO will develop capacities to defend against ballistic missiles, on which it wants to cooperate with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners. These capacities are not perceived as replacing, but supplementing the nuclear deterrent.

This is a controversial issue, as there are different opinions among NATO members concerning the degree of priority for missile defense, which has caused a rift in the Alliance. Besides the USA, it is Denmark that is the most active and long-time proponent of missile defense, having already undertaken major steps towards that already in the past. In August 2004, Denmark, Greenland and the United States signed American agreements concerning the use of an early warning radar system in Greenlandic Thule for the needs of the American missile defense system. (The Copengahen Post 2010) A zealous proponent of missile defense is Lithuania; Estonia and Latvia adopted a lukewarm approach. (Greenhalgh 2009) On the contrary, France had had a reserved approach for a long time, but it has finally conceded to missile defense. (Reteurs 2010) Canada, too, is one of the countries that view this project with skepticism and there are voices that it has changed its attitude only in order not to block other states and not to become isolated within the Alliance. (O’Neill 2010)

Greater emphasis than in the previous strategic concepts is laid on crisis management, including conducting out-of-area expeditionary operations. Article 22 of the 2010 Lisbon Strategy states that “the best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.” (Strategic Concept 2010: 19–20) Therefore, the Alliance wants to concentrate on the development of doctrine and capacities for the needs of expeditionary operations, but also on building suitable civil capacities for crisis management. Last but not least, it will expand and intensify political consultations with allies and partners pertaining to all stages of a crisis. Territorial restrictions for such operations are not imposed in any way. The 2010 strategic concept can be interpreted as such that NATO will be much more involved in the field of crisis management than before and it will be engaged anywhere where there are threats to the security of member states. The only limitation will be the ability to arrive at consensus
between member states on the launching of such an operation. Not even have the problems that NATO faces in Afghanistan at present led to a decrease in the emphasis on crisis management so far. Adrian-Hyde Price referred to NATO’s global ambitions as modest and reached the conclusion that it is due to the resistance of non-Western powers (Russia, China and Brazil) to the global engagement of NATO. (Hyde-Prince 2011: 50)

It has not been not an easy topic to discuss inside the Alliance either. Above all, they have discussed the issue of the Alliance’s territorial scope and the accordance of its engagement with international law. The idea about turning NATO into a global alliance is of the US origin and it was strongly supported by the G. W. Bush administration. (Hallams 2011: 426–427) While the USA was asserting much more global ambitions, the tandem of France and Germany slowed this effort down. This is not be so surprising, because France had long held a reserved position towards the idea of “global NATO”. (Hallams 2011: 426) Many analysts, for instance Charles Kupchan or Simon Koschutt, have criticized the idea of a global NATO as well. They warn against paralyzing and exposing NATO to many new serious security problems, starting with the Arab-Israeli conflict and ending with security concerns over India. (Hallams 2011: 447–448)

The document’s character of a compromise, which had to balance different interests of NATO members, is reflected in the fact that the Alliance concurrently confirms all its traditional roles. The transatlantic character of NATO has been preserved. Nevertheless, the emphasis on out-of-area missions is more evident than in any previous NATO strategic concepts. Moreover, there is no explicit mention that the Alliance will conduct these operations only with the mandate of the UN Security Council. On the other hand, there is no mention of the opposite either. On the whole, we can agree with Klaus Wittmann’s evaluation that the Alliance does not emphasize crisis management over collective defense, as it regards both as equally important. (Wittmann 2011: 34)

As regards out-of-area crisis management, three groups of states were established in the Alliance. First, there are states placing primary emphasis on collective defense, i.e. on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. They see engagement in areas and operations with no clear link to NATO security as wasting precious resources. This group includes above all Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Norway, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria. (Górka-Winter, Madej 2010: 7–8) Never-
theless, these countries do take an active part in out-of-area operations. However, they regard them more likely as an act of solidarity with their allies than as a necessity for security. The most critical attitude to these operations is adopted by Norway, which absolutely explicitly requires NATO’s greater orientation on tasks arising from Article 5. (Norwegian Ministry of Defense 2009; Faremo 2010)

On the contrary, the second group believes in NATO involving itself in crisis management outside the transatlantic area also. According to them, NATO should guarantee international stability on the global scale too. It must be pointed out here that these states do not underestimate the importance of collective defense, but they just do not see why it is being stressed in a situation where there is no threat of a direct military attack against the territory of member states. This group includes mainly the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, and partly also the Netherlands. (Górka-Winter, Madej 2010: 7) In this group, it was the United States especially that devoted a great deal of effort to involve out-of-area missions into the new strategic concept of NATO and “had been pushing a more globalist perspective for some time.” (Webber 2011: 101) According to the USA, confirming NATO’s traditional tasks more likely played the role of calming down the new member states and Poland in particular. To a certain degree, the USA was disappointed that the new strategic concept did not deal with the Afghan issue more. On the other hand, the overall emphasis on out-of-area operations is more likely in accordance with American interests. (Slocombe 2010) Similarly, Great Britain also supported placing a greater emphasis on out-of-area operations in the new strategic concept of NATO. Among other proponents of NATO’s global involvement, there was Canada, and this was so not only within crisis management. According to Canada, the Alliance should boost its relations with the democratic states outside the Euro-Atlantic area participating in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. (Chapin 2010: 14) The Netherlands also emphasized the major role of operations conducted outside the NATO borders, even in regions with no link to the Euro-Atlantic territory. (Górka-Winter, Madej 2010: 71)

Finally, the third group is formed by other member states that see collective security and out-of-area operations at the same level or that regard them as mutually complementary. Thus NATO should be able to defend the territory and people of member states and at the same time
have capacities to tackle with threats outside its territory. It includes especially three influential European members, France, Germany, Italy, and furthermore, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, and Turkey.

France does not cast out out-of-area operations absolutely, yet it draws attention to the fact that NATO is not a “global policeman” and engaging in operations out of its area should not become a rule. Out-of-area operations should take place only for very serious reasons and with the mandate of the UN SC. (Górka-Winter, Madaj 2010)

Germany does not reject operations out of the transatlantic area a priori either. It only requires that they have a clear link to its security. (Auswärtiges Amt 2010) However, it is essential from the German point of view that the operations of collective defense are clearly distinguished from other Alliance actions, as according to the German law, every foreign intervention taking place outside collective defense must be approved by the Bundestag. (Auswärtiges Amt 2010) With certain objections, Italy supports the continuation of the role of NATO in crisis management; yet it associates its participation with a threat to Italian security interests. (Alcaro 2010: 3) According to the current Alliance strategy, out-of-area crisis management will be a significant part of its activities.

The Alliance wants to continue in its involvement in the process of arms control, support the disarmament of both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, just as the non-proliferation endeavor. Simultaneously, it will place emphasis on cooperation with Russia and greater transparency while doing this. The regime of controlling conventional weapons in Europe will be based on the reciprocity, transparency and consent of the host country.

The Russia issue was a very important and to a certain degree dividing issue in the discussions about the contemporary NATO strategy. As Mikayel Bagratuni claims, “the new Strategic Concept indicates that the alliance wants Moscow’s cooperation on missile defence and will seek agreement with Russia towards transparency of the country’s nuclear weapons that NATO wants removed from its borders.” (Bargatuni 2011: 2) In general, NATO again declared its readiness to build a true strategic partnership, which is an attitude that is seen with suspicion in many former communist countries.

On the whole, the contemporary NATO strategic concept is very vague and unclear concerning many key issues pertaining to the elimina-
tion of security threats. According to Mark Webber, there is a strong tendency to repeat the Lisbon strategy statements agreed in the past, which is a sign of difficulties to achieve consensus between NATO members. (Webber 2011: 100) The controversial points, such as the role of (especially tactical) nuclear weapons, missile defense and crisis management without the mandate of the UN SC will have to be interpreted ad hoc on the grounds of the current political constellation in NATO. The issues of the NATO decision-making process and burden sharing were not raised in the Lisbon NATO strategy either.

2.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS ADAPTATION

In general, the evolution of NATO strategies after the end of the Cold War has paved the way for significant changes inside this organization. The direction of these changes can be summarized as widening the NATO agenda to include many new issues and extending the scope of NATO territorial interests. Some scholars argue that this trend is counter-productive. Sven Biscop points out that “response to global challenges and relation with third states require a much broader, comprehensive approach that encompasses all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. While NATO can contribute, it is not equipped to take the lead. … NATO must continue to play a leading role, by contrast, in what constitutes its core business: hard security – both defense against threats to our territory and global military crisis management. Here lies the strength and the continued relevance of the Alliance.” (Ringmose, Rynning 2011: 100) However, the process of NATO transformation follows a different logic. Softer and softer security issues have been incorporated into the NATO agenda and have helped NATO to survive the end of the Cold War. As regards the importance of the 2010 NATO Lisbon strategy, it is possible to agree with Karl-Heinz Kamp, who says that “the new strategy is not the end of a debate but rather the beginning.” (Kamp 2011: 172)
3. NATO ENLARGEMENT

3.1 ALTERNATIVES TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

The NATO enlargement represents a major part of this organization’s entire adaptation process to the new international security environment. After the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone three waves of enlargement. In 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO. Five years later, in 2004, the Alliance was expanded by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. Finally, in 2009, NATO was joined also by Albania together with Croatia. The NATO enlargement process has not been completed yet. The open door policy is still in progress. However, the prospects for an early further wave of NATO enlargement are not very good.

Soon after the end of the Cold War, NATO established cooperation with former enemies and gradually founded a system of institutions to consult security problems, cooperate with non-member states, and finally also to prepare candidate states for membership. In the last two decades, a lot of new bodies were created. The first one was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), established in December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members. Later the Partnership for Peace Program followed. The Partnership for Peace Program – PfP intended to 1. accomplish transparency of defense planning processes, 2. ensure democratization of civil-military relations, 3. boost member states’ ability to contribute to international security in operations under the authority of the UN or OBSE, and 4. develop abilities of participating states to cooperate with NATO structures. The ideology maker of the entire program was Bill Clinton and his administration. (Rupp 2002: 345; summed up in Asmus 2002) Yet the Partnership for Peace Program does not provide its members with security guarantees. Via this program, the Alliance committed itself to offering consultations only if the state involved felt under threat.

The PfP program is very flexible. It has always been up to every country how it will modify its individual program regarding its intentions in foreign policy. The American top military leaders viewed the program as a replacement for NATO membership; yet it had gradually developed
into something completely different. (Hunter 1999: 193) Many PfP member states conceived this program as a preparation for their future membership in NATO (For more see Rupp 2002: 346–347; Hunter 1999: 194). The results of PfP can be appraised from several points of view. For a certain time, it diverted the growing pressure on NATO expansion in a different direction and granted time to study various models of this step. Another crucial factor is the fact that it showed the Alliance’s good will to help resolve transforming countries’ problems and provided the Alliance with information concerning these countries necessary for the timing of its future steps.

Transitive countries used these institutions both for consultations with NATO and preparations for NATO membership. Since 1992, the North Atlantic Alliance had had to face the efforts of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to obtain NATO membership. (Asmus 2002: 1–18) It was especially Poland that was striving via diplomatic means to influence the NATO enlargement process and sought to obtain membership due to geopolitical reasons. (Dančák 1999: 29–30) Besides, already in 1990, Poland rejected Henry Kissinger’s proposal to form a neutral buffer zone between NATO and the USSR claiming that countries in this region would become the bone of contention between powers. (Vykoukal 2003: 219)

The reasons for the Atlantic orientation of Central European states’ security policies can be found especially in their fear of the lack of security guarantees face to face to the uncertain political development in Russia and the Balkans. Transitive states saw NATO as a tool of maintaining the transatlantic security link and preserving American guarantees for the security of Europe. Without the transatlantic security link, transitive countries would be far from finding NATO as attractive. (Pieciukiewicz 1996/1997: 129–130; Roskin 1998: 37; Hunter 1999: 191; Glebov 2009: 59) Nevertheless, it is only a part of the story. To a certain degree, transitive states (especially in Central Europe) found themselves in a paradoxical situation. As their main motives for joining the alliance, one can regard obtaining security guarantees against outside aggression, especially against Russia. In this respect, it is necessary to highlight the fact that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is formulated very vaguely and need not be a guarantee of automatic military help. (Roskin 1998: 30–31) The price for providing security guarantees should have been coping with NATO’s new security tasks and meeting the Alliance’s criteria. (Hubel 2004:
The anti-Russian thorn, based on their recent historical experience, could not be ignored in their politics. Cf. Pieciukiewicz 1996/1997)

Yet at the same time they were joining an organization that was simultaneously changing its orientation very radically, expanding the field of its activities beyond the framework of collective defense and saw Russia as a partner for cooperation, not an enemy. On the contrary, the NATO member states were more likely pursuing through NATO enlargement a policy of building up trust and cooperation with states in Eastern, Central and South-East Europe than strengthening NATO security capacities and capabilities. When comparing it with NATO enlargement in the Cold War era, Daniel N. Nelson and Sean Kay reached the conclusion that candidate states attached much less importance to military and strategic criteria at this time. (Nelson 1998: 137−138; Kay 2003: 106)

The political strategy of transitive states based on their effort to join NATO had yet another dimension. One should not underestimate that in Central and Eastern European countries, NATO membership was perceived as a confirmation of belonging to the West as well. Candidate states saw their accession to NATO and the European Union as joining the main institutions of the West. (Carpenter 1994: 112, Wiarda 2002: 147; cf. Valasek 2006)

On the whole, it can be said that NATO enlargement in the early 1990s was an extremely uncertain matter, even though the retrospection, knowing the actual result, can mislead the readers to believe that the process of new democracies joining the North Atlantic Alliance had no other alternative. However, nothing was as far from reality, since there were at least three options as an alternative to NATO enlargement: 1. Providing security guarantees to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe by NATO and Russia, 2. establishing a sub-regional security system based e.g. on the Visegrád Group, and 3. establishing a Pan-European security organization based on the OSCE. (Pieciukiewicz 1996/1997: 130–131)

### 3.2 STUDY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

In the mid 1990s, simultaneously with the development of the PfP, NATO member states were dealing with the problem of future enlargement. They had finally reached the conclusion that the current question was no
longer whether to expand NATO eastwards but only when to do so and how to resolve mutual relations with Russia. The outcome of this process was the conducted Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995. Even though it does not explicitly say so, this document is a sum of criteria that must be met by future new NATO members. As these criteria of future membership, we can regard: 1. building a stable democratic political system that will fulfill the mutually shared values that the Alliance proclaims, 2. ensuring democratization of civil military relations, 3. inhabitants’ willingness to defend mutually shared values and their support for the country’s accession to the Alliance, 4. a positive attitude of the inhabitants of the particular country to their army, 5. The country’s ability to ensure a certain degree of security by their own means and contribute to the strengthening of international security, 6. ensuring the ability of cooperation of the new members with the Alliance structures, and 7. resolving all disagreements with neighbors and intensifying integration tendencies. (Cf. Hodge 2005: 28). The entire Study on NATO Enlargement more likely stresses the criteria the fulfillment of which serves to defend democratic values, human rights and peaceful coexistence of states than the criteria of maximizing military capacity. When analyzing the NATO enlargement process, Andrew Kydd regards the established criteria as a means that will make it possible to reveal candidate states’ willingness to cooperate and distinguish those countries ready for mutual cooperation from others. In this view, the NATO is a security community of certain values and norms in the sense of the approach by Karl Deutsch. In his opinion, NATO membership is a certain reward to countries that are willing to implement norms preferred by the current member states, build up mutual trust and extend cooperation with each other (Kydd 2001: 806)

The main proponent of NATO enlargement was the administration of Bill Clinton, who was inaugurated in 1993, as well as its prominent figures, such as James Goldgeier, Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright. Initially, the idea of NATO enlargement had little support within the American administration. A major role in promoting the idea was played by Anthony Lake especially. The main resistance in the USA against the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance, supported mainly by military-strategic and geopolitical arguments, came from the military spheres, especially from the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supporters of NATO enlargement prevailed within the Clinton

The process of NATO enlargement received rather fierce and exhausting criticism both in the academic and political sphere. A prominent figure among security experts, George F. Kennan, opposed NATO enlargement and called this step the worst mistake of American foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, as it would put cooperation with Russia at risk. (Goldgeier 1999: 18; Duignan 2000: 57) Another prominent Western scholar, Kenneth N. Waltz, stated that the reasons for NATO enlargement were unconvincing. In his opinion, NATO enlargement would make new dividing lines in Europe, cause a deterioration in relations with Russia and contribute to the convergence of Russia and China. Waltz regarded the enlargement policy as ill-judged, as it turned Russia into an (old) new enemy. (See Waltz 2001) John Lewis Gaddis criticized the Clinton administration for their alleged preference of the anti-Russian policy similar to the Versailles Peace after World War I, resulting in new hostility between Germany and other European powers, instead of learning its lesson from the results of the Congress of Vienna following Napoleonic Wars. At that time, the defeated France was fully included in the international relations system. In his opinion, NATO enlargement could antagonize Russia and boost anti-Western forces in Russian society. (Gaddis 1998: 28)

Many collective actions against NATO enlargement were taken as well. In June 1997, an open letter written by fifty US security experts, officials and politicians across the whole political spectrum was published labeling NATO enlargement “a policy error of historic importance.” In their opinion, NATO enlargement would decrease Russian readiness to cooperate with the West, draw new dividing lines in Europe, degrade NATO’s ability to provide Article 5 guarantees, involve the USA in unsettled disputes across Central and Eastern Europe, and start a debate in the USA about the high costs of the whole NATO enlargement process.

It was Russian resistance that formed the chief obstacle to NATO enlargement in the second half of the 1990s. As is claimed by Ronald D. Asmus, the Clinton administration was able to put the enlargement through even despite the Russian resistance, but the primary intention was to reach an agreement. (Asmus 2002: 20–29; 297) The Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement in the early 1990s was by no means
a categorical denial. Boris Yeltsin claimed in 1993 that expanding the Alliance to Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not contravene Russian interests. (Vykoukal 2003: 222) However, in the middle of the 1990s Russian negative attitude to NATO enlargement was very strong. Asmus regards the negotiations between Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki in March 1997 as a breakthrough. (Asmus 2002: 294)

Moreover, there were different opinions among NATO member states concerning the issue of which state to invite to join the Alliance and that a compromise had to be reached. There was a general agreement as regards Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which were also invited at the 1997 Madrid summit to join NATO. From the perspective of the states whose efforts to join NATO had failed, it was important that that the results from the Madrid summit left the door open for further NATO enlargement. Putting an end to the enlargement process and its discontinuation would mean creating new dividing lines in Europe. (Cf. Goldgeier 1999: 21). The open door policy was supported both by the United States, which by doing so compensated for its disapproval of a wider enlargement of NATO, and European powers, among which the primary role was played by France. Moreover, “The NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. This reflected the Allies’ desire to build a security forum, which would include Western European partners and be better suited for the increasingly sophisticated relationships being developed with partner countries. Many partners were deepening their cooperation with NATO, in particular in support of defense reform and the transition towards democracy, and several partners were by then also actively supporting the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (NATO 2011a)

In order to support the effort of candidate states, NATO launched its program called the Membership Action Plan – MAP, within which every year the progress of participating states in meeting the criteria for accession to NATO is evaluated. The Membership Action Plan has become a universal tool for preparing candidate states for NATO membership and supporting the reform of the defense sector. According to NATO, “the Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO program of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership. Current participants in
the MAP are the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which has been participating in the MAP since 1999, and Montenegro, which was invited to join in December 2009.” (MAP 2012)

3.3 THE “BIG BANG” AND FURTHER PROSPECTS

Soon after the Washington summit in April 1999, enlargement ceased to be the main issue on the NATO agenda. Other tasks gained priority, in particular the stabilization of Kosovo and other countries in the Western Balkans. Despite that, consensus was achieved within NATO that the future of the next round of NATO enlargement depended on candidate states’ abilities to meet the established criteria. The 2002 Prague summit launched the process of the second round of the Alliance enlargement and left space for a third round. Against the background of the best possible forms of war against international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, NATO agreed on its massive enlargement with the accession of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, which was also successfully completed in 2004. When analyzing the second round of the enlargement, one can reach the conclusion that none of the new seven members had met the Alliance criteria completely. Moreover, the geostrategic value of the new members also varies. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria has strengthened the strategic position of NATO, especially in connection to its activities in the Balkans, yet the membership of the Balkan states nowadays encounters the same problems that were pointed out in the debate on the first round of enlargement. The new members’ military contribution is not negligible for NATO, yet it is not monumental either. (For more see Šedivý 2001 and Kay 2003: 108–110). The second round of NATO enlargement is sometimes referred to as the “Big Bang”.

The second wave of NATO enlargement was very sensitive because three former USSR states sought NATO membership. As regards the second round of enlargement, Douglas M. Gilbert and Jamil A. Sewell concluded that “a common theme among these Baltic leaders is that Russia not only posed a threat militarily, but also threatened to bring these states under a Russian political, economic, and military sphere of influence.” (Gilbert, Sewell 2006: 422) Concerning the second round of NATO enlarge-
ment, they feared that the accession of the former USSR states would be understood by Russia as an act of hostility. According to Kydd, the logic of NATO enlargement undermines the degree of cooperation with Russia, which is a price that is paid for expanding the security community and building up cooperation on the territory of former socialist states. (Kydd 2001) Kent R. Meyer, too, criticized fiercely the American policy of supporting the accession of Baltic states to NATO. He claimed that due to the expansion of NATO to include the Baltic states, it is not only American national interests that are put at stake, but also the NATO ability to operate efficiently as a collective defense organization. He perceives NATO enlargement to the Baltic states as redundant, as it by no means contributes to the growth of NATO military capacities and imperils the cooperation with Russia. Meyer accentuates that the North Atlantic Alliance is unable to defend the Baltic states militarily in case of their conflict with Russia. (Meyer 2000/2001) Moreover, Gallen Carpenter also criticized the enlargement for its potential to increase Russia’s hatred against the West and he seemingly approved of tolerating a certain Russian sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. He also stressed many problems in post-communist states which complicate their accession to NATO. (Carpenter 1994: 45–69, 76–84)

In comparison with the second round, the third round of NATO enlargement was quite unproblematic in terms of NATO-Russia relations. Albania has been strongly committed to obtaining NATO membership ever since the downfall of the Communist regime. On several occasions, it has also been stated that integration into NATO was the primary goal of the Republic of Albania’s foreign policy (Albanian Council of Ministers 2007; Albanian Government 2005; Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Albania’s membership of NATO has consistently had high support among the population as well as politicians (for more information see Congressional Research Service 2006; The Institute for Democracy and Mediation 2007). Croatian representatives have continuously stressed the importance of shared values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and a market economy (Croatian Government 2008; 2010). The desire to join NATO was articulated by Croatian representatives immediately after the election following former President Franjo Tudjman’s death. Croatia started to participate in the PfP, EAPC, and MAP in 2000 and 2002.
From his 6 July 2006 speech, the General Secretary of NATO at the time, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, made it more than clear that if Albania wanted to become a NATO member, reforms in the military sector, no matter how important, would not be sufficient for Albania’s accession to NATO. According to Scheffer, the main commonalities of the Alliance states were shared values, a pluralist system, democracy, freedom, and tolerance. (NATO 2006a) In the case of Croatia as well, NATO has exerted pressure upon the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of the rule of law. The most often discussed problems, aside from the traditional problem with justice, corruption, and organized crime, have been the return of refugees, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the low level of support for Croatian membership of NATO among the public). (NATO 2006a) Both countries joined NATO in 2009. (Kříž – Sxitová 2012: 1–34)

Membership is further sought by Macedonia and Georgia. Despite the strong support of the USA and Central European countries, Georgia and Ukraine did not receive MAP due to strong opposition led by Germany and France at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit. (Valášek 2009: 26–26) Taking into account the poor state of Georgian readiness for NATO membership (Kříž – Shevchuk 2011: 89–97), the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and priorities of the Obama administration, it is not very probable that Georgia will be able to join NATO in the near future. As regards Macedonia, there are no signs that Greece is ready and willing to change its attitude towards this country and hence future Macedonian NATO membership is further uncertain.

Ukraine is a completely different case. Yanukovych ended the policy of seeking NATO membership, prolonged the Black Sea fleet agreement with Russia and caused a deterioration in Ukraine – NATO relations. (Henrik, Lindbo 2010: 94). Nevertheless, the recent deterioration of relations with Ukraine need not necessarily last forever. However, it is not very probable that the above-mentioned countries will join NATO in the near future. The main obstacle lies in the dividing power of this idea in the Ukrainian society. It is a much more sensitive issue than the prospects for Ukrainian EU membership. To cut a long story short, this issue is not on the table now and this is doubly true after the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
3.4 NATO ENLARGEMENT RESULTS

As for the results, NATO enlargement has still had a mainly positive effect. It has helped Central and Eastern European countries to build ties with Western institutions and served as an additional incentive for democratic transformation. Douglas M. Gilbert and Jamil A. Sewell even concluded that “the role of NATO in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Moldova reduced levels of external threat and provided much needed bargaining leverage with Russia to resolve outstanding international border issue and the disposition of Russian troops in the states. The expansion of NATO eastward therefore aided to creation of a peaceful environment for democracy to survive.” (Gilbert, Sewell 2006: 429) Despite strong criticism against NATO enlargement policy, we can reach the conclusion that the enlargement has not done the Alliance any significant harm. Only very few of the dire predictions about the negative impact of NATO enlargement have come true. As was pointed out by Helle Bering, it is not democratic development in Russia that jeopardizes NATO enlargement, but the politicians around Vladimir Putin. (Bering 2001: 5–6) The West supports his authoritarian tendencies perhaps only by tolerating them and trying to appease Russia in various ways, just as throughout the 1990s (e.g. economic aid in the 1990s, joining the G8, holding fora within NATO), without obtaining guarantees of any further democratic development in this country or a non-aggressive foreign policy. The conflicts within NATO have been caused mainly by disputes between the “old” NATO members (Iraq and missile defense) rather than by the qualitatively different character of “new” members. The new members did not even veto the war in Yugoslavia, waged in order to stabilize Kosovo, which was controversial from the international law perspective. For the time being, Sean Kay’s concerns that an extensive NATO enlargement, while preserving the consensual decision-making mechanism, would undermine the NATO ability to adopt political decisions, have not come true.

By no means was it the NATO enlargement that made European powers view the American program of antimissile defense built outside the NATO framework with skepticism, nor did the enlargement itself result in the crisis connected to the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Moreover, the enlargement did not cause a change in the attitude of the USA and European states towards the International Criminal Tribunal
and Kyoto Protocol. It was not the enlargement process that would put NATO’s credibility at risk, but the lack of willingness of European countries to obtain adequate military capacities corresponding with the needs of the present international security environment, and taking on security commitments that they cannot meet, such as in Afghanistan or, most recently, in Libya. The countries that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 did not start to pursue the closed door policy either, but they very intensively endeavored to build up cooperation with their neighbors in order to help them get ready for their future integration into NATO. Therefore, no new dividing lines were drawn in Europe and what is very important, thanks to the enlargement, the old lines have not been reinforced either.

Nevertheless there is an area in which NATO enlargement has contributed to the disagreement between NATO members, i.e. the relations with Russia. As Antonesko and Giegerich point out new NATO members very often tend to see Russia as a threat while some prominent NATO members, especially France and Germany, have a different view and are trying to start close cooperation with Russia on many security issues. (Antonesko – Giegerich 2009: 14–15)
4. NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS

4.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NATO – RUSSIA RELATIONS

Russia is the only transition state that has gained a special position in its relationship to NATO. Reasons for that can be summed up in five theses and do not lie only in the ownership of nuclear weapons. (Bagratuni 2011: 1) First, it is only Russia that has nuclear and conventional capacities which can pose a risk to the military security of NATO member states. Secondly, Russia has ambitions to be a global player in world politics and its institutions have at their disposal certain knowledge of regions (e.g. Afghanistan or the Balkans) that have become important for NATO over the past twenty years. Thirdly, the entire post-Soviet area where Russia has – with the exception of the Baltic States – considerable influence both in the form of “hard power” and “soft power”, is an area of latent conflicts. Fourthly, the European member states of NATO have been finding themselves, due to their own intentional policies, dependent on the USSR and Russia for energy, and thus they want this region to be stable. Last but not least, fifth, there still remains a certain romantic fascination with Russia both among leftist intellectuals and politicians and representatives of big business.

If we appraise the history of relations between the Alliance and Russia after the end of the Cold War, we can generally state that it is the quality of relations between the USA and Russia that is the essential component of the quality of relations between NATO and Russia. This rivalry has resulted from the ongoing perception of NATO as a tool of influence of the Russian rival in Europe, i.e. the United States. If American-Russian relations were improving, Russia’s relationship to NATO was also getting better, and if they were deteriorating, the tension between Russia and the Alliance was getting worse too.

After the changes of Soviet foreign policy, the disintegration of the USSR and Russian regaining of sovereignty, NATO tried very intensively to develop cooperation with Russia. Robert E. Hunter speaks of overcoming the eighty-year (self-imposed) isolation of Russia as one of the key tasks of the reformed NATO. (Hunter 1998: 18) However, the limiting factor here is the relatively profound lack of popularity of NATO in Rus-
sia, which is by no means restricted only to the ruling political elites and persists until today. (White, Krosteleva – Allison 2006: 186) Soon after the end of the Cold War, the general tendency of Russian foreign policy regarding NATO was to achieve the reorganization of the European security architecture. From the Russian point of view, it would be ideal to accomplish the disbandment of NATO and foundation of new structures in which Russia would assume a major role. In the beginning, Russia pinned its hopes in the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). After it had become clear that such a goal was impossible to achieve, Russia tried to obtain a privileged relationship with the Alliance, which would enable it to affect its policy in a desirable direction. (Ratti 2009: 400–401) Russia intends to be perceived by the world as an equal partner of the Alliance, having the same importance in international relations as the Alliance itself. Nevertheless, Palmi Aalto claims that “Russia’s status as a great power in the present system is a result of its former superpower position; possession of almost one-third of the world’s natural gas resources, and substantial amounts of oil and uranium; possession of a large nuclear weapons arsenal; a seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; its remaining regional power vis-à-vis Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe; plus its own vigorous claim to be recognized as a great power and its relative acceptance by the other great powers” (Aalto 2007: 461) As it had acquired its status of a power by the recent decline of its superpower position, Russia is not perceived in the world as an actor comparable to NATO. This is evident from Russia being ranked among the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). This perception of Russia has not been changed in any way by the Russian effort to develop strategic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and China, or the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001.

The ambitious Russian aim to be perceived as such a powerful actor as NATO could not comply with the cooperation developed in common Alliance forums formed for former post-communist states; Russia also became their member when joining the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) in 1991 and PfP (Partnership for Peace) in 1994. In the end, expectations have not been fully met. Their mutual cooperation culminated in the mid 1990s with the participation of the Russian military contingent in the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the IFOR
forces. An important milestone in the mutual relations was the passing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (hereafter, only Founding Act) from May 1997. This document aimed to offer Russia a deepening of the mutual partnership and created the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The process of deepening cooperation also involved the foundation of the Russian diplomatic mission in NATO in 1998.

When appraising NATO-Russia relations in this period, Tuomos Forsberg reached the conclusion that a frail friendship had been formed and that the dispute between the Alliance and Russia was over. (Forsberg 2005: 334) The Russian reconciliatory approach towards NATO changed in the course of the Kosovo crisis, which generally led to a deterioration in relations between NATO and Russia. It was in 2009 that Russia, owing to NATO enlargement and the war in Yugoslavia, adopted a new security strategy that crucially modified the Russian approach towards the West. (Rustrans 2012) A major change in comparison with the perception of security threats in the 1990s was that the West was referred to as a threat to Russian security interests.

A crucial shift of the Russian policy towards the West in general and the USA and NATO in particular was brought about by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Russia declared solidarity with the USA and, what is even more important, it provided the USA with valuable intelligence information and logistic support. At that time, the new Putin administration in Russia decided to re-establish and encourage cooperation with NATO. First of all, the Alliance opened the NATO Information Bureau in Moscow (2001), and later in 2002, also the Military Liaison Mission. According to Graeme P. Herd and Ella Akerman, some analysts believed that “11 September had facilitated fundamental foreign policy realignment between Russia and the West and represented a key foreign policy change for Russia.” (Herd – Akerman 2002: 358)

The restoration of subdued cooperation between NATO and Russia was speeded up by the joint declaration from Rome called “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” from May 2002, which extended the Constitutive Act. (NATO 2002a) Based on this, the PJC was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Between 2003 and 2005, Russia together with NATO member states participated in many joint military exercises. (Khudoley – Lanko 2004: 123) On the grounds of the NRC, the Action
Plan on Terrorism was passed in December 2004, aimed at improving the common capacity in preventing terrorism, fighting terrorism and coping with the consequences of terrorist attacks. (NATO 2004)

It is complicated to evaluate the current results. On the one hand, the Council has created a forum that can be used to discuss key security problems. Yet on the other hand, it is evident that it has contributed only very little to the convergence of the positions of NATO and Russia in the key issues of international security problems. Antonesko and Giegerich see the main causes in the heritage of the Cold War, the different strategic culture of the West and Russia, as well as in the Russian view of NATO as a tool of American policy in Europe and most recently also in Asia. NATO and Russia differed in their expectations. NATO member states expected the Council to develop understanding with Russia, while Russia supposed that via this body, it would gain certain influence in the Alliance, despite not being its member. (Antonesko – Giegerich 2009: 13–17)

Relations between the Alliance and Russia were damaged by the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, due to which mutual relations were severed. (Asmus 2008) Russia responded by a series of steps that can be viewed as aggressive. In 2009, it pronounced NATO enlargement and alleged risks stemming from it as the main reason for modernizing its armed forces. Nevertheless, already in 2008, it had sent Dmitry Rogozin to Brussels as its NATO ambassador, which was interpreted as weakened interest in the development of relations with the Alliance. (Valášek 2009: 16) After Obama’s inauguration and his policy of resetting relations with Russia, a new form of relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation was sought. Mutual relations were already restored by 2009 and a year later, the Secretary General of NATO, Andreas Fogh Rasmusen, visited Russia and negotiated with the Russian president. (NATO 2014) At the Lisbon 2011 NATO Summit, the NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement was signed and relations basically got back to normal. (NATO 2010)

The brief overview of relations between NATO and Russia drawn above shows that these relations had been formed over the past twenty years especially by four long term controversial issues: the NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999, the North Atlantic Alliance enlargement, building the anti-missile defense shield, and the Russo-Georgian war from summer 2008. However, there have been and still are more controversial issues. They include: the CFE Treaty, the modified form of which was not
ratified by the West, as Russia did not want to meet its obligations and withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldavia, and Russia finally terminated the contract in November 2007; U.S. resignation from the ABM contract due to the plans of building anti-missile defenses; Western support of “color” revolutions, which once toppled the pro-Moscow rulers in Georgia and Ukraine; cyber attacks on Estonia, of which Russia was suspected; and problems with natural gas supplies in 2009. (Antonesko – Giegerich 2009: 14–15) Last but not least, the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most serious recent bone of contention between NATO and Russia.

4.2 RUSSIA AND KOSOVO CRISIS

Until the events in Ukraine in 2014, the severest deterioration of mutual relations between NATO and Russia undoubtedly occurred in connection with the Kosovo crisis. While dealing with the Kosovo crisis, Russia played a game in which it intended to accomplish more goals. It was especially restricting Western influence in the Balkans, keeping “face” and the role of the protector of Serbs, and last but not least, also confirming the prestige of a power with which any crucial problem of world’s politics must be discussed. As was shown by David Mendeloff in his study, the perception of the entire crisis by the Russian political elite and the public was affected by the “Myth of Slavic Brotherhood”, which consists of three main ideas: “First, the existence of a profound special relationship between Russia and Orthodox Balkan Slavs. Second, the romanticization of the Orthodox Slavs. And, third, the belief that Russia has been the benevolent, selfless savior and historical protector of the Slavs, in contrast to the bellicose, duplicitous, self-serving and predatory motives of the Western powers.” (Mendeloff 2008: 38) The lack of historical background of these ideas, which was shown persuasively by the above-mentioned author, does not change the fact that this perception of the world had an impact on Russian foreign policy.

In its reaction to the Alliance’s 1999 war on Yugoslavia, Russia ended its activities within the PJC and PfP, withdrew its military mission from Brussels and broke off negotiations on establishing a NATO military mission in Russia. (Ratti 2009: 403) After the end of the conflict, by a quick
shift of its forces from Bosnia to Kosovo in the surroundings of Pristina, it tried to gain political capital in the form of its own sector to keep face in front of the Serbs and possibly also make favorable conditions for a potential division of Kosovo. In the end, Russian forces were deployed within the American, French and German zone. (Gallagher 2005: 75; Latawski – Smith 2003: 103–104) According to John Norris, Russia showed in the Kosovo crisis that it understands regional security as a zero-sum game. In his opinion, Russia views the strengthening of the West as a weakening of Russia. (Norris 2005: 308) On the other hand, Norris claims that despite the tough rhetoric, the degree of Russia’s cooperation with the West after the launching of air attacks was much greater than in the Cold War period. The Russian administration did not speak unanimously and there were voices supporting non-escalation of the conflict with the West due to Kosovo and a constructive Russian share in solving the crisis. According to Norris, when negotiating the conditions under which bombing would be ended, Russian diplomacy isolated Milosević, which is evaluated by this author as a positive contribution to the solution of the crisis. (Norris 2005: 307–310) After the end of the conflict, Russia participated in the KFOR and tried to play the role of the protector of Serbian interests. Nevertheless, Russia strongly opposes the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence and is not prepared to recognize this new state.

Till the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the Kosovo issue can be regarded as a topic that is rather complicated, yet relatively well defined by time (1998–1999) and not pertaining to interests that are viewed by today’s Russia as vital. This is very much different in the case of NATO enlargement. It is a long-term process affecting relations between the Alliance and Russia over the whole period of the Cold War and it concerns regions in which the contemporary Russia demands the surrounding world to acknowledge its special interests. One can regard establishing a demilitarized buffer zone between NATO member states and Russia, which would eliminate these countries from European and transatlantic security cooperation, as a general objective of the Russian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Russia could return into such a security vacuum in the future. From the Russian perspective, it was especially the first and second round of the enlargement that was problematical, and last but not least, also the debates about the potential membership of
Ukraine and Georgia. On the contrary, NATO enlargement by the Balkans met with much less resistance and Russia finally digested this step.

### 4.3 RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

NATO enlargement was perceived very negatively in Russia and this negative perception definitely was not typical only of political and military elites, but was representative of the authentic attitudes of the broad masses. (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 314; Ratti 2009: 402) The first round of NATO enlargement was accompanied by a number of threats from Russian politicians, top military and government officials. (Bering 2001: 3–4; Ratti – Luca 2009: 402; Rupp 2002: 351) The Russian Duma even referred to NATO enlargement as the most severe military threat for Russia since 1945. (Rupp 2002: 351) This overreaction of the Russian political elite was rooted also in the fact that NATO’s image of an aggressor is much more deeply rooted in Russia than in other states in the region. (Glebov 2009: 54–55)

As is pointed out by Mark Kramer, in the second half of the 1990s, the entire Russian and Soviet (Gorbatchev) elite of that time, supported by some researchers in the West (e.g. McGwire), claimed that when negotiating about the re-integration of Germany, the Soviet Union was promised NATO would not be enlarged further to the East and that the breach of this alleged promise could lead to deteriorated relations with Russia. (McGwire 1998: 23–42) However, Kramer, on the grounds of an analysis of primary sources unavailable in 1998, proved persuasively that negotiations between the USSR and the West in 1990 regarding German re-integration pertained only to the fact that no Alliance infrastructure would be built within the territory of the GDR. The USSR had no claims in 1990 concerning the non-expansion of the Alliance into further countries of Central and Eastern Europe and it was not given such guarantees by the West. (Kramer 2009: 39–61) Kramer reaches a clear conclusion that “declassified materials show unmistakably that no such pledge was made.” (Kramer 2009: 55) If Kramer’s analysis is correct, one can derive from it that in the early 1990, NATO enlargement was an issue that was beyond the framework of thinking of contemporary political elites both in the West and in Russia.
Above all, Russia vehemently opposed NATO enlargement to the Baltic States and in general to any post-Soviet countries. (Blank 1998: 115) The consequences of this step for the balance of power between NATO and Russia were purposefully exaggerated by the Russian side. (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 315) However, the military balance of power may not have been of significance anyway. The efforts of the Baltic States to join NATO threatened Russian national interests defined in the classical style of the superpower Realpolitik. Khudoley and Lanko note that in the second half of the 1990s, Russia tried to discuss security issues pertaining to its western neighbors with France, Great Britain and Germany, yet not with states that were involved, and thus it was making the same mistake as Soviet diplomacy did in the 1930s. (Khudoley – Lanko 2004: 125) Russia inferred from Western endeavor to consolidate this region that it in particular intends to undermine Russian influence in this region and gain unilateral political, economic and military advantages. The enlargement of NATO to include the Baltic States was also viewed as a threat for the Russian forces in the outpost area of Kaliningrad. (Blank 1998: 119–120) Another Russian fear was related to weaker control over the transport routes for Russian energetic resources. (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 317) In the 1990s, Russians tried to exchange their consent for the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for leaving the Baltic countries outside the NATO doors.

In the debates on the second round of NATO enlargement, the Russians adopted a strategy of protraction and relating NATO enlargement to anti-missile defense. The Russians invested 50 million USD in a propaganda campaign in the Western media against NATO enlargement, in doing which they followed the best traditions of the Soviet Union. (Bering 2001: 4–5) Moreover, Russia also artificially provoked border disputes with the Baltic States in order to make their accession to NATO more difficult and it protracted the conclusion of treaties about border delimitation. Furthermore, Russia also used the problem of the minority rights of Russians living in Estonia (30 %) and Latvia (34 %). (Meyer 2000/2001: 73) Another Russian method was relating NATO enlargement to aligning the Baltic States to S-KOS. (Khudoley – Lanko 2004: 121–122) It is possible to agree with the conclusion that those activities “were not only ineffective, but also counterproductive”. (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 330) In addition, due to its threatening of negative conse-
quences, Russia missed the chance to negotiate concessions in issues that are very important to them. (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 320)

The policy of NATO enlargement affected NATO – Russia relations after the accession of Baltic States as well. Karabeshkin and Spechler pointed out that “Russian analysts are now convinced that eastward NATO enlargement cannot stop with the second wave because the US is interested in widening its presence in the heartland of Eurasia to obtain access to strategic energy sources and control over transportation routes.” (Karabeshkin – Spechler 2007: 319) In practice, it was especially the issue of a potential accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO after the Color Revolutions. Ukrainian membership in NATO was perceived as a direct threat to Russian security interests, especially in connection with the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. (Makarychev 2009: 45) Nevertheless, NATO was divided on the issue of how to continue with NATO enlargement. Six NATO countries – Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal were against NATO enlargement by the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia. Meanwhile, the Americans under the Bush administration, Canada, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Turkey and former WP members advocated further NATO enlargement. (Bagratuni 2011: 1–2)

In this respect, Bruce P. Jackson spoke of the so-called “soft war” between the West and Russia over Eastern Europe. The Western strategy strove for democratic stabilization of this region by supporting democratic regimes, guaranteeing the access of these states to world markets without Russian mediation (especially in the realm of energy resources) and incorporating these countries into Western institutions. Western goals were in contradiction with Russian interests in building a network of autocratic regimes in the area friendly to Russia and hence eliminating the influence of Western countries. Jackson states that the political strategy of the West does not endanger Russian vital interests; it is only in contradiction with its imperial ambitions, which became stronger under the Putin administration. In this dispute, it is especially the means of “soft power” that are used, i.e. diplomatic, economic and cultural tools. (Jackson 2006)

If the West had bet in this “soft war” on the strategy of supporting the prodemocracy movements in Ukraine and Georgia, Russia adopted the policy of instigating the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic States to demonstrate against local governments, and it is believed to have stood behind the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007. (Valášek 2009: 6)
fighting for world public opinion, Russia tried to oppose the potential accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO in the international forum by means of a strategy of rhetorical attacks, in which it changed the logic of argumentation ad hoc, according to its current needs. The roots of this approach are seen by Andrey Makarychev to lie in the fact that the Color Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia had been perceived as a Russian defeat. (Makarychev 2009: 40–51) The general strategy of Russia was to discredit the democratic legitimacy of political elites of that time in both countries and hence slow down their accession to NATO. Moreover, both countries were attacked by the Russian military and Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. While in Georgia Russia conducted classical war, in the case of Ukraine Russia bet on hybrid war. Nevertheless in both cases “soft war” escalated into “hot war”.

4.4 OTHER BONES OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE WEST AND RUSSIA

Another topic that has been influencing NATO-Russian relations on a long-term basis is anti-missile defense. Russia has been watching the American effort to deploy elements of anti-missile defense in Europe with great suspicion and has tried to prevent it by various means. The aggressiveness of Russian policy has grown slowly in relation to the success this tactic has had in causing a rift between the USA and some of its European allies. Moreover, in 2007 it threatened to aim its own nuclear weapons at targets in the Czech Republic and Poland. In May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev threatened to deploy nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad enclave, if interceptors were to be placed in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic. (Ratti 2009: 415) At present, after the improvement of relations and launching the debate on anti-missile defense, Russia wants to build a single joint anti-missile system, in which it will be responsible for covering the sector over its territory. However, the Alliance has preferred for a long time to build two separate, but cooperating systems, as it does not want to depend on Russia in this sphere. (Bagratuni 2011: 3) The approach of both partners offers little space for compromise and it is questionable as to why Russia actually conceptualizes this issue in this way and hence pushes the negotiations into a deadlock. One of the
possible answers is that it is trying to slow down Western anti-missile defense as much as possible, as it would be able to reduce not only Iran's capabilities to hit Western territory, but in the medium-term horizon, also reduce these capabilities of the declining Russian nuclear potential.

Besides these traditional issues forming the relations between NATO and Russia, there is another issue that has been becoming the focus of attention in recent years, i.e. the issue of the Arctic. Technological development and climatic changes have opened this territory up to economic exploitation, be it in the form of new transport routes or new sites of resources, in particular energy resources. In the region, there interests of the USA, Canada, Norway and Denmark on the one hand clash mainly with those of Russia on the other hand. To cut a long story short, Norway and Denmark favor cooperation and wish to solve the ongoing dispute in a peaceful way. Simultaneously, both of these countries prefer a non-zero-sum game approach (e.g. natural resources exploitation, environmental protection). On the contrary, the USA assumes a rather reserved attitude towards cooperation, even though this definitely does not mean it prefers confrontation or contributes to rivalry in this area. The afore-mentioned countries would not use armed force unless they needed to defend themselves. Russia and Canada, i.e. the countries controlling the largest areas, have a totally different approach, which makes them more alert as far as security issues in the region are concerned. Russia, which has the greatest economic and military capacity, is the region’s most important actor. Furthermore, as opposed to other states involved, its style of action is rather provocative at times, which has been caused by Russia’s recent return to superpower status and spreading its influence into neighboring countries, as well as by the negative view of the situation in the Arctic among Russian elites. It must be stressed that despite the present risks, the afore-mentioned states have held a long-term peaceful position. What they are doing at present, i.e. increasing the military capacity in the region, cannot be viewed as something unusual or aggressive. The anarchy in the Arctic very much resembles the situation in the world, e.g. in terms of the level of institutionalization of relations between the Arctic states. There certainly is a certain degree of conflict potential in the region but it tends to be over exaggerated by some researchers (such as Borgerson, Spears and Young). Therefore, a growing conflict in the Arctic is possible, yet not inevitable. (Kříž – Chrášťanský 2012)
The Obama administration came up with a concept of resetting relations with this Eurasian power. The overall policy of the Obama administration stems from perceiving the world as a space where the balance of power is changing and the boom of the BRIC countries has resulted in the undermining the relative power of the West. According to Obama, the Pax Americana or Pax Britannica has ended. The NATO Lisbon summit brought along another attempt at transforming relations with Russia to a quantitatively higher level, emphasizing three rounds of problems: cooperation on the basis of the NATO-Russia Council, theatre missile defense and Afghanistan. (Hyde-Price 2011: 47–48)

As the 2014 Ukrainian events show, the “reset policy” has only encouraged Russia to act in the old fashioned imperial style. On the whole, one can reach the conclusion that the reset of relations between the USA and Russia has not brought any particular positive results or improvement of relations between the West and Russia so far; on the other hand, until the 2014 Ukraine crisis it had not cause deterioration in them either. The entire problem of the Russian behavior lies in Russian strategic culture, which is indistinguishable from the strategic culture of the Soviet Union. And it is indistinguishable because its bearers, nomenclature communist cadres and secret service agents have never given up political power in Russia.

Paradoxically, the NATO-Russia relations worsened after the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest when Ukraine and Georgia had not obtained the consent with the intensification of integration with NATO and the prospect of early accession, by which the entire process was postponed indefinitely. However, the responsibility lies on Russia and its imperial policy ignoring the security interests of its neighbours, which it regards as the object of its own superpower policy and not equal partners. After all, it was Russia and not NATO that over the past years has initiated two wars against its neighbours and in fact annexed Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea.
5. NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS

5.1 NATO PEACE SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS – CONCEPT EVOLUTION

As was already mentioned at the beginning of this work, NATO’s traditional task in the Cold War lay in deterring the Soviet Union and its satellites from invading Western Europe and keeping the transatlantic link, especially with the United States. Solving armed conflicts and stabilizing crisis regions were not on the Alliance agenda at the time of the Cold War. The Alliance was occupied with the Cold War and therefore it would have lacked the trust of the conflict parties when carrying out these activities. These old truths of the Cold War no longer apply. According to Ivan Dinev Ivanov, since the 1990s, the North Atlantic Alliance has started to play a major role in stabilising crisis regions. (Ivanov 2011: 78) The beginning of this Alliance transformation must be sought in the 1991 strategic conception; nevertheless, as is claimed by Frantzen, for NATO PSO this new strategic concept did not represent an important milestone, it just said that the Alliance had to contribute to ensuring international security and peace by participating in the UN military capacity. (Frantzen 2005: 59) The path to today’s active and multifaceted crisis management was still long.

The Alliance engagement in this area is the result of a combination of three main reasons. First, the lack of ability of the international community and in particular the UN to respond to conflicts arising after the end of the Cold War in Europe had generated demand for an institution that would cope with them. Furthermore, these conflicts themselves posed threats for NATO member states, which ultimately viewed the adaptation of an existing tool as the best possible way to gain an institutional mechanism for their solution. And last but not least, one must also mention the interest of NATO as an institution in justifying its existence after the termination of the Cold War, which encouraged NATO to enter the realm of crisis management. (McCalla 1996: 445–475)

From the perspective of classifying peacekeeping operations, there is a certain terminological ambiguity in scholarly literature, the elimination of which is not the aim of this article. (Urbanovská 2012: 27–44) The Alli-
ance uses the term Crisis Response Operations (CRO), including NATO Peace Support Operations (NATO PSO) and Natural, Technological or Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations (NATO NTHDRO). Also since the end of the Cold War, NATO has continued the tradition of conducting disaster relief operations, which had already been launched in the 1950s. Many NATO member and non-member states have received help in these situations.\(^{(NATO 2011b)}\) The CRO category comprises all Alliance operations that have not been undertaken within the right of individual or collective self-defence. Thus when applying Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it concerns collective defence operations, which differ from CRO. This article was invoked only once, in 2001 after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Outside of CRO, the most important for the Alliance’s position in the international system are PSO. The NATO PSO concept was formed very gradually. At present, it is very thoroughly elaborated in the Alliance’s doctrinal documents defining NATO PSO as “multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief.\(^{(AJP 2001)}\) NATO PSO are undertaken upon request and under the mandate of an international authority (UN/OSCE etc.) and on the grounds of the decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

In fact, we distinguish two types of operations in crisis management, regardless of the international organization undertaking them. They are operations carried out according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter (peaceful dispute settlement) and operations within Chapter VII (peace enforcement actions). NATO PSO are multi-functional operations in the sense that they include a large range of activities, from classical UN peacekeeping to activities belonging to peace enforcement operations. Hence they can be placed among actions conducted “half way” between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. half way between the pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement operations. According to Zůna, NATO PSO differ from war in the fact that there is no explicitly defined opponent to them (Zůna 2002: 40).
NATO’s actual entry into this area was quite fast. Already in June 1992, i.e. nearly a year after the ultimate end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, the NATO Council decided at the Oslo meeting to support peacekeeping activities within CSCE. (See Löwe 1994: 168; Baxter 1996: 6) In December 1992, at the ministerial meeting in Brussels, the Alliance included UN peacekeeping among supported peacekeeping activities. From the practical point of view, it was necessary to draw up key doctrinal documents which the Alliance would follow in these operations. (Velitchova 2002: 15–17)

In the first half of the 1990s, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, the former Minister of Defence of the FRG, wanted NATO, against the background of the conflict in Bosnia, to perform a much more active role in the area of crisis management. Woerner believed that the UN did not have sufficient capacity to cope with such crises and hence NATO’s engagement was absolutely necessary. The desire to justify the need to preserve the Alliance after the end of the Cold War too could also have played a certain role here. Moreover, he did not hesitate to persuade the contemporary American administration about the appropriateness of his attitude. According to Ryan C. Hendrickson, his influence on NATO’s orientation was crucial. (See Hendrickson 2004: 508–527) After his death, this course of development was pursued by his successor Willy Claes, who had to solve problems connected to the military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina called Deliberate Force in particular. (Hendrickson 2004: 95–117)

Nowadays, within PSO, the deployed NATO forces fulfil a broad range of tasks. The Alliance monitors the adherence to peace treaties and ceasefire agreements; it mediates between the sides of the conflict; it is active in the reform of the security sector; it provides military support to international organizations and oversees the implementation of sanctions and embargoes, and distributes humanitarian and other assistance; it is in charge of mine clearance; it supervises territory demilitarization and arms control; it contributes to the training of the state’s future military forces; it supports humanitarian aid; it supports human rights organizations; it assists in election planning and monitoring; it maintains the restoration of public order and the rule of law, it searches for war criminals and brings them to particular international judicial institutions; and it assists in operations leading to the country’s economic restoration and reconstruction. (Wilkinson 2000: 74–76).
Hence, at present there are three basic principles defined for carrying out NATO PSO: the impartiality principle, the consensus principle and the principle of restricted use of force. Impartiality is the key principle for NATO PSO. It means that NATO PSO must be conducted in accordance with the mandate and the operation must not favour any party of the dispute. (Donald 2003: 431) In this concept, applying force against any party of the conflict is a consequence of its activities threatening the fulfilment of the operation’s mandate or international humanitarian law. Yet the use of force is not automatic. It depends on whether it is purposeful from the perspective of the mandate of the mission. An important feature of impartiality is the transparency of the entire process. (AJP 2001) The use of force itself is then no longer impartial. (Zůna 2002: 41). The party consensus principle is based on the parties’ consent for conducting an operation and cooperation with NATO. The consensus of parties results in achieving a political solution of the situation and ensuring peace.(AJP 2001) The consensus of conflict parties can vary during NATO PSO depending on a number of factors. In civil and interstate conflicts, it is enough to achieve a minimal consensus, or the parties’ mere tolerance towards the operation is sufficient as well. (Wilkinson 2000: 72) The Alliance uses the consensus principle as a demarcation criterion differentiating peacekeeping operations from peace enforcement operations. (Donald 2003: 431) If necessary, obtaining consent with an Alliance operation can be also enforced by military force. (Zůna 2002: 55) Use of force is not as restrictive within NATO PSO as in the case of UN peacekeeping and it goes far beyond the framework of mere self-defence. Its use in order to implement the mission’s mandate is possible and usual. The limits that are the result of the mission’s mandate and reality in the area of deployment are defined in ROE. The Alliance adopts the approach that when using force, it must take into account the impact on carrying out non-military activities as well as the impact on the actions of other actors who pursue the same goals as the operation led by NATO. (AJP 2001)

Over the past 20 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has conducted several dozen NATO peace support operations. At present (2014), the most complex operation of the North Atlantic Alliance is taking place in Afghanistan, where NATO has led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) since 2003. It is definitely not the only Alliance operation nowadays. The North Atlantic Alliance further remains present in Kosovo.
Since 2001, it has been carrying out monitoring via Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea, focused primarily against terrorist activities. Furthermore, piracy is suppressed in Operation Ocean Shield, following Operation Allied Provider and Operation Allied Protector off the Horn of Africa. Moreover, since 2007 NATO has been supporting AMISOM, the African Union mission in Somalia. (NATO 2013e)

In general, the extending NATO engagement in PSO generates pressure on the adaptation of NATO military structures and member states’ armies towards smaller, more flexible and voluntarily recruited structures. (Ivanov 2011: 85)

Another important consequence of these operations is an everyday and very intensive cooperation with the UN. Its forms vary, starting from creating a secure environment for UN activities in Kosovo and ending with the protection of vessels with humanitarian aid for Somalia. Despite this, as is pointed out by Michael F. Harsch and Johannes Varvick, the relations between the UN and NATO are intricate, as the Alliance is perceived by a part of its members as a relic of the Cold War and the tool of American influence. Since 2005, the Alliance has been striving to formalize relations in the form of a joint declaration with the aim of accomplishing a similar relationship as is held by other regional organizations in the world (African Union and ASEAN). Finally, formalizing the relationship was also important for the Alliance due to both organizations being mutually interdependent in many respects, especially in solving armed conflicts, the UN on the Alliance in peace enforcement operations and NATO on the UN in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. Last but not least, the Alliance thus gains a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community as an agent in solving armed conflicts. After several postponements, this declaration was signed on 23 September 2008. (More in Harsch – Varwick 2009: 5–12)

This work does not aim to give a detailed analysis of all military operations in which NATO has participated since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, some of them have represented a real milestone in NATO’s history and thus they will be paid further attention in greater detail. The first great Alliance engagement in peace support operations started in the Balkans and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the role of NATO had changed from the protector of UNPROFOR into the guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement. NATO’s engagement in Bosnia is also
interesting in that after its termination, the mission was taken over by the European Union, and this organization was provided with NATO military capacities within the Berlin Plus agreement. Another breakthrough Alliance mission was Kosovo. It was a breakthrough because it was the first time in its history that NATO had entered a war; moreover, this in contradiction to international law. This involvement is closely connected to NATO’s participation in the stabilization of Macedonia. This case is interesting and exceptional also because international community’s tools of early warning before the conflict’s escalation and de-escalation functioned in its early stages and NATO played a crucial role there. As was already mentioned above, today’s most complex Alliance operation is the engagement in Afghanistan, which has had a major impact on the form of NATO over the last decade in many parameters, starting from strategic concepts and ending with adaptation of military structures. On the other hand, Operation Unified Protector in Libya is significant as well, as it is the first attempt at using the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) concept, yet at the same time there were certain doubts whether NATO had rigorously followed the mandate given by UN SC resolutions. The case of Iraq, even though NATO did not take a direct part in it, also influenced the functioning and form of the Alliance. And to conclude, in connection to the September 11 terrorist attacks, it was the first time that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked, which also represents a milestone in NATO’s history.

5.2 NATO’S ENGAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The North Atlantic Alliance had passed its “apprenticeship exam” in conducting military operations supporting peace in the Balkans, in particular on the territory of former Yugoslavia. NATO’s military engagement in the conflict on Bosnian territory started in summer 1992 by Operation Maritime Monitor based on the mandate of the UN SC resolution 713. By this resolution, the international community imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. (UN SC 1991) Another UN SC resolution 757 imposed an economic embargo on the “rump” Yugoslavia (Serbia–Montenegro) (UN SC 1992). The aim of NATO, implied from the afore-mentioned resolutions, was to supervise the observation of the embargo on arms
import to the whole territory of former Yugoslavia and the 1992 economic embargo against Yugoslavia. Later on, between 1992 and 1993, the Alliance also carried out an air monitoring operation Sky Monitor to support the international effort to stabilize Bosnia, which was launched on the basis of UN SC resolution 781. The resolution established a no-fly zone over the airspace of Bosnia and banned all military flights except for flights in favour of the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force). NATO monitoring operations did not prove to be a very efficient tool to de-escalate the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Hence the Alliance switched in the region to the policy of enforcing arms and economic embargoes through operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Guard. However, this policy was not consistent, as the Western countries tolerated the supplies of military material to Croatia and Bosnia, both from Western and some Islamic countries. Thus they helped to eliminate the initial supremacy of Bosnian Serbs in heavy arms. Another important Alliance engagement in Bosnia was Operation Deny Flight between 12 April 1993 and 20 December 1995. UN SC resolution 836 from 4 June 1993 allowed the Alliance, based on the request of UNPROFOR, to conduct airstrikes against ground targets in order to protect “safe areas” declared by the international community and in other explicitly mentioned cases. The particular task of Operation Deny Flight was to monitor the airspace over Bosnia and enforce the compliance with the restriction on flights in the no-fly zones, provide close air support to UN forces and, on the grounds of a UN request, conduct airstrikes against targets posing a threat to the safe areas. NATO’s engagement had been shifted towards peace enforcement (Gray 2008: 290). During Operation Deny Flight, NATO in cooperation with the UN, with different degrees of success, enforced by the threat of air attacks the withdrawal of heavy arms from the surroundings of Sarajevo and their placement under the supervision of UN forces, carried out airstrikes for the protection of the UNPROFOR, and protected “safe areas” (Findlay 2002: 241–252; Tesař 1999: 321–322). Whilst NATO was successful in enforcing a no-flight zone, the Alliance fulfilled other tasks with various results.

In the course of Operation Deny Flight, after the fall of the “safe areas” in eastern Bosnia and the Srebrenica massacre, Bosnian Serbs violated the protected area of the UN – Sarajevo by their attack on a market full of civilians on 28 August 1995 and rejected the requests of
the UN and NATO to withdraw heavy arms. The Alliance responded to this event on the grounds of UN SC resolution 836 with an intensive air campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, which started on 30 August 1995. Even though NATO Secretary General Willy Claes warned other parties of the dispute not to make use of this situation for their own benefit, as NATO wanted to remain seemingly neutral in the conflict, the Alliance action benefited the opponents of Bosnian Serbs, who used the new situation to conquer vast areas in Central and Western Bosnia (Hladký 2005: 288). The Alliance did not want to disturb the balance of power in the conflict. General Michael Ryan stated that the operation had not aimed to defeat the Bosnian-Serb army on the battlefield, but to put an end to its attacks on Sarajevo (Beale 1997: 36). It cannot be deduced from the way of conducting the entire operation that its strategic goal would be a total military defeat of Bosnian-Serb troops. By the operation, the Alliance pursued the strategic goal of not permitting a re-upheaval of the balance of power in the area for the benefit of Bosnian Serbs, which could have occurred in the case of the fall of the “safe areas”. On 12 October 1995, after delays from Bosnian Muslims, who wanted to make use of their achieved predominance to maximize territorial profits, a ceasefire was concluded. An agreement terminating the violent stage of the conflict was finally signed after the meeting in Dayton on 14 December 1995. Based on Dayton, the Alliance launched Operation Joint Endeavour on 20 December 1995, which was carried out by IFOR (Implementation Force).

Operation Joint Endeavour monitored compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The mission had the following primary tasks: 1. enforcing the cessation of hostility along the agreed line of ceasefire; 2. establishing a separation zone between the Serb troops and the forces of the Bosnian government; 3. monitoring the withdrawal of heavy arms and their storage or demobilization; and 4. control of the airspace over Bosnia (OHR 1995). Simultaneously, the operation would provide a safe environment for the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR troops that had not been transferred under IFOR, and the free movement of persons all over the country. The wording of the Dayton Peace Agreement justified NATO creation of conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced people. The Alliance participated in the provision of security in the first elections after the end of the civil war in
September 1996. The United Nations Organization, non-governmental organizations, media and public intellectuals put pressure on NATO to extend its tasks by the prosecution of war criminals and fulfilling police tasks. Finally, the Alliance did get involved in these areas, even though it had always emphasized the need of collaboration with other international organizations. Nevertheless, the Alliance fulfilled these tasks and the collaboration of NATO and the UN was evaluated as good (Smith 2010: 24–25).

By UN SC resolution 1031 adopted on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Alliance received a sufficiently robust mandate, as the resolution “authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack” (UN SC 1995). In its initial stages, approximately 60,000 soldiers took part in Operation Joint Endeavour, 50,000 soldiers out of which came from NATO member states and around 10,000 soldiers from non-member countries. As opposed to UNPROFOR, the main difference lay in the massive American peacekeeping presence. (Ivanov 2011: 86).

After the successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the NATO’s engagement in solving the Bosnian issue continued with operation Joint Guard and the subsequent operation Joint Forge, taking place up to 2 December 2004. These operations were carried out by the SFOR (Stabilization Force) contingent. The international-law basis for the operation conducted by SFOR was given by the UN SC resolution 1088 from 12 December 1996, adopted on the grounds of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this resolution, the UN SC “authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish for a planned period of 18 months a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the legal successor to IFOR under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement; 19. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 18 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by SFOR as may be necessary
to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of SFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to SFOR's taking such measures.” (UN SC 1996) The number of troops deployed gradually declined and it oscillated around 12,000 soldiers at the time of ending the NATO engagement and the operation being taken over by the European Union in December 2004. In this process, they used the mechanism known as Berlin Plus, which makes it possible to assign NATO capacities for the needs of the European Union.

The engagement in Bosnia is important for NATO, especially as the doctrinal documents for NATO PSO were created against its background and the participation in crisis management had become this organization’s daily routine. Moreover, the Alliance also learned close cooperation with other international organizations, especially with the UN. And last but not least, this engagement revealed existing deficits in military sphere and contributed to the debate about the necessity to overcome great differences in the military capacities of the USA and European members. The main importance of this engagement lies in the fact that the Alliance has mentally coped with the fact that it is a major agent in the field of crisis management. On the other hand, experience with using force against Bosnian Serbs had led to false conclusions about its efficiency, which became evident later in solving the Kosovo crisis.

5.3 NATO ENGAGEMENT IN KOSOVO

5.3.1 Genesis of the Kosovo crisis and evolution of NATO politics

The Kosovo crisis served as a major catalyst of the development of Alliance abilities to take part in crisis management. The conclusion that it was the Alliance’s “journeyman ship exam” is not far-fetched at all. As opposed to the crisis in Bosnia, it was a conflict that NATO had entered before the conflict parties themselves created a deadlock. At that time, it was by far the most complex Alliance engagement with a very strong humanitarian aspect, struggle for nation building and, after the adoption of UN SC resolution 1244, also a democratizing ambition. However, the Alliance got involved in the solution of the Kosovo crisis step by step.
The entire 1980s was a period of permanent tension in Kosovo. After the general strike in 1989, Kosovo and Vojvodina were deprived of their autonomy (Schultz 2008: 15). Despite that, before 1990 the majority of Albanians had supported the continuation of a reformed Yugoslavia (IICK 2000: 42–43). From the early 1990s, their final goal was to gain independence from Kosovo via delegitimizing Yugoslav state institutions (IICK 2000: 44–48). In the first half of the 1990s, the main agent of the conflict on the Albanian side was the League for Democratic Kosovo – LDK, led by Ibrahim Rugova, who preferred the strategy of non-violent resistance. Approximately since the mid-1990s, LDK’s influence on the events in Kosovo had been declining, which was also exacerbated by the omission of the Kosovo issue from the Dayton conference programme. Rugova was unable to respond to this fact and mobilise Kosovar Albanians to manifest their resistance (Judah 2000: 67–68). The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), arising from political radical (former Marxists of various characters, students and admirers of the anti-Serb resistance and the bandit tradition of the region) and criminal (smugglers, human and drug traffickers) elements of Albanian society in Kosovo and the foreign diaspora, gradually came to prominence. (Duignan 2000: 93; IICK 2000: 51–52; Judah 2000: 61–69). The leadership of the KLA was gradually assumed by Hashim Thaci. The KLA, offering an alternative of violent struggle for the rights of Albanians living in Kosovo, had been viewed in the West up until the 1990s as a terrorist organization. (Henrikсен 2007: 129) Nevertheless, according to the official standpoint of the North Atlantic Alliance, the KLA was established as a direct product of the repressive Serb politics (Robertson 2000: 6). Gradually, the KLA grew stronger and stronger and by the beginning of 1999 it already had several thousands of fighters at its disposal. At the turn of 1997 to 1998, the KLA launched an enormous, and for the West and Yugoslavia also surprising, campaign against the Yugoslav security forces in the Drenica Valley. (Judah 2000: 70). Milošević in retaliation launched intensive military operations against the KLA, which also had a great impact on Albanian civilians. According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), between February 1998 and March 1999, the fighting in Kosovo had caused around 1,000 civilian casualties and over 400,000 people had fled or had been expelled from the country (IICK 2000: 2).
The international community had come to realize that it would have to deal with the problem, if it was not to escalate into a crisis of a similar extent as in Bosnia. From the turn of 1997 and 1998, the West started to pay more and more attention to the conflict in Kosovo both on the basis of the Contact Group and bilaterally. Progress had not been achieved until Richard Holbrook’s meeting with Belgrade on 6 October 1998 supported by the OSCE. To promote its requirements, the Alliance pursued a coercive strategy on 13 October 1998 by adopting the so-called “activation orders” for airstrikes (NATO 1998). Under the threat of Alliance airstrikes, Yugoslavia gave its consent to the fulfilment of UN SC resolution 1199, restricted its military operations in Kosovo as well as the presence of security forces (McGwire 2000: 15). The KLA was not involved in this diplomatic process and after the withdrawal of Serb security forces, it filled the vacuum that had been produced. (Henriksen 2007: 151–155).

The “Račak Massacre” in January 1999, in which 45 persons lost their lives in controversial and unclear circumstances, made the Contact Group draw up and propose a complex plan for solving the crisis (Weller 1999: 219–221). Even though at that time some European states already suspected the KLA of having been trying to elicit an inadequate response from Belgrade by its provocations (Kaplan 2010: 177), it eventually supported the representatives of the tough line in the West. The Contact Group agreed on many firmly formulated principles for solving the entire problem of Kosovo, which at a general level presupposed putting an end to violence, territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, establishing democratic and sovereign institutions in Kosovo, protection of human rights, and implementation of the agreement with the participation of international institutions (Weller 1999: 225–226). The key negotiations about the solution of the crisis took place against the background of threats of a military intervention against Serbia, in February and March 1999 in Rambouillet in France.

The final version of the Western proposal of the agreement called the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo comprised the following key points: immediate cessation of hostilities, a peaceful solution of the conflict, a three-year interim period before determining the final status of Kosovo, providing territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, self-government for Kosovo, the assertion of human rights and freedoms, protection of minorities, free elections under the supervision of OSCE,
amnesty for acts related to the conflict, the withdrawal of the vast majority of Yugoslav security forces, and an international peacekeeping presence under the command of NATO in Kosovo (UN SC 1999b). Both rounds of negotiations failed. The agreement was ultimately signed only by the delegation of Kosovar Albanians, even though it was not satisfied with the results either, as they did not guarantee the possibility of obtaining independence after the end of the three-year interim period. The agreement included a reference to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act (Weller 1999: 245). In the passages about the inviolability of frontiers in Europe except for changes by peaceful means and with the consent of the affected sides, this act gave great space to the rejection of Kosovar independence by Yugoslavia. The United States had to put diplomatic pressure on the Albanian side in order to persuade it to sign it (Hehir 2006: 69). As is stated by Marc Weller, the solution of the Kosovar status, even though unsatisfactory from the perspective of Kosovar Albanians, was balanced by NATO’s robust peacekeeping presence in the province (Weller 1999: 250). However, this aspect of solution was not acceptable for Belgrade, which at certain stages of negotiations suggested deploying sparse and lightly armed UN troops (Hehir 2006: 69–70). As the LDK and KLA wanted to achieve a NATO peacekeeping presence in Kosovo and were interested in keeping Western support, they could not but agree with this agreement. In 1999, neither the West nor other Balkan countries wished for an independent Kosovo (IICK 2000: 154–155). The main problem of negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris lay in the mutually exclusive requirements of the conflict parties. Kosovar Albanians had not been satisfied for a long time with the restoration of autonomy and had been requesting independence on the basis of the right of self-determination, whilst Serbs offered autonomy as the greatest concession possible, referring to historical demands and the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe by the use of force included in the Helsinki Final Act. Ten years before that, autonomy may have been a sufficient solution for Kosovar Albanians, yet in 1999 this was no longer true. From that moment, the crisis had inevitably led to a military solution.

On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Alliance responded with air-strikes – prepared from spring 1998 and announced in advance – against Yugoslavia under the code Allied Force, which ended on 10 June 1999. In the airstrikes period, the number of approximately 400,000 refugees
was increased by 863,000 more people who fled or were expelled outside Kosovo, plus also 590,000 internally displaced persons. Despite the ongoing air strikes, 40,000 members of the Yugoslav security forces supported by 300 tanks clearly predominated over the KLA, which had around 18,000 fighters (IICK 2000: 86–87). The ethnic cleansing of Kosovo intensified in the third week of Alliance strikes (Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999: 540).

In April 1999, hence after the beginning of airstrikes, top representatives of NATO member states modified the political aims of these airstrikes in the following way: 1. unarguable end to all military actions, violence and displacement, 2. withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, 3. stationing of international forces in Kosovo, 4. creating conditions for the return of refugees and work of international organizations, and 5. making a political agreement for Kosovo based on the Rambouillet Accords and in accordance with international law (NATO 2001f).

Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia was the first of NATO’s wars. Despite the high number of involved members (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United States, Turkey and the UK), the entire air operation took place under the tutelage of the United States, which carried the greatest military burden in this campaign. The United States provided 61 % of all fighter planes and pilotless reconnaissance means deployed in the operation. American personnel comprised 75 % members of NATO armed forces in the Kosovo operation (Ham 2005). The American air forces carried out 62 % of all combat flights (Auerswald 2004: 646). European powers contributed fighter planes in the following way: France 84 planes, Italy 58 planes, Great Britain 39 planes and Germany 33 planes (U.S. DoD 2000: 78). In the beginning, 400 planes were deployed in the campaign. When NATO had proceeded to attack strategic targets in Serbia, the number of planes participating in the campaign was increased up to 1000. (Manulak 2011: 364; Lambeth 2001: 35).

Within Operation Allied Force, the North Atlantic Alliance flew 38,400 sorties and 10,484 strike sorties (IICK 2000: 92). Its length of 78 days is not a very long time, yet the total length significantly exceeded the expectations of NATO political elites and the public. The immediate effect of airstrikes on undermining the capacity of Yugoslav forces to
terrorize civilians and fight with the armed, which had been the first goal declared by NATO, was more than dubious. According to the evaluation of the success of the strikes after the end of the fighting, NATO airstrikes on tactical targets were in fact unsuccessful and caused minimal damage (Barry – Evan 2000). In spite of that, after all, Wesley Clark is right in his conclusion that NATO had eventually destroyed enough targets, as the political aim of the campaign had already been accomplished in fact (Robertson 2000: 27). It was Yugoslavia and not NATO that had to make essential changes in its policy. Therefore, if Michael Mandelbaum at that time referred to the operation as a military success and political disaster, an opposite conclusion is closer to reality. The Alliance was much less militarily successful than it was thought at the time of conducting the operations. Nevertheless, a military disaster was finally enough for a political victory, lying in the fact that the responsibility for Kosovo was assumed by the international community represented by the UN.

5.3.2 Problematical character of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo

Even today, the 1999 Alliance military intervention in Kosovo within Operation Allied Force is still a rather controversial matter. The Alliance engagement had no UN SC mandate, as the entire matter had not been brought up to the Security Council at all for fear of the Chinese and Russian veto. Both countries interpreted the entire matter as interference in the internal matters of a sovereign state and viewed it as a dangerous precedent due to its internal affairs (Bjola 2005: 290). Another reason was that the Clinton administration was not interested in obtaining the UN SC mandate as it did not want to be constrained by this organization during the military operation itself (Weinberger 2002: 254). Be it because of any of the afore-mentioned reasons, since summer 1998 the United States had been trying to find arguments confirming the possibility of intervention even without the explicit authorization of the UN SC (Kille and Hendrickson 2010: 512, Kaplan 2010: 174).

The UN Security Council’s appraisal of the entire situation in Kosovo had its dynamics and had been evolving gradually. By its resolution 1160 from 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council called upon the conflict parties to seek a political solution, condemned violent acts of all conflict
parties, imposed an embargo on Yugoslavia as well as guerrilla and terrorist groups in Kosovo, confirmed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and encouraged allowing Kosovar Albanians a great deal of autonomy. Hence the resolution condemned both the excessive use of force against Albanians by the Yugoslav security forces and acts of terrorism committed by the KLA or other actors, and emphasised the necessity to use non-violent measures in settling the dispute. The resolution made it expressly clear that the Kosovo issue had to be solved in accordance with the principle of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, yet it simultaneously stated that the rights of Kosovar Albanians had to be protected and they were to be allowed to participate in Kosovo’s administration (RB OSN 1998a). This resolution did not yet explicitly refer to the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security, even though it imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia (Kritsiotis 2000: 333–334).

The West responded to the Yugoslav military campaign against the KLA from the spring and summer 1998 by making diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, which resulted in UN SC resolution 1199 from 23 September 1998. The UN Security Council condemned all acts of violence and the displacement of 230,000 Kosovars, admitted the deterioration of the security situation in Kosovo, required the end of hostilities, a ceasefire, solving disputes by non-violent means, improving the humanitarian situation and Yugoslavia’s cooperation with international organizations. This resolution already contains a reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was a very significant shift in comparison with the previous resolution. The situation in Kosovo is interpreted as an impending humanitarian disaster. Nevertheless, this resolution does not include an authorisation to adopt any enforcement provisions against Yugoslavia, and the UN looked further for a solution to the crisis in the dialogue of Kosovar Albanians with Yugoslav political authorities (RB OSN 1998b).

Based on UN SC resolution 1203 from 24 October 1998, OSCE sent a verification mission (OSCE-KVM) to Kosovo in order to monitor the ceasefire. This resolution stresses the need of implementing the previous resolutions, emphasizes the obligation of UN members to retain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and describes the situation in Kosovo in a similar spirit to previous resolutions. Furthermore, it condemns the acts of violence and terrorism committed in order to achieve political goals.
The humanitarian situation is further referred to as worrying. The resolution welcomes the agreement between the Contact Group and Yugoslav political authorities about the reduced presence of Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo. This resolution does not even contain any authorization clauses from which any state or international organization could deduce its right to enforce the requirements of the UN Security Council by military force (RB OSN 1998c).

On the whole, we can say that the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council (1160, 1199, 1203) contain certain common points that must be taken into account when evaluating the situation: the responsibility of Yugoslavia for the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, condemnation of the use of excessive force by Yugoslav security forces and the terrorist activities of Kosovar Albanians, appeals for ending the fighting intended for all the conflict parties, announcement of the violation of human rights, and the conclusion that this phenomenon is not viewed by the international community exclusively as an internal matter of Yugoslavia (IICK 2000: 142). The resolutions do not comprise any authorisation to use the threat of military force or use military force, which is essential to be in accordance with international law, if the military operation does not take place within the realms of self-defence.

The UN SC resolutions mentioned above show that the Alliance did not unreasonably attack an irreproachable member of the international community. On 26 March 1999, the UN Security Council refused to condemn these Alliance attacks by a vote of 12:3. A resolution condemning the use of force by NATO members against Yugoslavia was proposed on 25 March 1999 by these three states: Russia, India and Belarus (Kritsiotis 2000: 347). When justifying this military operation, NATO member states and Alliance representatives used two lines of argumentation: humanitarian-human-rights and international-law (Kritsiotis 2000: 339–345). The UN General Secretary Kofi Annan did emphasize the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for keeping international peace and security and criticized the absent authorization of NATO to intervene, but he did not question the need of military action as such. Annan also said about this issue: “While the genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder, the more recent conflict in Kosovo has prompted important questions about the consequences of action in the absence of complete unity on the part of the international
community. It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been called, humanitarian intervention: on one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a United Nations mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The inability of the international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile these two equally compelling interests – universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human rights – can be viewed only as a tragedy. It has revealed the core challenge to the Security Council and to the United Nations as a whole in the next century: to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to stand.” (UNGA 1999) The UN further cooperated with NATO in solving the Kosovo crisis (Kille a Hendrickson 2010: 513–514, Kaplan 2010: 174–175, 179).

5.3.3 Further development of the Alliance engagement in Kosovo

While the Alliance operation Allied Force was quite obviously illegal from the perspective of international law, the NATO engagement in Kosovo within Operation Joint Guardian, which has been going on up until today (since 2005 as Joint Enterprise), is not problematic as regards the mandate. The 1998 Kosovo declaration of independence did not change much about the NATO engagement. When Yugoslavia had met the Alliance requirements and Operation Allied Force had ended, KFOR (Kosovo Force) was deployed in Kosovo. According to UN SC resolution 1244, their mandate was to “establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission; contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations; provide appropriate control of the borders of fry in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM [Macedonia] until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN.” (UN SC 1999a) The resolution was adopted by 14 votes with one abstention from China. The resolution demanded the end of violence and repression in Kosovo, the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, an international peacekeeping presence in Kosovo, the ensuring of safe return for all refugees, KLA’s demilitari-
zation and the establishment of an interim administration. All legislative and executive powers were assumed by UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo). The executive body responsible for implementing the resolution was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN SC 1999a). As a consequence of this resolution, a UN protectorate was established over Kosovo. De iure, Kosovo further remained under the control of Belgrade; de facto the power was taken by UNMIK supported by other institutions of the international community including NATO. The passages confirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia were asserted into the proposal of the resolution by Russia and China (Warbrick 2008: 677).

When Operation Allied Force was over, the international community’s primary goal was not to launch democratization in Kosovo. Based on UN SC resolution 1244, Kosovo became a UN protectorate with a very slight possibility of autonomous administration. (Marten 2004: 44–52) Nevertheless, in the long-term perspective, the international community did pursue the goal of democratizing Kosovo. It was OSCE that was in charge of these activities. The international community’s activities created conditions for forming the self-governing organs in Kosovo that started to overtake part of UNMIK’s powers (Woehrel, Kim 2005: 4–7).

As is pointed out by Daniel Silander, it was another evolution of UN peacekeeping, which had developed very dynamically after the end of the Cold War. UN peacekeeping operations of the first generation required the consent of conflict parties, they could use force only in self-defence and their task was especially to monitor the situation in the crisis region. Second generation peacekeeping could already take place without the consent of all conflict parties and it took over many tasks of state and public administration in the affected regions. Third generation peacekeeping again extended the tasks and scope of peacekeeping forces. The country’s overall post-conflict reconstruction is often within its framework. According to Silander, the UN engagement via UNMIK in Kosovo and UN engagement in East Timor make up a special category of fourth generation peacekeeping, which is based on a very wide mandate of the UN SC. In his opinion, fourth generation peacekeeping strives to build up state structures in failing states, or also to establish state institutions that have never existed on the particular territory in the past, and assume for a certain interim period a complex responsibility for the administra-
tion of the particular territory and its preparation for the future autonomous development (Silander 2009: 23–24).

After several years of international protectorate over Kosovo, the future status of Kosovo became a crucial and controversial issue. On 14 February 2005, the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was appointed a UN special envoy charged with preparation of the future status of Kosovo. Negotiations over the final status of Kosovo took place with little success since February 2006 in Vienna. (Berend 2006: 413; D’Aspremont 2007: 651). The attitudes of Kosovar Albanians and Serbia were as incompatible as in 1999. In 2006, it was clear that Kosovar Albanians would not agree with a return to the situation before 1999 when Kosovo was only a Serb province (Mema 2006: 161–162). On the contrary, Serbia demanded that the final status of Kosovo lie in autonomy within Serbia. Both sides firmly defended their incompatible requirements in the negotiations (UN SC 2007: par. 2).

Finally, the issue of Kosovo’s future status was dealt with by Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, introduced on 2 February 2007 and passed to the UN SC on 26 March 2007. It was also recommended by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (UN SC 2007: 1). The plan presupposed that Kosovo would obtain limited independence, which was referred to as the only viable solution of the entire issue (UN SC 2007: par. 10). Independent Kosovo was to further remain under the supervision of the international community. However, the plan actually anticipated the establishment of institutions typical of an independent democratic state, i.e. bodies of state power built upon the principle of its distribution and restriction. Security institutions should be established – the police, intelligence service and the rudiments of an army. Kosovo should have the right to conclude some international treaties. Even though Kosovo should further remain under the supervision of international institutions, its bodies were to be granted exclusive responsibility in the areas under their control. On the whole, this document outlined as a goal the establishment of a democratic and decentralized state built upon the rule of law, which would guarantee a high standard of human rights for all its inhabitants and special rights for ethnic minorities in the field of education and healthcare. Refugees’ rights to return should be protected and there should be mechanisms enabling the settlement of property lawsuits resulting from their return. According to the plan, an international
presence (UN, OSCE, NATO and EU) should be maintained in the country. The responsibility for the plan’s implementation was to be assumed exclusively by Kosovar political authorities. The Kosovo Protection Corps was to be transformed into small armed forces (Kosovo Security Force – KSF) subject to the supervision of KFOR. KSF was to have 2,500 active soldiers and 800 reservists. Kosovo was not allowed to enter a state union with other states. The implementation of the Ahtisaari plan was to be supervised by the International Civilian Representative (ICR) led by the International Civilian Office (ICO) (RB 2007: 6–9).

Given this situation, on 17 February 2008, Kosovar politicians, after being assured about the political support of the West, unilaterally declared independence. Kosovar independence was immediately acknowledged by the USA and later on by other states. Nevertheless, the USA did not regard this process as a precedent for other regions (Bislimi 2012: 58). Out of 27 EU members, 22 states also acknowledged Kosovar independence. The European Union exerted political pressure on Serbia in order to make it change its negative attitude. Serbia refused, pointing out the unprecedentedness of the entire case (Hannum 2011: 159). The independence of Kosovo has been recognized by 88 countries. The UN Security Council has not been able to agree on its standpoint, which shows the factionalism of attitudes of the international community as regards this issue (Warbric 2008: 686–687). Kosovar politicians declared their willingness to adhere to the Ahtisaari plan and guarantee the rights of minorities, which was evident also from the Kosovar constitution. (Woehrel 2012: 1). The Alliance still remains present in the country on the grounds of UN SC resolution 1244 and intends to remain in Kosovo until the SC adopts another decision (NATO 2008).

Although the results of the international community’s intervention in Kosovo are often subject to criticism, the situation in this country is quite different nowadays than it was in the 1990s. Kosovo is no longer at the centre of attention of world news agencies, as the conflict has de-escalated to the level of a latent conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. The valid Kosovar constitution has implemented quite a lot from the Ahtisaari plan. Kosovo is a decentralized state setting quotas (10 seats for Serbs and 10 seats for other minorities out of the total of 120) for the representation of minorities in the Parliament as well as at the local level. Minorities’ interests are represented in the Permanent Committee. Mi-
norities do not have the possibility to veto proposals of decisions. Local municipalities have the right to establish trans-frontier cooperation. In combination with the distribution of inhabitants with Serbs inhabiting the northern part of the country and some isolated enclaves in Kosovo, a considerable degree of territorial autonomy is formed. Although there are voices among Albanians criticizing this state, a high degree of autonomy for minorities has become the reality in Kosovo (Stroschein 2008: 662–663, 665). The level of violence in the country is much lower than it used to be, despite the security situation being complicated in the north of the country and rare outbreaks of unrest. The Kosovo security forces sometimes pester Serb inhabitants of Kosovo, for example by confiscating property marked by Serb symbols (UN SC 2012: par. 9, 10, 15–18, 45 and p. 11).

On the whole, Kosovo is striving to build democratic institutions and wants to become a member of the Western institutions in the medium term. At least on the level of rhetoric, the country is aspiring to achieve EU membership. Before the declaration of independence, the then government of Kosovo signed the Kosovo Action Plan for the Implementation of European Partnership, which aims to support the country’s European orientation (McKinna 2012: 18). To depict Kosovo as a symbol of destruction and example of failure of the international community is wrong, even though Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo are more likely to live next to each other than together.

In 1999, the Alliance played the role of the peace-enforcer that made Belgrade withdraw from Kosovo and devolve it under international administration. Later on, its role changed into the role of a security guarantor of other international institutions administering Kosovo. After the Kosovar declaration of independence, NATO supervised the situation in the region and deterred the conflict parties from escalating it into a violent conflict.

5.4 MACEDONIA

The NATO engagement in Macedonia started before the escalation of the conflict in 2001. Soon after the declaration of independence, Macedonia started to strive to build closer cooperation with NATO and was success-
ful in this effort, as it joined the PfP programme in 1995. The cooperation of Macedonia with the North Atlantic Alliance significantly intensified in the period of the war of the North Atlantic Alliance against Yugoslavia when 12,000 Alliance soldiers were deployed in Macedonia (Liotta and Jebb 2002: 96–111). After enforcing the departure of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo, the end of Operation Allied Force and beginning of Operation Joint Guardian, these forces were sent to Kosovo. (NATO 2001a).

Regarding the 2001 escalation of the conflict between the Macedonian state and guerrilla groups of Macedonian Albanians, the Macedonian government requested an intervention of the international community against these Albanian guerrilla groups (Waisová 2005: 88). Nevertheless, the West made diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, supported the maintenance of the country’s territorial integrity, emphasized its ability to ensure peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence, condemned acts of violence, and held intensive political and military consultations with Macedonian political authorities (NATO 2001b; NATO 2001c). One can reach the conclusion from available open resources that NATO clearly stood up for the Macedonian government, which it regarded, as opposed to the guerrilla groups, as democratically legitimate. The Alliance rejected attempts at a forcible change of the frontier; KFOR was assigned to guard the frontier between Kosovo and Macedonia and prevent armed people from Kosovo from infiltrating Macedonia. Further on, NATO sent its diplomats to the country (Hans-Joerg Eiff) and strengthened the existing NATO Liaison Office in Skopje. Last but not least, the North Atlantic Alliance called upon its member states to bilaterally support Macedonia (NATO 2001d).

In response to President Trajkovski’s request from 14 June, on 27 June 2001 NATO agreed to station 3,000 soldiers in Macedonia. The North Atlantic Alliance set four general conditions of the engagement itself for the conflict parties, i.e. the Macedonian government and guerrilla groups: reaching a general political agreement between the main political parties, appropriate legal enactment of the status of NATO troops in Macedonia, a time schedule for the handing over of arms, and concluding a permanent ceasefire between the parties (NATO 2001e).

After achieving a ceasefire between the Macedonian security forces and Albanian guerrilla on 5 July 2001 (NATO 2001a), in order to im-
plement the Ohrid Framework Agreement and based on the request by the Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski, military operation Essential Harvest was launched on 22 August (NATO 2002a). Approximately 4,800 soldiers from 17 countries under the UK command took part in the entire operation (BV 2005: 11). The task of this military operation was to collect, within the time interval of 30 days, weapons voluntarily handed over by Albanian guerrilla fighters and pass them on together with ammunition to the Greek contingent in order to be disposed of. Furthermore, NATO forces were to supervise the dissolution of Albanian guerrilla groups (NATO 2002a). The operation had no UN SC mandate, yet it took place after the end of violence, signing the peace treaty, at the invitation of Macedonian political authorities and with the consent of most conflict parties. Consequently, NATO was engaged in the region within operations Amber Fox and Allied Harmony, which had similar tasks to Essential Harvest. In spring 2003, the forces deployed in the region were taken over by the European Union launching its first crisis management military operation entitled Concordia (NATO 2004).

The Alliance proceeded in Macedonia in close cooperation with other international institutions. (Hatay 2005: 39–52). The military engagement of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was carried out only after the diplomatic pressure of the international community, was a guarantee for the belligerent sides that the treaties concluded would be adhered to. The Macedonia case is a unique example of successful prevention of conflict escalation and quick reaction by the international community. The North Atlantic Alliance played a major role in these processes.

5.5 NATO AND AFGHANISTAN

If Bosnia was the apprenticeship and Kosovo the journeymanship exam testing the Alliance’s ability to conduct crisis management, Afghanistan is definitely a masterwork. Never in its history had the Alliance carried out a more complex operation in which it would simultaneously wage war against rebels, reconstruct the country and lay the firm foundations of a modern state. NATO’s path to Afghanistan was not simple or straight.

The American administration responded to terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 by a campaign that it itself referred to as “the war on
terror”. Within this campaign, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants states the right of collective or individual self-defence. By its resolutions 1368 and 1373, the UN Security Council also clearly expressed its viewpoint and called upon its member states to bring to justice all persons that had prepared, organized or sponsored these terrorist attacks. In order to understand the international community’s attitude to the terrorist attacks of 11 September, it is essential to know that the UN General Assembly, which, however, possesses a consultative vote only, did not refer to these acts as an attack. In spite of this, it encouraged international cooperation to punish the perpetrators. (Murphy 2002: 244) The September 11 terrorist attacks were quickly responded to by NATO. Already on 12 September 2001, an interim decision was reached about invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. After proving the foreign origin of the attacks, the interim decision was confirmed. (Bennett 2001/2002: 6)

The Taliban, after a series of open American appeals and informal negotiations with the Americans, refused to extradite Bin Laden. (Murphy 2002: 243–244) Therefore, the George W. Bush administration decided to destroy the contemporary regime in Afghanistan within its right of individual and collective self-defence. The American military strategy in Afghanistan lay in supporting the Taliban’s enemies using all available means. It concerned airstrikes on the positions of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, training anti-Taliban soldiers, stationing several thousand Special Forces troops directly in Afghanistan, and supplies of material of all kinds. The American policy towards Afghanistan can be interpreted in the way that the US aim was to destroy the terrorist threat to the USA and leave the country’s internal affairs up to the will of Afghan political authorities. The only American request was that it would not be a regime clearly hostile to the USA. (Cf. Rubin 2004: 167) Under outside and inside pressure, the Taliban regime collapsed quite quickly and the international community had to face the question of what the further fate of Afghanistan would be.

At the international conference in Bonn in December 2001, the question of Afghanistan’s future was dealt with. The final Bonn agreement was signed on 5 December and approved by the UN SC on 6 December by resolution 1383. The establishment of ISAF (International Security
Assistance Force) was decided by the UN Security Council by resolution 1386 from 20 December 2001 (UN SC 2001b). It was crucially influenced by the United States (Tomsen 2011: 641–643). The original tasks of ISAF were very restricted, although the UN Security Council resolution was approved within Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council authorized “the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment; 2. Calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of the Force and the Secretary-General” (UN SC 2001b). In the beginning, the international community was only to assist local political authorities, which in actual fact meant helping those warlords who had toppled the Taliban with American help to build the nation. (Merz 2007: 6–7) Gradually, the democratization agenda occurred among the international community’s goals.

The core of ISAF was formed by the armed forces of Western countries, yet up until 2003 it was not a NATO operation. Initially, this idea was perceived negatively by the United States as well. Against the background of controversies surrounding the Iraq war in 2003 and the shift of American attention towards the Near East, the USA revised its negative attitude. (Taylor 2004: 11). At the time of taking the entire operation over by NATO (August 2003), the ISAF mission was restricted to Kabul and its surroundings, but its territorial scope soon started to expand. Formally, NATO’s decision to expand the mission outside Kabul was authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1510 from 13 October 2003 (UN SC 2003). The territorial expansion of the mission’s scope was completed on 5 October 2006 when ISAF had taken under its command international forces operating in the east of Afghanistan. (NATO ISAF 2014)

Besides territorial expansion, ISAF started to broaden its tasks as well. In 2003, contrary to the original plan, the coalition also started to be more engaged outside the security field. On American initiative, first provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) were established, composed of several dozens of soldiers cooperating with civil organizations in reconstructing the sphere of operation. Many NGOs define themselves against
this concept pointing out the loss of a clear distribution of powers between civilian and military sectors. (Petersen 2005: 19–20) An important task of the Alliance is to ensure safe and secure elections. (Goodson 2005: 89–90; Ghufran 2006: 88–90). By expanding the territorial scope of the mission and evolving the ISAF tasks, this mission became the most complex Alliance operation that NATO had ever conducted. In Afghanistan, the Alliance fought the rebels, participated in the build-up of the Afghan security forces, ensured stable and secure environment for other institutions of the international community, carried out the country’s reconstruction via the PRT, and built infrastructure and state institutions. Thus from the war against Al Qaeda responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks, it was transformed into a war against the Taliban waged in order to modernize and democratize a country living under asystem with many parameters of the European Middle Ages. Hence if the West could suppose after the Bonn Conference that it would assist local authorities with the country’s post-war reconstruction, after assuming responsibility for the whole Afghanistan, due to the character of the Western engagement, it was more likely a counterinsurgency operation combined with laying down elementary foundations of a modern state.

NATO got involved in the civil war that had raged in the country since the 1979 Soviet invasion. The conflict in Afghanistan has several overlapping dimensions affecting each other. One is the modernization dimension, i.e. a conflict between a traditional society based on religion and a modern society asserting secularism, which started in the 1920s on Afghan initiative. Another dimension is the socioeconomic conflict between the parts of society benefiting from Western presence and the others. An important facet is that of an ethnic conflict, as Afghanistan has quite an ethnically diverse structure with several dozen varying ethnic groups. The main ethnic groups are the Pashtuns (42%), Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%) and Uzbeks (9%). Another dimension is the conflict over legitimacy between the present government and the Taliban. The conflict also has a regional aspect, as there is a clash of interests in the country of Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, China and recently also the West led by the USA. Last but not least, the conflict in Afghanistan is part of the American “war on terror”. The conflict in Afghanistan was definitely not launched by the West, which did not get involved in it until the 1979 Soviet invasion and then especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001. (Bell 2013: 6–16) Therefore, it cannot be terminated by the West either.

Besides the intricate situation on the spot, additional problems had generated restrictions and caveats of the individual Alliance armies restricting the deployment in Afghanistan. This concerns rules setting limits for conducting military operations by their prohibition from participating in some types of operations or to operate in certain areas. The most severe problems are not the restrictions but the caveats, which are only anticipated, but still observed. This situation makes it very complicated for commanders planning operations. At the national level, Saideman and Auerswald identified around 50 to 80 of these caveats that must be tackled by NATO in Afghanistan. It is generally believed that these caveats impair the Alliance’s military efficiency and form various groups of states according to the degree of burden that they carry. The situation is such that only some countries participate in the most demanding and riskiest operations. Thus the organization’s cohesion as such becomes undermined. Within the North Atlantic Alliance, during the ISAF mission, it was assumed that the country with the highest limits for deploying its soldiers was Germany, which is not very accurate. Soldiers from Belgium, Spain, Italy and Turkey were also considerably restricted. (Saideman – Auerswald 2012: 67–70, 76)

In the Afghan operation, between 2007 and 2009, the West found itself in a very difficult situation that was interpreted as imminent defeat. Not even with Western support were the Afghan forces able to ensure security in the country. The number of attacks was increasing and 36 out of 376 districts were not under the control of Afghan authorities at all. At that time, the ISAF forces were not sufficiently equipped, trained or mentally prepared to fight the rebels. The mission and methods for accomplishing it were too vague and unclear. (Kaim 2008: 607–608) Although at that time the West was definitely not fighting Al Qaeda in the country, but more likely the Taliban, a change of strategy was necessary. (Zipfel 2008: 19–30) Soon after his inauguration, the newly elected American President Obama announced a new comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan signalizing the shift of US emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan. According to Obama, the aim was to defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and prevent its return. (Obama on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009)
The main aim was set to make it impossible for Al-Qaeda to use Afghanistan as a safe environment for other attacks on the USA and its allies. According to the USA, the main means to achieve it lay in enforcing the abilities of the Afghan state to run and defend the country. The secondary means was boosting the counterinsurgent operations (COIN). Hence Obama asserted the temporary stationing of a greater number of Western soldiers in Afghanistan accompanied with increased efforts to build up structures of the Afghan state. His new approach also included the endeavour to reintegrate those parts of the Taliban that wanted to end hostilities. Moreover, the United States also put pressure on the surrounding states and among them mainly on Pakistan to create conditions to stabilize Afghanistan. Within the new strategy, Western forces paid much more attention to protecting Afghan inhabitants, which was preferred to eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Western soldiers left their bases and emphasis was placed on their presence among local inhabitants. Furthermore, the change of the American and hence also the Western strategy included changes in particular military posts as well. In summer 2009, command was assumed by General McChrystal. The application of this strategy resulted in delegating responsibility to Afghan authorities, which started in 2011 and is to finish in 2014. (Council on Foreign Relations 2009; Dale 2011)

An important milestone in the development of the Western approach towards Afghanistan was the London Conference in January 2010, where the strategy of a gradual withdrawal from the country and Afghanization of the conflict was adopted. The London Conference initiated the process of political and social reconciliation continued by assembling the Peace Jirga and High Peace Council. The detailed plan of the entire peace process was formulated at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011. At this conference, several basic principles were approved, according to which the process should take place. These were that the peace process must be carried out by Afghans and must represent all relevant interests in the country. The peacekeeping solution must confirm Afghanistan’s sovereignty and unity, must be based on rejecting violence and ending cooperation with international terrorist groups, and must respect the Afghan Constitution, including human rights embedded in it. Last but not least, the peace process must be supported by the surrounding states. Based on this, in January 2012 also several parts of the Taliban announced their
willingness to launch peace negotiations, which were also started at the beginning of 2012 and were not impaired by the terrorist attacks against some prominent members of the High Peace Council. (The Federal Government 2012: 13–14) By signing the final document, around 100 states of the world and international organizations committed themselves to support the peace process. (The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn 2011) At the Tokyo Conference in July 2012, donors pledged to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan the total of $16 bln. on the condition that there was continuing improvement in the field of human rights, the fight with corruption and the build-up of state structures. (Die Bundesregierung 2013: 26) Therefore, further help for Afghanistan is not automatic but it is conditioned by asserting modernization and democratization.

During 2013, the process of handing security over to local authorities in Afghanistan proceeded considerably, taking place in summer 2013 on the territory inhabited by 90% of the country’s inhabitants. (Die Bundesregierung 2013: 11) The Western states plan to withdraw themselves from the country in 2014. (Krause 2011: 151–152) The Alliance forces will only play a supporting and training role in the country and international help to the Afghan government will continue. This strategy was also confirmed by the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012. (NATO 2012a) In 2012, the United States signed a bilateral agreement on partnership with Karzai, implying that the USA plans a long-term engagement in the country. (The Federal Government 2012: 4) The ongoing withdrawal from Afghanistan is a very logistically demanding military operation, as within its framework over 70,000 vehicles and 125,000 containers have been transported. (The Federal Government 2012: 12)

After the adoption of a new (exit) strategy by the Obama administration, there was a temporary increase in the number of stationed forces and sources for military and civil operations in Afghanistan. Attention was paid to training the Afghan police and military forces. (Obama on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009) While at the end of 2008, there were around 60,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan (Kornelius 2009: 28), in 2013 up to approximately 130,000 soldiers from 50 countries were deployed in the country. However, that year the number of international forces started to decline, as the Afghan security forces took over responsibility for larger and larger parts of the country. In autumn
2013, c. 87,000 soldiers were deployed within ISAF. (NATO 2013d) As opposed to that, the number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) troops reached 345,000 in summer 2012. Even though their achievements do not quite meet the expectations, they are gradually improving. Similarly, according to available data, so is their perception among local inhabitants. (The Federal Government 2012: 7–9) At the end of 2013, the overall image was such that they had managed to reverse the negative development of the security situation in the country.

The Western efforts in the country have achieved mixed results. According to the UN Human Development Index, Afghanistan ranked 172 out of 187 countries in 2012. Thus the country still belongs to the poorest countries in the world just as it has belonged for the major part of its modern history. From the perspective of corruption perception, it is one of the most corrupt countries. The country still makes around 90–95% of the world’s opium production. By Western standards, respecting human rights is insufficient and women’s human rights can hardly be spoken of, especially in the countryside, in the areas oriented on tradition. (The Federal Government 2012: 13–24) Despite that, the biased image of destruction used by the Western media establishment when describing the situation in Afghanistan is definitely not complex or true. It does not follow the trends, take into consideration the country’s tradition or the overall context in the region. If at the turn of 2006 and 2007 violence had started to escalate and the security situation to deteriorate, then an opposite development has been observed since 2011. Due to the increased international efforts, temporary increase in the number of international troops, improving the abilities of Afghan security forces, and last but not least launching negotiations with the rebels, the trend of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has been stopped. Some parts of the Taliban declared their willingness to negotiate and negotiations were started. This development is welcomed both by the Afghan government and the USA. (The Federal Government 2012: 1–3; Die Bundesregierung 2013: 14–15) As regards the number of Afghan security forces, it is approaching the planned state of 352,000 members (19,000 army and 157,000 police). (Die Bundesregierung 2013: 12)

The public in Western countries often misperceives the level of current violence in Afghanistan and is not able to put it into the overall historical context. If we divide the whole conflict into three stages, the first between
1979–1989 characteristic of the Soviet military presence, the second between 1990–2000 typical of the Taliban's seizure of power, and the third from 2001 until now with active participation by the West, then this last stage is the least violent. In the first stage 982,000–1,622,000 people were killed and in the second stage 50,000–400,000 people, while over the last decade 30,000–100,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives. (Bell 2013: 2) The intensity of violence, which is distributed unevenly in time and space, is much lower than ever for the past 30 years. It is important from the perspective of Western, and in particular American, targets that Afghanistan ceased to be a safe place for Al-Qaeda. This organization has never overcome this blow and is still undermined. Due to the Western campaign, Al-Qaeda has lost many of its leaders, including Bin Laden in 2011. His elimination in Pakistan may have been impossible without the international military mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, the perception of situation by the locals is not purely negative. According to surveys from 2012, in a sample of 6,000 Afghans, 52% of respondents believe that the country is heading in the right direction. Over the past decade, they have managed to build up the bank system and basic telephone network. There are dozens of radio stations in the country offering an alternative view of the world. The country has received great developmental and humanitarian aid, although it is partly used inefficiently and sometimes even embezzled by local leaders and foreign actors engaged in Afghanistan's reconstruction. However, this has contributed to the fact that the country’s GDP has increased tenfold over the last decade. Healthcare and the approach to it have improved considerably. Life expectancy has extended from 45 to 62 years. By Western standards, Karzai and his government are corrupt and inefficient; nevertheless, it is one of the best and most competent administrations in the region. The build-up of Afghan security forces has been accompanied by many problems, yet it continues and their abilities are gradually improving. The increase in the international military presence in the country in 2012–2013 pushed the Taliban onto the defensive. Average daily losses of civilians vary around six people. According to Bergen, with a certain degree of exaggeration, the entire security situation in the country is better than for example in New Orleans. (Bergen 2013: 60–62) Great progress has been achieved in the realm of education. Whilst there was hardly any education system in 2001, in 2012 schools were attended by over 7 mil. children including 2.7
mil. girls. (The Federal Government 2012: 22) On the whole, Afghanistan is not a country that would necessarily need to internally collapse, if after the international military campaign the international community’s (and especially the West’s) interest continues materialized in financial support. Today’s situation is different from 2001 and the return to the conditions of that time would mean considerable costs for the Taliban. However, that does not mean that Afghanistan could not collapse and that the Taliban may not try to take revenge.

According to Bell, after the end of the ISAF mission, there is a danger of the conflict’s escalation and it is necessary to endeavour to conclude an official peace treaty. (Bell 2013: I.-III.) The acceptance of such a treaty is uncertain and it is not very likely that it would be approved by all parts of the Taliban. The international community is aware of these circumstances. Therefore, for the first three years after the withdrawal of ISAF from the country, the Afghan government has been promised $3.3 bln. per year to finance the Afghan security forces, out of which c.$2 bln. per year shall be contributed by the USA. (Die Bundesregierung 2013: 13)

The Afghan engagement has been NATO’s key topic over the entire decade and thus it has had a crucial impact on the whole Alliance. It sparked off a debate on the various forms of collective defence and in a certain sense it divided the Alliance, as not all the states agreed with the statement that this country’s stability was crucial for their security. However, it has been the most complex Alliance operation in which NATO had to find forms of cooperation with many various actors and hence fulfil tasks going far beyond the framework of its primary purpose, i.e. collective defence.

5.6 NATO ENGAGEMENT IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN LIBYA

The armed conflict in Libya is part of a broader process known as the so-called Arab Spring. The Arab Spring, characteristic of a hardly predictable dynamic, started as a result of social, economic, demographic and political changes in particular states (Gause 2011). Soon the unrest spread from Tunisia to other Arab countries including Libya. Erica D. Borghard and Costantino Pischedda divide the armed conflict in Libya
into three stages: the first stage dates from the beginning of the protests (16 February 2011) to the launching of the international and soon also Alliance military intervention; the second stage starts at the beginning of the Western military intervention (19 March 2011) and finishes in mid June 2011 when the rebels started to gain ground on the battlefield, and the third stage is represented by the period from mid-June to the collapse of the regime in autumn 2011. The first protests against the Gaddafi regime starting on 16 February 2011 turned into mass gatherings in many places. According to Amnesty International, as a result of activities of the government security forces in suppressing the protests, 109 people lost their lives there (AI 2011a: 16). Against the background of violence perpetrated by the Libyan security forces, an armed opposition was formed against the regime and the spontaneous rebellion changed into a civil war, quickly spreading to other cities. At that time, protests in the capital of Tripoli were suppressed by government troops using armed force (AI 2011a: 16). Gaddafi tried to persuade the world public that the rebellion was led especially by radical Islamic groups, by which he justified his policy (AI 2011a: 17).

The international legal framework for NATO engagement in the armed conflict in Libya was set by the UN Security Council in its resolutions 1970 and 1973. On 26 February 2011, the UN SC adopted resolution 1970 demanding an end to violence, calling upon the government to negotiate with the opposition, and imposing an arms embargo on the country. Furthermore, sanctions were imposed on political elites and their families. (UN SC 2011a). The outcome of the overall escalation and internalization of the conflict was adopting UN SC resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, by 10 affirmative votes and the abstention of Russia, China, India, Germany and Brazil. Together with the UK and France, the resolution was also proposed by Lebanon. Its adoption took place on the grounds of applying the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), even though in the resolution itself this concept is not explicitly mentioned. The resolution referred to the crisis as a threat to international peace, based its measures on Chapter VII of the Charter, and emphasized “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilian” (UN SC 2011b). It can be inferred from these words that it had been the first
practical application of R2P (Hurd 2012). On the other hand, the text of the resolution points out the responsibility of Libyan state authorities, and not the international community, to protect civilians, which makes this interpretation rather relative. The resolution called for the implementation of other measures against Libya, i.e. an embargo on arms import, a no-fly zone over Libya and restricted access to bank accounts. The resolution in particular “authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council” (UN SC 2011b). The conflict revealed the trend highlighted by Ivo Pospíšil, which lies in the fact that “over the last few years international institutions and courts have been asserting the application of human rights in armed conflicts more and more intensively, regardless of whether it is a domestic or international conflict and regardless of whether the conflict takes place on the territory of the particular state or outside the territory.” (Pospíšil 2011: 350)

Before launching the NATO engagement, the following states were involved in the airstrikes on Libya: the USA, the UK, France, Italy, Canada and Qatar. France was the first to start the airstrikes on 19 March 2011. The quick response was enabled also by the fact that France and the UK had been planning a military training Southern Mistral in that area on 21–25 March 2011 (Cameron 2012: 18). The key role for the progress of the actions was assumed by the United States, which focused on breaking down Libyan air defence (Garamone 2011; GS 2011c). Already when planning the whole operation in March 2011, it was evident to the military commanders that the operation to enforce a no-fly zone would be a standard military operation that would have to deal with the Libyan air defences. The fast advancement of the pro-Gaddafi forces against the rebels resulted in a different tactic than usual. The first airstrikes led by French forces Rafale and Mirage were aimed against the Libya ground
forces developed to attack the rebels around Benghazi (Anrig 2011: 89). It can be deduced from this nonstandard procedure that the situation of the rebels was desperate and that the main aim of the air campaign, at least at its very beginning, was to prevent their defeat. Afterwards, the military operation against Libya continued in the usual way, i.e. breaking down Libyan air cover and attacking the command and control systems, logistic support and supply routes (Gertler 2011: 7–14; Quintana 2012: 35–36). Consequently, the Alliance conducted airstrikes against the pro-Gaddafi ground forces and focused especially on Gaddafi’s elite forces in order to destroy and deter them and lower their morale (Jebnoun 2012). The North Atlantic Alliance in Libya did not attack the strategic infrastructure to a greater extent. Regarding the standard operational procedures of NATO armies, it is highly likely that some NATO members sent special units to Libya to localize and designate targets and collect information about the results of the attacks. However, the Alliance representatives denied the presence of any forward air controllers and special units under the Alliance command (NATO 2012b).

It is more than disputable whether the entire operation can be regarded as an action carried out by European states, which assigned the USA a supporting role, as is stated by Isabelle François (François 2011: 4). The United States provided for the military operation approximately half of all the deployed air forces (British air forces composed only a fifth of American forces) and it took a major part in the first stage of the conflict to silence and destroy Libyan air protection (Rogers 2011). Without the American engagement in the first stage when it was essential to subvert the enemy’s air protection, the airstrikes would have had only uncertain success. In the later stages, the USA provided intelligence and reconnaissance data, and ensured a major part of capacities for aerial refuelling (Daalder and Stavridis 2012: 2). Even though the USA intentionally stood in the background, the entire operation could not have been carried out without the American engagement.

The following states took part in the operation conducted both at sea and in the air, in a various way: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America (Boyd 2011; NATO 2011d). On the whole, only 14 out of 28 NATO member states were engaged militarily in the con-
conflict. Christian F. Anrig claimed in this respect: “With regards to Libya, one finds basically three categories of NATO countries: those that conduct offensive air operations; those that relegate their actions to air policing, effectively a non-combat role; and those which fail to appear at all.” (Anrig 2011: 92) Yet on the whole, the Alliance suffered more likely from the lack of available air capacities, which was confirmed also by the NATO Secretary General at the Berlin Summit on 14–15 April 2011. (Anrig 2011: 95, 99).

The prevailing attitude towards the NATO military intervention within the 2011 Operation Unified Protector was such that the NATO intervention was not in contradiction with international law and it was carried out in accordance with the mandate issued by UN SC resolutions 1970 and 1973. The prevailing tone of evaluating the Alliance action was determined by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who pronounced at the press conference after the end of the Alliance engagement that NATO had strictly adhered to the mandate of UN SC resolution 1973 in its operations (UN 2011). If we compare the progress of the Alliance military engagement with the mandate of both UN SC resolutions, it is possible to identify the following activities that NATO had no mandate for: 1. The Alliance is not a regional organization in accordance with the UN Charter, 2. by its policy, NATO pursued regime change, which is not authorized by the resolutions, 3. there was a violation of UN SC resolutions 1970 and 1973 by arms supplies and providing military training to the rebels and 4. the impartiality principle was not adhered to during the enforcement of UN SC resolution 1973.

The issue of NATO’s pertinence may be the least tricky, yet it should be included. Ademola Abass highlights that paragraph 8 of UN SC resolution 1973 authorizes individual states and regional organizations to intervene. These regional organizations derive their legitimacy from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This interpretation is questionable as NATO is a collective defence organization deriving its legitimacy from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, it is not a regional organization, such as LAS, which was authorized to the intervention by UN SC resolution 1973. Thus according to this interpretation, the intervention of the individual NATO members should be in accordance with international law, while the intervention of NATO as an organization is already a grey area and its legitimacy can be questioned. (Abass 2011).
Furthermore, it is absolutely clear that NATO’s aim in Libya was to topple the regime, for which it had no authorization from UN resolutions, as regime change is not even mentioned in UN SC resolution 1973. Hence if the Alliance had conducted military operations aimed at toppling the regime, one cannot speak of an impartial enforcement of UN SC resolution 1973. Its passages are formulated in general and thus they do not imply that the aim is only the protection of civilians against the attacks of government forces. Although this resolution emphasizes the responsibility of Libyan state authorities for civilian protection, it has a general ambition to protect civilians as well. It is evident from the international community’s intention to provide protection of civilians regardless of whether the threat was represented by pro- or anti-Gaddafi forces. Therefore, one could anticipate NATO’s efforts to enforce it against all conflict parties attacking civilians. However, the North Atlantic Alliance did hardly anything to prevent the rebels from attacking civilians. Amnesty International has documented a number of cases of torture, mistreatment, lynching and abusing local people supporting the regime by rebels, including murders of captured soldiers, mercenaries and members of paramilitary forces (AI 2011a: 70–78). Western countries provided military advisors who focused on improving rebels’ training and tactics (Schmitt and Myers 2011). The rebels were supplied with arms from France and Qatar (Anrig 2011: 102). That violated UN SC resolutions 1970 and 1973 imposing an embargo on arms import to Libya. During the campaign, the North Atlantic Alliance as an organization tried to avoid answering direct questions about who would supply the guerrillas with weapons. (NATO 2011b). Regarding the way the Alliance functioned, it is probable that arms supplies for the rebels were provided by individual member states and not NATO as a whole. It is nearly out of the question that it would have happened without at least the tacit consent of the Alliance.

To a great extent, the reality of combat operations approached providing air support to Libyan guerrilla groups. It is evident from the profile of airstrikes and their timing that their main purpose was to stop the pro-Gaddafi forces from advancing, as they had seized the initiative and started to defeat the rebels, and not to enforce a no-fly zone or protect civilians. They were aimed against the ground forces loyal to the government, who were pushing rebels out of the territory they had conquered.
Months after launching its engagement, NATO air force enabled the rebels to push the pro-Gaddafi forces onto the defensive and reverse the process of the fighting (Borghard and Pischedda 2012: 66–67). Hence we can reach the conclusion that NATO considerably exceeded the mandate given by UN SC resolution 1973. Finally, that it must have been an operation supporting the rebels can be proved by the fact that the chair of the National Transitional Council Abdul-Jalil acknowledged the great contribution of Operation Unified Protector and the West to the victory of the rebels and appreciated NATO’s efforts to minimize civilian casualties.

The actual short-term aims of the West, i.e. not to allow the defeat of the uprising, were feasible, in comparison with the complex aims of the Western engagement in the Balkans and Afghanistan, even without an extensive use of Western ground forces. Similarly to Kosovo, the role of the ground forces was assumed by local rebels. The ground operations of Western countries were restricted to the actions of the special forces of the individual member states in order to establish contact with the opposition, carry out reconnaissance of targets, collect information in the area, and possibly also in controlling Alliance planes. In its public announcements, the Alliance tried to camouflage this issue and avoid clear proclamations about engaging forward air controllers (NATO 2011b).

The air force *per se* was not able to bring about the reversal, even though it prevented the defeat of the rebels and by attacking the ground forces of Gaddafi’s army, it created conditions for the final success of the rebels. The Western air force deprived the pro-Gaddafi forces of their superiority in heavy weapons. Since May 2011, there had been a distinct improvement in the coordination of the guerrilla groups with NATO forces as well as in their tactical skills. Special forces of France and Great Britain took part in improving the training of the rebels and it is unlikely that they would do so without NATO being aware of it (Eyal 2012: 61).

Operation Unified Protector ended on 31 October 2011. According to the official data of NATO, approximately 8,000 troops and over 260 air assets including helicopters had been deployed, plus 21 naval assets of all kinds including submarines. There were over 26,500 sorties and around 9,700 strike sorties. Within the military operations, 5,900 military targets were destroyed including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600 tanks or armoured vehicles. 3,100 ships were hailed and 300 vessels
were boarded, whilst eleven of them were denied transit. The sea forces aided the rescue of over 600 refugees in distress at sea (NATO 2011e). The entire operation was carried out in very demanding conditions when it was very hard to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. The circumstances of the military intervention allowed great space for mistakes and collateral damage both among civilians and rebels. The Alliance air campaign was the longest in the post-Cold-War era; nevertheless, it was less intensive than against Yugoslavia in 1999 (Jebnoun 2012: 3). Despite that, according to Alexandra Gheciu “NATO’s air power has been crucial in eroding Colonel Gaddafi’s military machine, thus limiting the regime’s ability to use its significant military power against the (initially, at least) poorly organized and ill-equipped rebels”. (Gheciu 2012: 1)

According to Elizabeth Quintana, “the Libya campaign was conducted throughout with very restrictive rules of engagement, with a mandate to protect the population and minimize collateral damage to the infrastructure.” (Quintana 2012: 31) The total number of civilian casualties as a result of NATO activities is more likely dozens than hundreds (Quintana 2012: 35). Despite that, Amnesty International has criticized some aspects of the Alliance campaign and documented cases of attacks on civilian objects, which are explained by NATO as the failure of combat systems, or wrong target identification. (AI 2011a).

In the case of Libya, it was undoubtedly not an illegal NATO military intervention without the UN SC mandate as in the case of Kosovo. In this case, the Alliance exceeded the mandate given by UN SC resolutions 1970 and 1973. As the most serious violation of UN SC resolutions one can regard the effort to change the regime, which was not authorized at all by these resolutions. There was also a violation of UN SC resolutions 1970 and 1973 by arms supplies and providing the rebels with military training. Moreover, the impartiality principle was not adhered to either in enforcing the generally formulated UN SC resolution 1973, since NATO did not intervene in any way against the rebels, who in many cases documented by Amnesty International represented a threat for civilians.

The country’s very complicated development after toppling Gaddafi implies that not all rebelling groups identify themselves with the aim of building democracy in the country. In spite of that, much has been accomplished after the declaration of the country’s liberation in October 2011. By the end of 2011 an interim government was established and at
the beginning of 2012 legal and institutional conditions were created for holding 2012 elections. The progress in building up state structures was also praised in UN SC resolution 2040 from March 2012. However, since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, the North Atlantic Alliance has had only a small influence on the events in the country.

5.7 NATO AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OPERATIONS

Collective defence is the traditional task of the North Atlantic Alliance. Yet, in the Cold War period, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty never had to be invoked. It is a paradox that the issue of member state’s defence against an outside attack was first seriously brought up in 1990 in relation to the Iraq crisis. After the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the UN Security Council granted a mandate to the coalition led by the USA to force Iraq out of this country. At the Alliance level, the question of helping Turkey started to be discussed in case it was attacked by Iraq, for example in retribution for the Turkish help to the international coalition. NATO’s major contribution to strengthening Turkish security was the deployment of the Patriot missiles and air forces in 1990–1991. As is stated by Lawrence S. Kaplan, the use of the North Atlantic Alliance as a tool of intervention in the Persian Gulf against Iraq would have required a rather extensive interpretation of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as Article 5 could not be applied. The international community’s war under the command of the USA to liberate Kuwait thus took place without the direct participation of NATO. Despite that, the solidarity of the allies was evident; as many as 12 out of 16 member states detached their military capacity in favour of this war. (For more see Kaplan 2004: 111) NATO was also faced with the issue of Iraq in 2003 in connection to the invasion by the USA, Great Britain, Australia and Poland. At that time, Turkey feared that it could become the target of Iraqi revenge. However, as is highlighted by the then NATO General Secretary George Robertson, NATO needed as many as 11 days in 2003 to guarantee solidarity with Turkey in case of an attack, and it was more likely divided than united by this debate. (Robertson 2004: 45, Kaplan 2004: 143)

Another debate on collective defence took place in NATO against the background of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the USA,
which have had far-reaching consequences for the foreign policy. The war on terrorism declared and waged by the USA is one of them. As regards the topic of this work, it is irrelevant whether it is really possible to fight with terrorists in such a way that it can be regarded as war. The character of American military operations against states sponsoring international terrorists, i.e. against Afghanistan under the Taliban rule (support for Al-Qaeda) and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (proven support for Palestinian terrorists and alleged support for Al-Qaeda) undoubtedly makes it possible to talk about war in the true sense of the word. It is a war launched by Al-Qaeda by a series of terrorist attacks in the first half of 1990s, such as the 1993 unsuccessful attack on the World Trade Centre. In 1996, the USA managed to drive Al-Qaeda out of Sudan, yet this organization found a new shelter in Afghanistan and succeeded in other operations against American targets, such as the 1998 attacks on the American embassy in Africa or the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen. (Nichols 2005: 6; Murphy 2002: 239) Hence the September 11 terrorist attacks can be interpreted as their continuation and up until now also the climax of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist campaign against the USA.

By an irony of fate, it was exactly the part of Afghan mujahedeen who had radicalized against the background of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and at that time had the financial, material and moral support of the USA against the Soviet invaders that offered Al-Qaeda refuge. In this respect, it is necessary to point out that Al-Qaeda, probably in order to call to action other Muslims, openly had already encouraged them to attack American targets in 1996, and thus it expressed open hostility to the USA. (Murphy 2002: 239) In other words, the reward for the American policy of supporting Afghan Muslims in the war against the USSR was the Taliban’s hostility, expressed by giving shelter to Al-Qaeda. Moreover, it cannot be said that the United States was irreconcilable towards the Taliban in the 1990s and hence aroused its hostility. As is emphasized by Kenneth Katzman, the Clinton administration adopted the policy of diplomatic pressure combined with holding an informal dialogue with the Taliban. Also the Bush administration before the September 11 terrorist attacks pursued de facto the same policy and did not directly support the Taliban’s enemy, the Northern Alliance, militarily, according to resources available today. The closing of the Taliban’s New York office in February 2001 based on UN SC resolution 1333 was compensated for by maintain-
ing informal contacts. (Katzman 2004: 8) On the whole, the USA under Clinton and G. W. Bush before 11 September 2001 tried to change the situation in Afghanistan by peaceful means and did not completely rule out negotiating with the Taliban. This lenient attitude of the USA, which was no exception among other countries, did not prevent the Taliban from offering a refuge to Al-Qaeda, which mounted a direct attack on the US territory on 11 September 2001. As was already mentioned in the parts regarding Afghanistan, as early as on 12 September 2001 NATO took an interim decision about activating Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which was soon confirmed. (For more see Buckley 2006)

In actual fact, the consequent reaction of the United States was in accordance with the long-term tradition of the American foreign policy. Actually, the Clinton administration also once reacted to terrorist attacks by using military force against Sudan and Afghanistan. Unlike the Republican administration’s measures, those were half-done and unsystematic steps that did not do much harm to terrorist groups. On 7 October 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants the states right of collective or individual self-defence. The operation was never restricted only to Afghanistan, as it was also conducted in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Undeniably, its key part are military operations carried out in Afghanistan.

On 8 October 2001, within the reaction of NATO allies, five AWACS early warning aircraft were transferred to the USA to support counter-terrorist operations (Operation Eagle Assist). Besides the US troops, military personnel from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Turkey, and Great Britain took part in this operation as well. A total of 830 soldiers from 13 member states participated in patrolling the American coast. (Rupp 2002: 353) By that, the United States gained extra military capacity to conduct military operations in Afghanistan. The allies expressed their support of the American endeavour by stationing ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan and in 2003 they agreed with these force being taken over by the North Atlantic Alliance. Some American allies from NATO supported the USA in carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom. The exchange of intelligence information became more intensive and the security of American organizations in European states was tightened. In general, it can be said that the combat operations
in Afghanistan were conducted by the United States only with the limited military support of its European allies. The most militarily distinct was the participation of Great Britain, which deployed 6,000 troops in the region of Southeast Asia to support the American endeavour. (Johnson – Zenko 2002/2003: 53)

Within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, maritime operation Active Endeavour was launched aimed at protecting the Eastern Mediterranean. The NATO permanent sea forces deployed 8 frigates and a logistics ship in that area. In actual fact, the operation started on 6 October 2001 when the Alliance’s Standing Naval Force launched operation in the area and thus supported the efforts of the United States in its fight against international terrorism. (For more see Cesaretti 2005) A day later, on 7 October, the USA and its allies mounted an attack against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In February 2003, Operation Active Endeavour was expanded into the Western Mediterranean as well. From that moment up until May 2004, the Alliance sea patrols had not only patrolled the area of the operation, but they had also escorted trade ships through the Strait of Gibraltar. On 16 March 2004, within the assumption of greater responsibility within the fight against terrorism, NATO extended the operational area to the entire Mediterranean. The Alliance hailed 115,000 vessels and boarded 162 suspect ships. (NATO 2013a)

This whole operation is a typical example of multinational efforts based on the North Atlantic Alliance when combating international terrorism. When evaluating the mission’s overall profile, it must be stated that it is primarily a non-combat operation deterring terrorists and their henchmen, monitoring strategically important places in the Mediterranean Sea, providing escorts through the Gibraltar Strait and developing cooperation within the Mediterranean Dialogue programme. By and large, the military operation is regarded as NATO’s substantial contribution to the fight against terrorism.

In general, we can agree with the view that after the terrorist attacks, the United States took only little account of the possibilities of cooperation when seeking the best reaction possible offered within the North Atlantic Alliance. (For more see Woodward 2002) Petr van Ham points out that the American refusal to use the North Atlantic Alliance as a platform to intervene against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was justified by the relative military weakness of European armies. (Ham
Sebestyén L. v. Gorka stresses the American bad experience with its allies and the Alliance as a whole in the Kosovo crisis as well as NATO’s contemporary objective unpreparedness to conduct military operations in Central Asia. (Gorka 2006) Moreover, the United States feared that the acceptance of the European contribution would lead to disagreements in the carrying out of the campaign itself. (Kaplan 2004: 136–137) This American policy was viewed by many European states with disapproval. However, that does not imply that NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was only symbolic. (Cf. Hubel 2004: 286)
6. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NATO MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

6.1 GENERAL TRENDS IN WESTERN MILITARY

After the Cold War had ended, the armies of Western countries underwent a deep, and in fact, permanent transformational process, significantly changing their form. The general trends in the development of the armies of Western democracies after the end of the Cold War are dealt with by a number of authors. These include Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal (2000), Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993), Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum (2001), Jeffrey Simon (2004), and Timothy Edmunds (2006), as well as many others. If we take into account the findings of the above-mentioned authors, we can reach the conclusion that after the Cold War, the military in Western Europe and North America underwent changes in the following key areas: 1. perception of security threats; 2. definition of main missions; 3. the extent, structure, and materiel of forces; 4. methods of military recruitment; and 5. image of military professional.

First, the militaries of Western democracies after the end of the Cold War typically show a changed perception of security threats. The threat of a military attack against the state's territory has subsided and greater importance is attached to the so-called “new security threats,” such as ethnically motivated conflicts, international terrorism, and piracy.

A changed definition of main missions is derived from the changed perception of security threats. The main mission of militaries is held to be the elimination of these new security threats, which is carried out by a wide range of expeditionary operations, from peacekeeping, to peace enforcement operations rather than by waging war.

Third, to accommodate the changed character of missions, the size, structure, and materiel of Western militaries have been adjusted at a pace varying state by state. The number of soldiers as well as heavy military hardware has been reduced. At the same time, structural changes have also taken place, following the extension of forces capable of operating outside the domestic territory in a whole range of peace operations. Simultaneously, the findings of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) are
being implemented. The aim is to master the abilities to carry out precise strikes in order to minimize collateral damage causalities of own soldiers. Growing attention is thus also paid to non-lethal weapons.

Fourth, there has been a change in the way of recruitment. In current Western armies, there has typically been a departure from mass conscription armies to volunteer armies (if this had not taken place already in the Cold War period, as was the case of the USA and Great Britain).

Finally, the carrying out of these expeditionary missions imposes new demands on the character of the soldier. Soldiers are expected both to operate in a war situation as well as to fulfill new tasks connected with the fight against terrorism, peace-keeping, and post-conflict stabilization of crisis regions. A military professional may possibly have to be a combination of crisis manager, technician, soldier, and statesman.

The military sector in NATO has changed dramatically over the past twenty years. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant decrease in the strength and readiness of forces, an increase in transparency and a profound transformation towards obtaining capacities suitable for conducting a wide scale of expeditionary military operations of crisis management. The development in this direction was already taking place after the signature of the CFE Treaty in 1990 and especially by its implementation throughout the 1990s. The CFE Treaty set equal ceilings for each bloc (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty), from the Atlantic to the Urals comprising of 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs); 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters. In fact, the treaty codified a substantial reduction in the numbers of heavy combat weaponry and introduced efficient control and inspection mechanisms. Thus it put an end to the process of quantitative conventional armament in Europe and concealment of the strength of signatory states’ armies as well as their troop deployment locations. The treaty’s application very much reduced the risk of a major conflict in Europe. (Hodge 2005: 27) In 1999 the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Istanbul in order to adapt the Treaty to the new post-cold war situation. However, NATO bound its ratification on the fulfillment of Russian obligations to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia. As Russia considered the linkage between the Treaty and the military withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova illegitimate and was not willing to support the US missile
defense plans in Europe, it suspended the original Treaty and the follow-up agreements in 2007. (BBCNews 2007)

Nevertheless, at present all NATO members have reduced their conventional armed forces under limits prescribed in the CFE treaty. This development was caused by other factors, the most significant of them being: 1. conducting expeditionary operations out of area within the remit of the UN, NATO and the European Union, which do not require as much heavy combat weaponry and personnel as in the past, 2. qualitative armament, which had started replacing quantitative armament since the 1970s when a lower number of highly sophisticated weaponry systems had replaced a higher number of simpler weapons, 3. value orientation of the societies of most Western states, unwilling to develop their military potential and preferring other areas, especially building the welfare state and 4. financial problems of Western states caused by a combination of losing their relative position in the world economy, long-term involvement in the politics of indebtedness, and last but not least, building the welfare state, which no longer promotes inhabitants’ personal initiative but, quite the opposite, confines it. On the whole, after the end of the Cold War, Western armies have been expected mainly to conduct various types of crisis response operations out of NATO territory, or in the case of Great Britain (Northern Ireland) and Spain (Basque) also within their territory in the framework of counterinsurgency and antiterrorist operations. The focus on territorial defense has been put back in place since the Russian 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

6.2 FROM CJT TO NRF

The transformation of the military sector has been a permanent feature of Alliance policy since the early 1990s, just as have the reforms of the armies of the individual member states. Therefore, NATO has announced a lot of initiatives aiming to improve NATO military capacities and capabilities. This fact might be interpreted as evidence of NATO’s inability to prepare and implement a complex military reform. Out of these initiatives, three are the most prominent: Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and NATO Response Force (NRF).
In 1994, an American initiative led NATO to the concept entitled Combined Joint Task Force. Emphasis was placed on improving interoperability, mobility and flexibility aimed at conducting efficient operations in NATO PSO. (More in Duignan 2000: 60; Yost 2000: 199–205; Ivanov 2011: 117–122) As NATO states, “a CJTF is a deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defense of the Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.” (NATO 1999b) It means that NATO authorities put emphasis on the ability to carry out military operations by grouping of military units (Forces) organized for the purpose of a specific mission (Task) involving at least two military services, army, navy etc. (Joint) of at least two nations (Combined). This concept has been put into practice in many NATO out of area military operations. A prototype is Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia aimed to support Dayton Peace Accords. (Jones 1999)

The most prominent initiative of the 1990s was the program called Defense Capabilities Initiative – DCI, which was announced at the NATO Summit in Washington. The program envisaged an improvement of abilities in five key areas: strategic mobility, sustaining forces in deployment and their logistical support, capacities to command ongoing operations, survival abilities of troops in the battlefield and especially an overall interoperability (ability to conduct joint combined operations). The concept stemmed from the assumption that potential military operations would be carried out to a smaller extent than had been planned in the Cold War period; yet they could be longer as far as their duration was concerned. Within their framework, multinational cooperation was also anticipated at the Loir force level, just as the concurrence of more conducted operations. In sum, there were 59 areas defined in greater detail the NATO states guaranteed to improve. Each state could choose their areas of primary interest. As is stated by Ivan Dinev Ivanov, “the shift from CJTFs to DCI depicts a pattern of vertical evolution form peacekeeping and peace enforcement to more advanced capabilities designed to respond and prevent international crises.” (Ivanov 2011: 122–123) The results of the DCI were not very convincing, despite the fact that about 400 specific improvements were allegedly achieved. Some authors argued that the DCI was a massive failure. (Binnendijk – Kugler 2002: 117–132) The unsatisfactory DCI results led to the situation that NATO further suffered
from serious flaws restricting its possibilities to carry out expeditionary operations.

Much more concrete – and more easily supervised – commitments were taken on by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the Prague summit in autumn 2002 where the Prague Capabilities Commitment – PCC was endorsed. As opposed to the very ambitiously and broadly conceived DCI, NATO focused on several selected areas within which the member states committed themselves to improving their own national military capacities. These areas are: protection against all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, intelligence and target surveillance, air-to-ground surveillance, command and communication systems, combat effectiveness including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses, strategic transport a mobility, air-to-air refueling and mobile logistics. The member states did not rule out the possibility of a certain specialization of some states, joint technology purchases and a formation of multinational forces. (Dančák – Suchý 2002: pp. 33–44) The then NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, believed that these decisions would not be a mere pronouncement, by which he may have hinted at the actual failure of the DCI. (NATO 2006b) The entire PCC agenda endeavored to improve capabilities to carry out expeditionary operations beyond Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. (More in Ivanov 2011: 122–128)

Last but not least, NATO member states decided to found the NATO Response Force – NRF, composed of ground forces, navy components and air forces deployable in a wide range of military operations including operations outside the territory of the NATO member states and comprising up to 24,000 soldiers. It was initiated by the United States and decided at the 2002 Prague NATO summit. (Rumsfeld Press for New NATO force 2002: 14) At the beginning, it was necessary to overcome the differing opinions of US European allies, especially Germany and France, about the form, purpose and method of deploying these forces. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2002; Buechner 2002) Moreover, the US forces were initially presumed never to join the concept, which, however, resulted in European members not taking the concept very seriously. (Mihalka 2005: 76–77)

According to NATO, these forces accomplished initial operational capability in 2004 and full operational capability in 2006. The key feature
of these forces is their flexibility. Their current structure is adapted to operational conditions. Furthermore, these forces are highly mobile, and capable of intervening in areas distant from member states’ territory. It is anticipated that the NRF will be sent to the area of deployment for a limited time period, before being replaced by other NATO troops. As the problem with force generation for the NRF persisted, NATO decided in 2007 to reduce the NRF numbers from the originally anticipated 24,000 soldiers. In addition, after a UK initiative, the NRF has served as a mutual defense tool since 2009. (Valášek 2009: 33)

The NRF is formed from the contingents of member states’ armies with a 12-month rotational period (originally 6-month). In the Immediate Response Force, a part of the NRF, there are 13,000–14,000 soldiers available. The IRF consists of a brigade-sized land component, a maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG), a combat air and air-support component, Special Operations Forces and a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense task force. The NRF has been built in order to be deployed in crisis response operations, anti-terrorist operations, stabilization operations, peace enforcement operations, embargo enforcement operations and non combat evacuation operations. The NRF was pronounced, despite some prevailing defects (strategic transport and logistics), to be fully operational at the NATO summit in Riga in 2006. (Bell 2006) Nevertheless, “the NRF never achieved the originally projected levels of commitment.” (Ivanov 2011: 127) The NRF took part in providing security at the Olympics in Athens in 2004, presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2004 and, coping with the consequences of natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005 and earthquakes in Pakistan in 2005 and 2006. In February 2013, NATO decided that the NRF would be the main component of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). (NATO 2013b) Even though the NRF represents a major NATO military tool, the story of its formation and especially the actual reduction of its size from 24,000 soldiers to 13–14,000 soldiers clearly demonstrate the problem NATO faces in the military field, i.e. long-term failure to actually implement the reformatory plans.

To a considerable degree, the adaptation of the military structures of NATO and its member states resulted from the need to have adequate capacities to conduct NATO PSO at their disposal. On the other hand, the
dichotomy between PSO capabilities and Article 5 capabilities is to some degree artificial. In a case of the invocation Article 5, the vast majority of NATO members would need deployable forces that are able to fight out of state territory. That is why the lack of ability of many NATO states to achieve the NATO goal that 50% of land forces should be deployable jeopardizes NATO credibility both in Article 5 and in non-Article 5 operations.

In sum, despite the efforts of Alliance representatives and partial accomplishments, the hitherto adaptation of NATO’s military structures has not removed the recurrent conflict between a political wish, need and often also commitment to launch a certain military operation of crisis management, and insufficient military capacities. With differing intensity, this discrepancy has jeopardized all previous Alliance operations. Furthermore, this is clearly, evident especially in the case of Afghanistan. The main problem is that there are a lot of duplications in European military capabilities, especially as far as bureaucratic structures are concerned.

Moreover, there is a huge gap between the U.S. and European military expenditures, which reflects the different willingness to share burdens of the NATO membership. While the USA has spent around 4% of its GDP on defense in this decade, the majority of European members have not allocated the promised 2% of GDP to defense in the same period. Some of them even spend only around 1% of GDP. (NATO 2014a) Therefore, the deficits of European members’ military capacities also put at risk the Alliance’s cohesion, as they tempt the USA to calculate the costs and profits of the membership itself. (Moore 2007: 106–108)

6.3 THE LISBON SUMMIT AND FURTHER

The NATO 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept put stress on the necessity of further NATO military transformation. It is necessary to take into account that since 2003, NATO military transformation has been driven by the desire to able to deal effectively with the Afghanistan challenge. The Alliance declared its commitment to "maximize the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets; ensure the maximum coherence in defense planning, to reduce unnecessary duplica-
tion, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements; develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity; preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and fading that bind us together; engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximize efficiency.” (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security for the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2010: 33–34) As Christopher M. Schnaubelt correctly concludes “the clear implication is that ongoing efforts at military transformation will continue along the same lines.” (Schnaubelt 2011: 143) It means that the obvious post-Cold War tendency towards building lighter and smaller units will continue. (Schnaubelt 2011: 147)

The problem is that the NATO Lisbon Strategy does not contain any reference to the obligation to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense. It shows the controversial nature of this issue. As Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer state, “Obama also failed in his efforts to persuade European allies to spend more on defense.” (Hallams – Schreer 2012: 320) Taking into account the necessity of deep budget cuts in almost all Western countries, it is highly probable that Western defense expenditure and therefore Western defense infrastructure will have to be further reduced. As Adrian Hyde-Price pointed out there are two choices: a series of ad hoc, uncoordinated cuts by different member states, which would further exacerbate existing problems of duplication, wastage and functional incompatibility; or coordinated cuts leading to more collaborative, and therefore more effective, defense procurement programs and to a restructuring of defense industries. The latter approach would reflect the need for greater industrial defense specialization, the pooling of resources, greater functional specialization and more cooperation – resulting in leaner but more integrated European NATO militaries. (Hyde-Price 2011: 51)

However, the implementation of this recommendation would mean agreement on the limitation of national sovereignty in its traditional understanding and that might be a problem for many European governments. On the other hand, the Western economic crisis caused by long term deficit financing could be a very good incentive for re-evaluating many traditional political attitudes. The contemporary France – UK pooling and sharing cooperation that started in 2010 and the A400M story have shown the way for possible future development.
Nonetheless, the experience from the past two decades has shown that besides military capacities, the Alliance needs also civilian capacities for conflict resolution that would serve to provide stability, security, transition and reconstruction. The cornerstone of these capacities was already laid by the PCC. (More in Ivanov 2011: 128–134) Further attention to the civilian capacities was emphasized at the NATO 2006 Riga summit when, against the background of NATO Afghan engagement, the Comprehensive Approach (AC) was adopted. Nevertheless, due to French resistance at the Riga summit, NATO members did not agree on building civilian crisis management capabilities. (Jakobsen 2011: 86) It does not mean that nothing has been done in this area. According to Niels Henrik Hedegaard, NATO successfully built teams for CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) supporting the local project in the NATO responsibility area and cooperating with local authorities. The NATO database of civilian experts who can be deployed in crisis management operations was established. Nevertheless, a much greater attention should be paid to building them up in the years to come, as is evident from the current NATO strategic concept. The Alliance should be able to deploy member states’ civilian capacities even if the other actors are reluctant to do so. At the Lisbon 2010 NATO conference, it was decided to improve NATO capacities for conflict prediction and post-conflict reconstruction, the doctrine for expeditionary operations would be improved, NATO would build capacities for training local military and police forces, and a pool of civilian experts would be created. (Hedegaard 2011: 79) On the one hand, such an evolution of the NATO attitude can help NATO deal with challenges in crisis management operation. On the other hand, Peter Viggo Jakobsen criticizes NATO for just following the ineffective EU path because member states are asked to prepare such capacities and the results rest on their good will. (Jakobsen 2011: 87–90)

In sum, as far as military capacities are concerned, according to Klaus Wittmann, “the Summit Declaration and the Lisbon Capability Goals do not contain more than the obvious goals (usability, deployability, sustainability etc.), well known from the 1999 Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) or the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of 2006.” (Wittmann 2011: 41) Although the current development in NATO military capacities does not indicate any diversion from building military capacities suitable for crisis manage-
ment operations, one should take into account that those military capacities can be used in case of a possible Russian military action against Poland, the Baltic countries or Norway as well. (Compare Valášek 2009: 19–20) The point is that these capacities are useful both for the Article 5 mission and for crisis management operations out of area. The progress achieved in the NATO adaptation process is still inadequate and NATO authorities are familiar with this. Therefore, NATO in “Political guidance on Ways to improve NATO’s involvement in stabilization and reconstruction” from 2011, “encourages Allies to further develop, in addition to their military capabilities, relevant national capabilities, including through multi-national efforts and in accordance with the NATO Defense Planning Process where appropriate; Contribute with stabilization and reconstruction related national lessons identified to relevant NATO bodies and databases; Incorporate stabilization and reconstruction related best practices into national operations, exercise and training activities as well as doctrine and concept development.” (NATO 2011f) Also the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit stressed the importance of developing capabilities crucial to perform the main tasks of NATO, collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO leaders agreed on the “NATO Forces 2020 goal” aiming at improving NATO capabilities. This package combines existing initiatives with new ones. The most prominent “new” initiatives are Smart Defense and the Connected Force Initiative. According to NATO, “Smart Defense is the opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration is given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities.” (NATO 2013c) As regards the Connected Force Initiative, NATO states that “this initiative seeks to expand education and training of personnel, complementing in this way essential national efforts. It will also enhance exercises, strengthen the bonds between the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Force Structure, and national headquarters and reinforce the NATO Response Force so that it can play a greater role in helping Alliance forces to operate together and to contribute to NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. As much as possible, NATO will also step up connections with partners, so that all can act together, when desired.” (NATO 2013c) As far as capabilities are concerned, NATO members set the following priorities: countering improvised explosive devices, improving air- and sea-lift capabilities, Collective Logistics Contracts, Theatre Missile defense, Cyber defense, Sta-
bilization and reconstruction capabilities, Air Command and Control, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and last but not least Alliance Ground Surveillance.

The transformation of NATO military structures and member states’ armies over the past two years has aimed at moving from armies of the Cold-War-like style, equipped with a great amount of military weapons intended to conduct a highly intensive fight while using weapons of mass destruction towards smaller, more flexible armies capable of efficient deployment across the whole scope of operations. In this process, the Alliance has had to cope with the pressure lying in the structure inherited from the Cold War period, the growing pressure of new operations and a drop in defense expenses. The inherited structure from the Cold War period has been less of a burden on the armies of the USA, Great Britain and partly also France, as these armies had always been built up for expeditionary purposes. On the contrary, the most overburdened power has been Germany. This reforming process has only been partially successful. The discrepancy between the needs of military capacities and capacities that are available for NATO, has not been successfully removed. In the military area, European states are still highly dependent on US capacities, which has not been eliminated either by the DCI or NRF projects. (Mihalka 2005: 76–77) What is more, this dependence has been becoming greater and greater, as was in fact proved by the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. (Kříž 2012) The Alliance reform efforts still more likely resemble the announcement of new programs trying to accomplish goals that were in practice unaccomplished in previous programs, yet pronounced as successfully accomplished for political reasons. The armies of NATO member states today are becoming smaller and smaller and it is questionable how long they will play the role of a deterrent against aggression. After all, a possible loss of the NATO credibility has been the subject of intense discussion.
7. CONCLUSION

As is shown in the previous chapters, after the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance underwent fundamental changes enabling it to survive in the changed conditions. The predictions of many prominent figures of international relations (Waltz and Mearsheimer) about the decline of NATO’s importance have not come true. The discrepancy between empirical reality and these predictions raises a natural question about the possible causes.

First, it is necessary to take into account the fact stressed already in the introduction that the NATO of the Cold War was not only a military alliance of collective defense based exclusively on a strategic calculus. The North Atlantic Alliance was and still is a community of states sharing common values, which serves, albeit often imperfectly, as a platform for discussion on security problems that the West was facing at any given time. Security problems did not disappear after the end of the Cold War. On the contrary, new problems, unknown before, occurred and the West had to cope with them and find their solutions. The existence of NATO provided it with an institutional platform that it was easier to adapt than the building brand new structures. Last but not least, the Alliance bureaucracy was also naturally interested in preserving the Alliance and it more likely supported the essential changes than resisted them. NATO’s major success is that after the end of the Cold War the security policy of European states had not been renationalized. It is evident from the above-mentioned logics of rational choice that member states were not interested in NATO’s fall.

NATO’s adaptation after the end of the Cold War had a considerable impact on the character of this organization. The entire process was relatively quick and stimulated by several important factors: US willingness to be engaged in European security also under the new conditions, transition states’ desire to build closer cooperation with NATO and gradually obtain membership, the need to respond to crises that had occurred in Europe and its surrounding areas, and the weakness of Russia, which attenuated its confrontational policy towards NATO in the 1990s.

Even though it is complicated to measure the importance of any institution and any conclusion of this type is subjective to a certain degree,
there is a prevailing agreement in scholarly literature that NATO further remains a crucial security institution of the West. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not imply that it is the same institution as in the Cold War period. In the second half of the 1990s, the question was discussed in scholarly literature as to what degree NATO could be successfully transformed into a collective security organization (Hillen – Noonan 1998: 28–29). Henry Kissinger reached the conclusion that NATO had become an organization more similar to a collective security organization than a traditional alliance. (Meyer 2003/2004: 94) Moreover, Richard E. Rupp was of a similar opinion. (Rupp 2002: 342) Although the changes in NATO were very fundamental, they do not justify such a radical conclusion and thus we cannot but disagree with such an evaluation of the results of the NATO adaptation process.

Within the NATO transformation, the Alliance structures did not incorporate mechanisms that would make it possible for the organization to eliminate a security threat to one NATO member by another member. The assumption that there will be a security threat from the inside of the organization is an important feature of a collective defense organization, such as the interwar League of Nations or the United Nations at present. An efficient reaction by NATO is prevented by the consensual decision-making mechanism enabling the conflict parties to block the Alliance as an institution. The North Atlantic Alliance is further focused on suppressing security threats coming from areas outside the territory of its member states. Moreover, despite NATO enlargement, this institution does not strive for membership inclusivity. Membership inclusivity is another important feature of a collective defense organization. On the contrary, NATO further remains an organization practicing an open door policy only towards European states and its enlargement is connected to meeting conditions by new members defined in the Study on NATO Enlargement. In other words, the Alliance is still an organization with exclusive membership. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Organization still remains, even after the changes taking place over the two past decades, an organization focused on the collective defense of its members. However, the nature of collective defense has changed as NATO responded to challenges that did not have such a priority in the Cold War era, such as instability caused by armed conflicts in the NATO periphery, international terrorism and WMD proliferation.
Hence if NATO has remained a collective defense organization, it does not mean that it is the same NATO as in the Cold War period. A major part of the Alliance activities at present take place in the area of consultation on security problems among member states (Article 4 of the Washington Treaty). An analysis of the adaptation process has shown that NATO has adopted others tasks, besides its traditional task, i.e. defending member states against aggression. The most important ones are creating a forum for cooperation in the security field with non-member states and participating in the stabilization of regions in crisis around the world.

Soon after the end of the Cold War, it established close cooperation with former enemies and founded a system of institutions for consultation on security problems (NACC, PfP, EAPC, PJC and NRC) and later also for preparing candidates for NATO membership (MAP). Transition countries used the institutions both for consultations and especially for preparations to obtain NATO membership. From the NATO perspective, this process cannot be regarded as a policy endeavoring to enforce its own position at the expense of Russia and confrontation with Russia. In the enlargement process, the North Atlantic Alliance did not give Russia the right of veto, yet on the other hand, it took into account Russian political stances, intensively consulted Russia on the entire problem, tried to dispel Russian fears and avoid the reawakening of enmity. Russia was involved in many new institutions that were a platform for cooperation. They include both the NACC, PfP, and especially the PJC and NRC. The intensity of cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation was directly dependent on Russia’s willingness to cooperate. By use of the preventive policy of holding a dialogue with Russia, the Alliance aimed to avoid a misunderstanding and forestall the reawakening of enmity. On the other hand, Central European and Baltic states tended to, with a various degree of intensity, perceive NATO as a security safeguard against the return of Russian imperial expansionism. On the whole, as a consequence of NATO enlargement, NATO has changed from a sub-regional security organization into an organization with a regional membership still also intensively cooperating with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area. In comparison with the Cold War, the political activities of NATO have grown considerably.

Despite many mistakes, NATO has very significantly contributed and still is contributing to the stabilization of crisis regions of today’s
world. Crisis management has become the main concern of Alliance activities over the past 25 years. Undoubtedly the greatest positive impact in comparison with the development before the involvement of the Alliance can be traced in the Balkans where NATO, in close cooperation with other relevant international institutions, has been engaged since the early 1990s. Before NATO entered the entire complex of conflicts, a more or less intensive war had been waged on the territory of former Yugoslavia. As opposed to that, it seems in 2014 that the republics of former Yugoslavia have been given from the international community – and also with the contribution of NATO – a second chance to stabilize themselves and aim towards future prosperity. The prospects of integration into Western structures, and within them also into NATO, more than likely helps the stabilization and transformation process. Out of all the problems in the Balkans, the most intricate is the Kosovo issue, still waiting to be solved despite the 2008 declaration of independence. UN SC resolution 1244 had not anticipated an independent Kosovo. NATO has been much less successful in Afghanistan. There are justifiable fears for what will happen after the withdrawal of a majority of Western forces planned for 2014.

A crucial aspect of NATO development after the termination of the Cold War is also the growing importance of this organization. Just as in the case of Hurricane Katrina and in the case of the earthquake in Pakistan and many other times, NATO has provided a very specific and hardly negligible aid to the victims of natural disasters (transport capacities, field hospitals, engineering capacities, water purification, etc.) Such a policy not only helps people in need, but it also makes it possible for non-member states to perceive the other than military dimensions of NATO, which contributes to the promotion of mutual trust.

In the military area, in accordance with the CFE Treaty and the need to obtain forces suitable for expeditionary operations, NATO has reduced the number of heavy military hardware deep below the maximal limits set by the treaty. This policy is related to the transformation of armies, the aim of which is to improve abilities to conduct military operations of crisis management. Despite the continual reform in the military area, there still remains a discrepancy between NATO’s ambitions and its military competences and the character of available forces and the needs of ongoing and planned military operations. The main problem is caused
both by small defense expenditures and the persisting duplications of
military capacities, and the pressure inherited from the Cold War period.

In the 1990s, NATO established close cooperation with other inter-
national security organizations, especially with the UN, European Union
and OSCE. As the most important, one can regard conducting peace-sup-
port military operations for the UN. The most significant practical re-
sult of the cooperation between the Alliance and the European Union
in the security area is peace-support military operations conducted by
the European Union with the assistance of NATO and using NATO as-
sets. It concerns military operations Concordia (Macedonia) and Althea
(Bosnia and Herzegovina). The cooperation of both organizations in the
military area was discussed during the entire 1990s. A crucial tool en-
abling the European Union to conduct various types of peace-support
operations is the agreement with NATO about using this organization's
operational capacities, generally known as Berlin Plus (2003), which is
based on the 1999 NATO Strategic Conception. However, the potential
of this platform is idle due to the Greece-Cyprus dispute and the lack of
willingness of the EU to proceed down the path of Turkey's integration
into this organization. Besides its traditional partners, the Alliance has
started, in accordance with its policy of expanding its activities also be-
yond the North Atlantic area, to engage also in Africa in supporting the
local regional security organizations.

After adopting the 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept, we can expect in
the near future a certain NATO reorientation back to collective defense
on the member states’ territory. The 2008 Russian invasion into Georgia
initiated this shift and the 2014 invasion into Ukraine may well accelerate
it. In spite of that, if we understand NATO as an organization endeav-
oring to protect and spread certain values, NATO will have to solve the
problem of which geographical framework it shall assert the preferred
values in. It does not concern only a potential membership of other Euro-
pean states that are interested in it, i.e. Georgia, Macedonia, and perhaps
also Bosnia. This problem is also connected to the question of potential
strengthening of cooperation with countries lying outside the traditional
geographical framework of NATO, yet holding the same or similar values
as NATO member states. This concerns especially Australia, New Zea-
land, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is not only about intensifying
cooperation with state actors. The broader geographical framework of
NATO also raises the question of intensifying cooperation with other regional non-European security organizations and, last but not least, also nongovernmental organizations.

Another important issue of the transatlantic debate on the future of the Alliance is NATO’s role in the changing world. In the entire Cold War period, NATO was an important forum for discussion on the security interests of Western European and North American countries and for conceiving a common security policy. Over the last decade, this role of NATO has diminished to a certain degree. As regards the United States, after the 1999 war in Yugoslavia, the stress on NATO as a military organization was reduced, as conducting military operations in cooperation with the allies causes numerous difficulties in achieving consensus and military planning, which are not reflected in increasing military capacities. The United States, due to the difficult search for a common political strategy with some European allies (especially with France and Red-Green Germany), the military weakness of European states and slightly different ideas about the best possible forms of ensuring one’s security, often negotiated *ad hoc* on the solution of a particular security problem and circumvented NATO as an organization in the latter years in the Bush administration period coalitions. On the other hand, the Obama administration has diverted from the European issues towards Asia directly among its priorities, which has led to a certain neglecting of the Alliance as a forum for consulting security issues.

The future of NATO is not predestined in any way. No decision has been made either about its end or its existence “for eternity”. The Alliance’s future will be decided by the everyday politics of its member states, which have similar yet not identical interests and hence must look for acceptable compromises every single day. The Alliance further remains above all a community of states sharing common values and a collective defense organization; at present especially against new security threats. Nevertheless, Russian expansionism in practice (Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014) shows the direction NATO may take in the following decade.
LITERATURE


Buechner, Gerold. 2002.“Not every country must be able to do everything – defense minister struck on NATO response force, the Defense budget and Iraq.” In: Berliner Zeitung.


Johnsen, W. 1995. NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College.


Lambeth, Benjamin S. 2001. NATO's Air War for Kosovo. A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica: RAND.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary. 2010. The Foreign Minister received members of the NATO Group of Experts, 4. 3. 2010.


The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn. 5 December 2011. Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to the Transformation Decade.


SUMMARY

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been going through a permanent adaptation process that has changed it beyond recognition. If the Alliance had wanted to survive the Warsaw Pact, it did not have any other choice. As regards the beginning of the permanent NATO adaptation process, it is possible to regard the adopting of the 1990 London declaration. Today’s shape of NATO differs from its form in the Cold War substantially. The Alliance’s tasks have been extended significantly, as well as its territorial range and the number of its members. Rob de Wijk points out that the successful adaptation of NATO to the new post-Cold-War realities is an unprecedented event because traditional military alliances were dissolved together with the expiration of the reason for their existence in the past. (Wijk 1998: 14–18).

However, one should pay attention to the fact that NATO has never been a merely military alliance based only on the idea of collective defense. According to Karl Deutsch, the Alliance has been an organization of states sharing common values, which makes war among members impossible. He calls this kind of alliances “security community”. (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler – Barnett 1998)

This paper aims to describe and analyze the main tendencies in the NATO transformation after the end of the Cold war and will proceed as follows. The second chapter will pay attention to the changes in the NATO strategic thinking. The third chapter will focus on the NATO enlargement followed by the fourth chapter dealing with the NATO-Russian relations. The fifth chapter is devoted to the NATO expeditionary operations and the sixth will provide a survey of the NATO military adaptation. The last chapter will summarize the main outcomes of the NATO adaptation after the end of the Cold War. As far as methodology is concerned, procedures typical of history science will be used in this paper.
Aalto, Palmi 34
Abass, Ademola 81
Ahtisaari, Martti 64, 65
Akerman, Ella 35
Albright, Madeleine 25
Alvin and Heidi Toffler 90
Annan, Kofi 61
Anrig, Christian F. 81
Antonesko, Oksana 32, 36
Asmus, Ronald D. 26, 27
Auerswald, David P. 72
Bagratuni, Mikayel 20
Bell, Robert G. 77
Bering, Helle 31
Biscop, Sven 21
Boesen, Henrik 15
Booth, Bradford 90
Borgensen, Berit Kaja 12
Borghard, Erica D. 77
Bush, George W. 18, 69, 86, 87, 106
Carpenter, Gallen 29
Claes, Willy 47, 52
Clark, Wesley 59
Clinton, Bill 22, 25–27, 86, 87
Cragg, Anthony 13
Deutsch, Karl 6, 25
Edmunds, Timothy 90
Flockhart, Trine 16
Forsberg, Tuomos 35
François, Isabelle 80
Gaddafí, Muammar 78–80, 82–85
Gaddis, John Lewis 26
Gheciu, Alexandra 84
Giegerich, Bastian 32, 36
Gilbert, Douglas M. 28, 31
Goldgeier, James 25
Gorbachev, Mikhail 39
Gorka, Sebestyén L. v. 89
Hallams, Ellen 97
Ham, Petr van 88
Harsch, Michael F. 49
Hedegaard, Niels Henrik 98
Hendrickson, Ryan C. 47
Herd, Graeme P. 35
Holbrooke, Richard 25, 56
Hunter, Robert E. 33
Hussein, Saddam 31, 86
Hyde-Price, Adrian 97
Ivanov, Ivan Dinev 45, 93
Jackson, Bruce P. 41
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo 98
Kamp, Karl-Heinz 21
Kaplan, Lawrence S. 85
Karabeshkin, Leonid A. 41
Karzai, Hamid 74, 76
Katzman, Kenneth 86
Kay, Sean 24, 31
Kennan, George F. 26
Kestnbaum, Meyer 90
Khudoley, Konstantin 40
Ki-moon, Ban 64, 81
Kissinger, Henry 23, 102
Koschutt, Simon 18
Kramer, Mark 39
Kupchan, Charles 18
Kydd, Andrew 25, 29

Laden, Bin 69, 76
Lake, Anthony 25
Lanko, Dimitri 40
Larsen, Lindbo 15

Makarychev, Andrey 42
Mandelbaum, Michael 59
McGwire, Michael 39
McChrystal, Stanley A. 73
Medvedev, Dmitry 42
Mendeloff, David 37
Mersheimer, John 6, 101
Meyer, Kent R. 29
Milošević, Slobodan 38, 55
Moskov, Charles 90

Nelson, Daniel N. 24
Norris, John 38

Obama, Barack 16, 36, 44, 72–74, 106

Pischedda, Costantino 77
Pospíšil, Ivo 79
Putin, Vladimir 31, 35

Quintana, Elizabeth 84

Rasmussen, Andreas Fogh 36
Reiter, Dan 6

Robertson, George 85, 94
Rogozin, Dmitry 36
Rupp, Richard E. 102
Ryan, Michael 52

Saideman, Stephen M. 72
Segal, David R. 90
Sewell, Jamil A. 28, 31
Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop 30
Schnaubelt, Christopher M. 97
Schreer, Benjamin 97
Silander, Daniel 63
Simon, Jeffrey 90
Spechler, Dina R. 41

Thaci, Hashim 55
Toffler, Heidi 90
Trajkovski, Boris 67, 68
Tudjman, Franjo 29

Valášek, Tomáš 12
Varvick, Johannes 49
Vondra, Alexandr 10

Waltz, Kenneth N. 6, 26, 101
Webber, Mark 21
Weller, Marc 57
Wij, Rob de 6
Williams, John Allen 90
Wittmann, Klaus 18, 98
Woerner, Manfred 47

Yanukovych, Viktor 30
Yeltsin, Boris 27
This paper aims to describe and analyze the main tendencies in the NATO transformation after the end of the Cold war and will proceed as follows. The second chapter will pay attention to the changes in the NATO strategic thinking. The third chapter will focus on the NATO enlargement followed by the fourth chapter dealing with the NATO-Russian relations. The fifth chapter is devoted to the NATO expeditionary operations and the sixth will provide a survey of the NATO military adaptation. The last chapter will summarize the main outcomes of the NATO adaptation after the end of the Cold War. As far as methodology is concerned, procedures typical of history science is used in this paper.

This book was published within the project
Innovation of Bachelor Study Programmes for Better Employability,
CZ.1.07/2.2.00/28.0238.