UKRAINIAN CRISIS – REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CZECHIA

Ukrajinská krize – regionální analýza migrace v kontextu České republiky

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Annotation

The aim of this article is to summarize and compare the development of migration related to the Ukrainian crisis in the context of previous migration crises and migration theories. Czechia, although not directly adjacent to Ukraine, is one of the major destination countries and was the target of the first wave of war migrants. However, refugee flows and destinations must be monitored in a broader context. We assume that the migration wave was largely conditioned by the existing Ukrainian minority in Czechia. Using comparison, multicorrelation analysis and data mining, the paper compares available data, related not only to the war in Ukraine but also to previous migrations and foreign workers' movement of foreigners for work. Based on comparative analyzes, contexts are sought that could clarify the targeting of migrants and relate them to historical economic and social conditions. Research shows that there is a strong push-pull effect, given the composition of foreigners in Czechia and the number of Ukrainians employed.

Key words

migration, refugees, war, Ukraine, Czech Republic

Anotace

Cílem článku je shrnout a komparovat vývoj migrace související s Ukrajinskou krizí v kontextu předchozích migračních krizí a migračních teorií. Česká Republika, i když přímo nesousedí s Ukrajinou, patří k významným cílovým krajinám a byla cílem první vlny válečných migrantů. Uprchlické toky a cílové destinace je však nutné sledovat v širším kontextu. Vycházíme z předpokladu, že migrační vlna byla z vysoké míry podmíněna existující ukrajinskou menšinou v ČR. Příspěvek pomocí metod komparace, multikorelační analýzy a datamainingu srovnává dostupná data, související nejen s válkou v Ukrajině, ale i s dřívějšími migracemi a pohybem cizinců za prací. Na základě srovnávacích analýz jsou hledány souvislosti, které by mohly objasnit cílení migrantů a dát je do souvislosti s historickými ekonomicko sociálními podmínkami. Z výzkumu je patrné, že existuje silný Push – Pull efekt, daný složením cizinců v ČR a počtem zaměstnaných Ukrajinců.

Klíčová slova

migrace, uprchlíci, válka, Ukrajina, Česká republika

1. Introduction

The new millennium is marked by persecution, violence, human rights abuses, and wars, which have spurred the growth of forcibly displaced people around the world. This worrying trend continued in 2022. Migratory pressures to Europe were characterized by buffer countries and subsequent natural or forced redistribution, mainly to the western part of the European Union. There are many studies that deal with migration tools, the redistribution of migrants, or the needs of migrants. Berger (2022) mentions the motivation in the European Union (EU) efforts to manage migration in the context of migration and development. Maccanico (2021) draws attention to the fact that the EU's migration policy model is designed to be inherently expansive and closely linked to the EU institutions and the governments of the Member States. The migration theories of Ravenstein (1889), who formulated the so-called laws of migration at the end of the nineteenth century, can be used as a starting point. Every migratory movement is the result of two basic influences, pressure and tension (stimuli of different kinds). The current dominant push factor is the Ukrainian war conflict (in the issues context of the analyzed in the current paper). The dominant so-called pull factor is the offer of the socioeconomic environment and labor market of the target country. However, if we think more deeply about push-pull factors, we can identify primary and secondary factors. The primary factor in the Ukrainian migration wave is undoubtedly the war, and the goal is to reach a safe destination. However, a closer examination of the structure of refugees and resource areas reveals other factors (relocation behind family members, relocation of capital and political influence etc.), which may be masked by the primary push factor. These secondary factors can be partially identified through pull-side analysis, where other contexts can be observed by comparing the environment and migration flows. These secondary factors can be traced, for example, to Lubej (2016). The paper does not aim at theoretical analysis and analysis of forms of migration, rather it is a practical comparison.

2. Starting points, methods and data

She pointed out the risks of the explosion of the Ukrainian-Russian problem in her study by Poiarkov (2022), which also draws attention to the possible risks of "security" migration. Semiv and Lalakulich (2017) also cite specific manifestations and trends of labor resources and migration systems in Ukraine as possible secondary factors. The findings of the Urbanski (2022) study indicated that pull factors have a greater influence on migration in similar situations as compared to the push factors. For this article, a research question was asked whether it is possible to identify secondary, sufficiently intensive push-pull migration factors and whether these factors in the migration flow to Czechia may be a high proportion of Ukrainian employees supported by previous Ukrainian immigrants. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 was expressed: The current wave of Ukrainian migration in Czechia is more due to the socio-economic form of migration, resulting from the possibility to travel for family members – breadwinners, than to the actual war migration. This research question and hypothesis are based on social, societal, and family ties, mentioned e.g., Denov et.al (2019), and was supported by the age and gender composition of refugees (see figures 7, 8). The hypothesis was expressed based on the identification of the wave of Ukrainian war migrants to Czechia, which did not correspond to the previous refugee waves in the nature of the target destination. The methods of comparison, correlation analysis, and data mining were mainly used for the analyzes. Data mining data from the Czech Statistical Office, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the CR, Eurostat, data.europa.eu, UNHCR and other existing databases were used for data mining.

3. Related migrations

From a pragmatic point of view, the current migration from Ukraine caused by the war is not the largest war or humanitarian migration in recent times; according to Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2021), the value of the factor "People displaced across borders by country of origin (mid-2021)" in the Syrian Arab Republic 6748000 people (see Table 1), UNHCR estimates that all forced displacement exceeded 84 million people in 2021 (by mid-2021).

Tab. 1: People displaced across borders by country of origin (mid -2021)

Country	People
Syrian Arab Republic	6748000
Republic Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4131000
Afghanistan	2610000
South Sudan	2278000
Myanmar	1128000

Source: own processing, data UNHCR (2021).

In contrast to previous migration, it is possible to identify in particular the fact that in the current Ukrainian conflict, the majority of refugees go to European countries and that the support system for refugees is at a quantitatively and qualitatively different level, including the legislative framework. The EU announced on March 4 that Ukrainian citizens (who, pre-war, didn't need a visa to stay up to 90 days in the EU territory) would be entitled to the newly enacted temporary protection directive – permitting them to live, work, and study in EU member states for up to three years (UNHCR 2021). To get refugee status, they need to be Ukrainian citizens or people legally living in Ukraine, such as foreign students. Family members of Ukrainian nationals with permanent residence in the destination country will also be granted status. Especially thanks to this support and the systematically created positive „for the migration" environment, the Ukrainian migration wave was very intense and incomparable in time with other refugee crises. Table 2 shows the numbers of migrants in the largest conflicts, it is clear that in terms of the number of refugees, the Ukrainian crisis is not above standard, including the percentage of the affected population.

Tab. 2: The 10 largest refugee crises in recent times, March 25, 2022

Event	source	Peak number of refugees	% of population
Syria civil war 2011-today	Syria	6878950	35,10%
Afganistan civil wars 1989-1996	Afganistan	6339095	51,80%
Afganistan Soviet war 1976-1989	Afganistan	5643989	47,90%
Venezuelan economicc/political Turmoil 2014-today	Venezuela	5083357	15,10%
Taliban regime 1996-2001	Afganistan	3840545	18,30%
Russion invasion 2022	Ukraine	3725806	9,10%
Taliban insurgency 2002-2021	Afganistan	3091800	10,70%
Derg regime 1974-1991	Ethiopia	2567998	7,30%
South Sudanese civil war 2013-2020	South Sudan	2446340	19,50%
U.S. occupation and insurgency 2003-2012	Iraq	2336914	8,20%

Source: own processing, data Desilver (2021).

If we compare the target destinations of the current migration waves (according to UNHCR, see Table 3), it is clear that the current migration waves were specific to two factors. First, the destinations were buffer destinations (e.g. Turkey), or these destinations provided an above-standard environment, especially economic (e.g. Germany, economic migrants).

Tab. 3: People displaced across borders by host country (mid -2021)

Country	Turkey	Colombia	Uganda	Pakistan	Germany	Sudan
People	3696800	1743900	1475300	1438500	1235200	1068400

Source: own processing, data UNHCR (2021).

If we focus on migration in the European area (there is no Turkey, for example) over the past 15 years (the interval is given by the availability of Eurostat data), Germany has absorbed the most migrants. Table 4 shows the overall, average and maximum values of migrants, the states are limited to the top10 group (in Table 4 the gray color indicates values higher than the median, other values are higher than the average). The order of the countries was determined by means of a multicriteria evaluation determined by the average order according to the values of total, avg and max. Czechia is added to the table for comparison. The "cluster" column indicates whether countries with a similar course have been identified for the respective state. The value "n" (no) in the "cluster" column indicates that no country with a similar course has been identified. The value "y / x" (yes / x) indicates that the country has a group (the value „x" indicates the number of these groups) with a similar course. The table clearly shows that developed economies are a priority for migrants, only Italy and Greece is a buffer destination. In the context of Czechia, it is clear that it is not one of the dominant destinations in the European area, in general. Figure 2 also shows that the development of Czechia migration correlates with Ireland and is characterized by relatively low and evenly distributed migration, the wave in 2015 is not dominant and migration reaches a maximum compared to priority destinations in 2018, 2019.

Tab. 4: Migration in Europe – 2008-2021(top state)

GEO	total	p1	average	p2	max	p3	p	cluster
Germany	2674840	1	191060	1	745160	1	1,00	y/1
France	1153915	2	82423	2	151070	4	2,67	y/3
Italy	725905	3	51850	3	128850	5	3,67	n
Sweden	585375	4	41813	4	162450	3	3,67	y/1
Spain	419165	5	29940	6	117800	6	5,67	y/2
Greece	418745	6	29910	7	77275	8	7,00	y/1
UK	374655	7	34060	5	46055	9	7,00	n
Austria	351985	8	25142	8	88160	7	7,67	y/3
Hungary	286730	11	20481	11	177135	2	8,00	y/2
Belgium	339545	9	24253	9	44665	11	9,67	n
Czechia	17590	24	1256	25	1915	26	25	y/1
avg	263067		19033		60515			
median	82185		5870		15240			

Source: own processing, data Eurostat (2022)

The similarity of the course was evaluated for individual countries and years by means of multicorrelation analysis, Figure 1 shows a part of the table with correlation coefficients, blue indicates a positive correlation, and red a negative one. Based on the correlation, groups of countries were identified in which migration courses were similar (correlation coefficient $R > 0.85$).

Fig. 1: R - coefficient - correlation analysis

	Germany	France	Italy	Sweden	Spain	Greece	Austria	Belgium	Netherlands	Hungary	Switzerland	Norway	Poland	Bulgaria	Denmark	Finland	Cyprus	Romania	Ireland	Malta	Luxembourg	Slovenia	Czechia	Portugal	Lithuania	Iceland	Slovakia	Latvia	Estonia	Liechtenstein
Germany	1,00	0,23	0,78	0,37	0,02	0,30	0,70	0,16	0,55	0,53	0,55	0,06	0,33	0,88	0,44	0,48	-0,05	0,00	0,12	-0,04	0,51	0,07	0,35	0,51	-0,04	0,60	-0,60	0,44	0,77	0,02
France	0,23	1,00	0,33	-0,21	0,87	0,85	0,03	0,01	0,37	-0,12	-0,31	-0,57	-0,52	0,09	-0,24	-0,02	0,83	0,50	0,54	0,43	0,58	0,84	0,63	0,88	0,33	0,78	-0,72	0,36	0,27	-0,03
Italy	0,78	0,33	1,00	0,21	0,07	0,47	0,52	-0,01	0,44	0,33	0,35	-0,11	0,02	0,62	0,26	0,32	0,01	0,15	0,24	0,62	0,11	0,46	0,66	-0,01	0,74	-0,69	0,56	0,84	0,12
Sweden	0,37	-0,21	0,21	1,00	-0,31	-0,38	0,80	0,73	0,73	0,96	0,83	0,82	0,46	0,62	0,97	0,88	-0,41	-0,35	-0,03	-0,16	0,25	-0,42	-0,01	-0,15	-0,25	-0,24	-0,08	0,16	0,64	0,09
Spain	0,02	0,87	0,07	-0,31	1,00	0,77	-0,11	-0,10	0,21	-0,21	-0,51	-0,58	-0,66	-0,09	-0,38	-0,11	0,89	0,58	0,51	0,57	0,33	0,89	0,57	0,75	0,28	0,64	-0,54	0,17	0,01	-0,19
Greece	0,30	0,85	0,47	-0,38	0,77	1,00	-0,13	-0,28	0,15	-0,25	-0,39	-0,62	-0,57	-0,03	-0,40	-0,12	0,66	0,28	0,65	0,52	0,51	0,64	0,74	0,85	0,00	0,84	-0,65	0,07	0,23	0,03
Austria	0,70	0,03	0,52	0,80	-0,11	-0,13	1,00	0,63	0,86	0,91	0,76	0,58	0,42	0,88	0,77	0,89	-0,10	0,06	0,12	-0,17	0,40	-0,05	0,24	0,24	0,14	0,22	-0,29	0,50	0,76	0,18
Belgium	0,16	0,01	-0,01	0,73	-0,10	-0,28	0,63	1,00	0,67	0,71	0,68	0,60	0,21	0,34	0,66	0,74	-0,10	-0,19	0,04	-0,12	0,46	-0,16	-0,08	-0,07	0,02	-0,21	-0,05	0,24	0,39	0,18
Netherlands	0,55	0,37	0,44	0,73	0,21	0,15	0,86	0,67	1,00	0,83	0,52	0,45	0,08	0,70	0,70	0,84	0,23	0,06	0,46	0,02	0,46	0,20	0,53	0,40	0,16	0,29	-0,41	0,43	0,69	0,21

Source: own processing

Subsequently, migration courses were sought. Figure 2 shows the waveforms in the correlating states. The picture shows that the correlating countries have courses indicating migration peaks (maxima) in 2015 with a slight shift in Germany to 2016. The partial graphs in Figure 2 gradually show the groups of countries in which the maxima are being moved to a later period (2017, 2019, 2021). On the basis of these extremes, it is then possible to identify the majority migration groups, according to the current migration crises.

*Fig. 2: Extrem migration analysis – cluster states*

Source: own processing, data Eurostat (2021).

Fig. 3: Extrem migration analysis – single states

Source: own processing, data Eurostat (2021).

Fig. 4: Extrem migration analysis – distribution of extremes

Source: own processing, data Eurostat (2021).

Figure 3 shows states that do not have the same course as other states. It is easy to see that in the European area, the migration waves were distributed with a relatively even distribution of maxima. Therefore, due to the even distribution, the direction of the linear line interspersed with the graph was identified, indicating the distribution of migration in the individual states in the given interval and the year with the maximum migration value (Figure 4).

Figures 2 and 4 show that Czechia has a maximum in 2019 and a growing directive, due to the prewar Ukrainian migration (maximum 2015, Figure 5) the pre-war Ukrainian wave was not dominant for Czechia.

4. Migration related to Ukraine

In connection with Ukrainian pre-war migration, we do not deal deeply enough with migration to some countries from the point of view of migration (Russia, Turkey etc.), because we finally compare the movement of Ukrainian population in the context of Czechia and these countries are not a priority for these analyzes.

If we look at migration and the numbers of Ukrainian citizens in other countries in the previous period, it is clear that this is a long-term process related to the overall political and economic environment of Ukraine. One of the important factors that serves as a selection criterion for refugee destinations is the presence of family or friends. Many Ukrainians are targeted at destinations where there are large Ukrainian diasporas and are therefore likely to be primary destinations. The statistics provided by these entities vary considerably, with many residence permits being short-lived, which can make it difficult to estimate how many people are in the country at any given time. Table 4 shows the number of citizens of Ukrainian nationality living in selected countries (the criterion is the number of people over 20,000) according to the migration monitoring at the University of Oxford (Walsh and Sumption, 2022). It is obvious that even though the Ukrainian pre-war migration crisis was not dominant for Czechia, Czechia is in second place in the number of foreigners of Ukrainian nationality.

Tab. 4: Number of Ukrainian citizens in selected countries

| Destination	Italy	Czechia	Germany	Spain	Portugal	Hungary	Lithuania	UK	France
Ukrainas resident	235907	162701	134989	107234	28629	27380	26989	25000	20285

Source: own processing, data Walsch and Sumption (2022)

If we continue to monitor the development of migration from Ukraine according to asylum seekers, it is clear that until 2021 the share of migrants in the comparison of registered foreigners of Ukrainian nationality in the dominant countries was around 10% (Italy 7.7%, Germany 11.9%, Spain 14.6%, in Czechia this share was less than 3% (2.89%, 4705 persons out of 162701), on the contrary in France this share was more than 50% (57.7%, 11665 persons out of 20285). Czechia in terms of the number of Ukrainian citizens (Table 4) shows the Czech specifics in the area of Ukrainian migration. It is clear that Czechia is characterized by a high proportion of legally living Ukrainians, who are more of a legal labor force than migrants in Czechia. migration in EU countries before 2022, then in Table 5 we see selected European countries in which the share of asylum seekers in relation to the population was higher than 0.01 (columns total, avg, and max – gray color – values higher than the median). is calculated on the basis of order (GEO_1, p) according to the total number of persons per s period in a given state, the average number of persons in a given state and the maximum number in one year in a given state (p1, p2, p3). Subsequently, the values (total, avg, max) were related to the population of the respective state (p4, p5, p6) and the order p_new was determined.

Tab. 5: Ukrainian asylum applicants in selected countries

GEO_1	total	avg	max	p1	p2	p3	p4	p5	p6	p	GEO_2	p_new	GEO_3	p_tot
Italy	18120	1294	4665	1	1	1	5	5	2	1,0	Italy	2,5	Sweden	0,07
Germany	16050	1146	4660	2	2	2	8	8	7	2,0	Spain	3,3	Czechia	0,04
Spain	15665	1119	3345	3	3	3	4	4	3	3,0	Sweden	3,5	Austria	0,03
France	11665	833	2350	4	4	4	9	9	12	4,0	Germany	4,8	Spain	0,03
Poland	8310	594	2295	5	5	5	6	6	5	5,0	Czechia	5,0	Italy	0,03
Sweden	7130	509	1415	6	6	6	1	1	1	6,0	Poland	5,3	Poland	0,02
Czechia	4705	336	695	7	7	8	2	2	4	7,3	Austria	6,3	Belgium	0,02
Netherlands	2 350	168	760	9	9	7	10	10	10	8,3	France	7,0	Germany	0,02
Austria	3 035	217	505	8	8	10	3	3	6	8,7	Belgium	8,7	France	0,02

Source: own processing, data Walsch and Sumption (2022).

The table also shows the order related only to the total number of asylum seekers and the population of the state, GEO_3. The table shows that Czechia was in the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine above the average, in 7th place (only in the maximum number in the year with the highest value Czechia was below the average), but due to the population it is already in 5th place in the evaluation of all three values (GEO_2), when comparing the total number of asylum seekers to the population, it is then in 2nd place behind Sweden. Therefore, it is clear (Table 4, Table 5) that of the European countries, Czechia has a specific position in the number of Ukrainian minority, especially in terms of per capita (Fig. 5). This figure also shows the long-term, evenly distributed number of Ukrainian asylum seekers.

Fig. 5: Ukraine asylum applicants

Source: own processing, data Walsch and Sumption (2022)

5. Migration related to the war in Ukraine

Figures and statistics on current numbers of migrants vary in the databases, focus on neighboring destinations, and do not accept the subsequent redistribution of migrants from transit destinations to final destinations. According to BBC (2022) the UN says that as of 29 March, four million people have left Ukraine: Poland has taken in 2,336,799 refugees, Romania 608,936 refugees, Moldova 387,151 refugees, Hungary 364,804 refugees, Russia 350,632 refugees, Slovakia 281,172 refugees and Belarus 10,902 refugees. Some people have travelled from Moldova into Romania and so are included in both countries' totals. According to ODP (2022) of 3.4. In 2022, this number even reached 4,215,047 people. In The Council of The European Union document „Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022, establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection „ states that "Depending on the development of the conflict, the Union is likely to face, on the basis of current estimates, a very high number of displaced persons, potentially between 2.5 and 6.5 million as a result of armed conflict, of which 1.2 up to 3.2 million will be applicants for international protection. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that in the worst case, up to 4 million people could potentially flee Ukraine. ". The document states that, as of 1 March 2022, more than 650,000 displaced people from Ukraine came to the Union via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. If we observe the cumulative increase of Ukrainian migrants (ODP, 2022) data, we can currently trace an almost linear character, which would show that the situation is no longer a shock wave related to the war in Ukraine but rather a logistical stable system providing targeted transport based on certain requirements and logistics options. Figure 6 shows, from left to right, the cumulative function for the entire duration of the war, for the last 14 days and for the last week (registered period). The linear trend equation is shown in dashed lines in the middle and right for comparison.

Fig. 6: Number of migrations - cumulative

*Source: own processing, data OPD (2022).*

6. Migration in Czechia related to the war in Ukraine

As already mentioned, Czechia has a relatively high proportion of foreigners of Ukrainian nationality. Figure 7 shows the share of Ukrainian citizens in the total number of foreigners in Czechia, a long-term high share, and a significant increase in 2022 (as of April 9, 2020) is evident, as well as an increase in the number of women (left graph). Czechia is also specific for its long-term high proportion of foreigners with permanent residence (graph in the middle). On the right, there is a long-term (current) higher proportion of men and an increase in Ukrainian migrants, especially after 2019. It is also clear that so far (April 2022) there has been no increase in the number of permanent Ukrainians in Czechia. According to statistics from the Ministry of the Interior, the current number of migrants (as of April 9, 2022) in Czechia is 160000, mostly in the 18-65 age group (Figure 8 on the left), the majority (3/4) being women. The age group of 7-15 years prevailed among men during March 2022, at present there was an increase in the group of 18-65 years (second graph from the left). The women are in the priority age group 18-65 (third graph from the left). The last graph shows the share of this age group in the total number of migrants.

*Fig. 7: Number of migrations*

Source: own processing, data MVCR (2022)

Fig. 8: Number of War Migrations

Source: own processing, data MVCR (2022)

Figure 8 shows that these are currently migrants represented mainly by women, preferably aged 18-65 and 3-15 years, ie, mainly families (mothers) with children. Subsequently, Figure 9 shows the current distribution of Ukrainian citizens. The first map from the left shows the share of foreigners in individual regions (in%), the second map shows the percentage of Ukrainians out of the number of foreigners. The third map shows the deployment of current war migrants as of April 9, 2022. The fourth map shows the distribution of Ukrainian citizens with permanent residence or registered at the social office. For greater clarity, the third and fourth maps are at the level of districts, which were compared proportionally in order (fewer people – lower index). It is clear that the current dislocation of war migrants is in regions with a high proportion of permanent residents of Ukraine. This distribution is related more to the real number of Ukrainians than to the percentage of Ukrainians relative to foreigners.

Fig. 9: Distribution of Ukrainians in regions (districts) in Czechia

Source: own processing, MPO (2022)

7. Discussion and conclusion

Although the conclusions show a tendency for war migrants to be deployed in areas with a high proportion of Ukrainian residents, the hypothesis cannot be confirmed or refuted at present. To accept or refute the hypothesis, a longer time series is needed from which it will be possible to unambiguously confirm whether the destination is random ("allocated accommodation" followed by a change of location over time) or targeted. In the longer term, it will also be necessary to include the return factor for migrants to Ukraine, after the elimination of individual forms of support, and to compare it with the return factor after the escalation of the conflict. It is clear that the situation in Czechia confirms the fact that the push factor is a war conflict, but the pull effect is independent of the push factor given by the long-term approach to the minority and the socioeconomic expectations of migrants. There is no denying that migrants go to destinations with a high proportion of co-workers. Nor can it be denied that much of the current migration wave has benefited from open migration policies and economic benefits for environmental change. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that asylum seekers rely on various strategies, including both legitimate and illegal practices, to secure asylum in the EU (Lewkowicz, 2021). However, in the future, it is necessary not only to create favorable conditions for asylum seekers, but to establish functioning integration and resettlement policies and programs and to promote a social climate that does not discriminate (positively or negatively) refugees and rejects xenophobia and racism. In the current divided society, support cannot be implemented only on the basis of marketing actions (promotion, explanation of positives, targeted hiding of negatives etc.) but on the basis of real measures supporting the real standard of living of residents. Under the pretext (often a false or misleading fact), asylum seekers cannot be preferred to residents. In this sense, it is necessary to respect the existing legislation and activate instruments for the protection of residents, for example, in the form of rejection, respectively. return of unwanted (criminal etc.) persons. For example, Slominski and Trauner (2021) point to a number of non-binding EU documents for European administrations. The current wave of migration and its direction also points to the need to present the real facts related to the integration of asylum seekers truthfully and without distortion, to present them in such a way that neither party feels like an inferior social group.

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